Iraq: contentious, controversial and explosive

The Iraqi transitional road to democracy has been difficult and historic, but nothing compared with the future implications of the time-bombs that litter the path ahead.

Five years on from the liberation of Iraq, the US occupation of the Mesopotamian plains remains as contentious, controversial and explosive as ever.

While Iraq has dominated international media almost daily, hopes for a swift and successful transition to democracy have been all but dashed. Rampant insurgency, a stagnant economy and bitter squabbling among the Iraqi mosaic has effectively placed Iraq in a worse position in respect to its stability and economy than it was under Saddam.

Battling a deadly Sunni-inspired insurgency and the forces of al-Qaida has left the US coalition in a quagmire. Daily suicide bombings, attacks by sectarian militias, high-profile assassinations and mass unemployment took a dramatic toll that was only later partially bridged by a controversial US surge strategy.

However, short-term gains and initiatives have all too often over-looked the long-term implications in Iraq. Ultimately no plan is effective if the will of the factions, plagued by common mistrust and animosity, is lacking the appetite to make the state a success.

Post-2003 euphoria

The short-lived euphoria that followed the Iraqi liberation from decades of brutal totalitarianism was quickly submerged by mass looting and anarchy. A number of high-profile blunders, such as the disarmament of the entire army and rapid de-Baathification by the Coalitional Provisional Authority only added fuel to a raging fire.

Although clearly none of the weapons of mass destruction were found as had been suggested by US intelligence, the majority of the Iraqi population, particularly Kurds and Shiites who suffered repression and lived under the shadows of Baathist nationalism, were grateful that in their eyes the real weapon of mass destruction was dethroned and later dramatically hanged.

As the problems compounded, the stance of the US administration slowly turned from attaining victory to achieving “success”. What was hoped to be a short-term operation has seemingly lengthened month by month. Within weeks, Iraq became the battle-ground for Islamic terrorism, fuelled by a disenchanted Sunni population who after decades of supremacy were now affectively playing second-fiddle to the Kurds and their Shiite arch-nemesis.

History making at the polls

The transitional road to democracy was rocky but nevertheless historic. In 2005, the population defied terrorists’ threats and went to the polls in their millions. Elections for an unprecedented Iraqi constitution in October 2005 were followed closely by the first elections for an elected Iraqi National Assembly.

However, although pictures of Iraqis with voting cards served as great marketing boost for the US, mass boycotting by the Sunni population only undermined the process.

While the constitution was approved by the required threshold, the Sunnis have demanded ever since that before any talk of political reconciliation, the constitution must be amended, a greater Sunni representation must be afforded in government and the Iraqi security forces be overhauled to dilute the virtual Shiite hegemony.

This is easier said than done in Iraq, with factions reluctant to loosen their hard-fought gains, just because Sunnis “regretted” their stance at the polls. Under strong US pressure, mindful that without enticing Sunnis into the political fold terrorists and insurgents may never be undermined, the Iraqi government has attempted to reach out to the Sunnis. Loosening of the de-Baathification laws and a promise to establish a constitutional review committee have provided limited dividends.

The wait for true democracy

The elections in Iraq were as predictable as they were historic. Voting patterns only highlighted the fragmented nature of the society. Most political parties representing each group united to maximise gains at the elections.

The elections only served as a political census and by no means revealed great insight into the policies and vision of an elected Iraqi government.

Iraqi negotiations were often bogged-down by protracted negotiations, missed deadlines and bitter squabbling. Frequently at a stalemate, it was only with feverish US pressure that the political process did not grind to a halt altogether.

However, all too often for the sake of progress, the real issues were swept under the political rug and remained unresolved.

Years later, the highly contentious issues of sharing of natural resources, the extent of federalism and the role of religion are still gathering dust in the Iraqi political chambers.

A year after the initial Iraqi hydro-carbon law was passed, Kurds, Shiites and Sunnis remain as divided as ever. With the second highest oil reserves in the world, oil revenues are key for the revitalisation of an Iraqi economy shattered by UN sanctions against Saddam and then by a lack of stability and investment.

Growing discord between the Kurdistan Regional Government and Baghdad

It is difficult to assess the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in the same breath as the rest of Iraq. While violence and sectarian bloodshed has engulfed much of Iraq, the Kurds, flourishing under de facto independence have been quietly building a model state with growing prominence, economic prosperity and strategic importance.

Impatiently waiting for what they perceive as a failing state, the Kurds have since sought a unilateral path while successfully marketing the Kurdistan region as “the other Iraq”.

However, the rapid gains and transformation of their region into a credible economic hub has come at a price. After the Kurds approved their own oil laws, international oil companies flocked to the region. A number of exploration contracts were awarded but were followed by a strong rebuke from Baghdad insisting that any deal signed without the consent of the central government was “illegal”.

Increasing allegations of over-reaching by Kurds, have added to a growing rift between regional powers, the legal implications of the current constitution and the allocation of the Iraqi national budget.

Clearly, the Shiites in particular can ill-afford to alienate their Kurdish partners, and with the much-maligned and shaky Iraqi government spear-headed by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki under intense spotlight, the Kurds will feel confident to continue developing their region unchallenged.

The recent tensions between Arbil and Baghdad only served as a reminder that key issues between both sides have only been papered over by the greater difficulties in the rest of Iraq.

The Kurds are suspicious as ever that Baghdad does not want to see a successful Kurdish entity developing. The lack of a decisive response from Baghdad over the recent Turkish invasion of Kurdistan only added to their frustration.

Ominously the issue of oil-rich Kirkuk, side-stepped for many years by Baghdad, is coming to the boil and another delay in the referendum, original scheduled for the end of 2007, may call the Kurds' bluff and induce a deadly conflict.

The US surge

Under the controversial US surge strategy initiated in early 2007, violence has steadily declined and security has dramatically improved. However, while the US has been credited with a successful strategy, there have been a number of key factors in the turn around that may yet produce a future minefield that Iraq could well do without.

Increasingly alienated by heavy handed al-Qaida tactics, chronic lack of employment and years of fighting, the Sunnis turned against the insurgents. The advent and expansion of Sahwa or Sunni Awakening Councils, armed and funded by the US, were a success story that at least on paper paved the way for greater national reconciliation.

The benefit of driving out al-Qaida cells from their neighbourhood is a bigger slice of the political cake, the inauguration of the Sunni militias into the Iraqi security forces and ultimately an overhaul of the constitution.

The other factor in the decline in violence is the ceasefire by influential cleric Moqtada al-Sadr who enjoys great support in the Shiite-dominated south. However, recent well documented violence in Basra may yet mean that the 60,000 strong Mehdi Army may enter back into the fray.

As important as Sunni support remains, the key for the US is containing al-Sadr. In 2006, sectarian hit squads on the back of high-profile bombings of key shrines threatened to send the country to the brink of civil war.

The trillion-dollar war?

By most conservative estimates, the war in Iraq has already cost the United States more than US$400 billion, however according to a Nobel Prize-wining analyst the war, at the current rate of expenditure, could astonishingly surpass three trillion dollars by 2017.

With the number of American casualties in Iraq now past the critical 4,000 mark, coupled with the huge cost of combating a war with no end in sight, the growing disillusionment of the US public is easy to see. The good name of the US has been severely tarnished abroad and public opinion at home has turned slowly from anguish to anger.

The US mid-term election of 2006 for control of Congress was by far dominated by the Iraq war with the Democrats making significant gains.

Both Democratic presidential candidates have called for a comprehensive troop withdrawal. Hillary Clinton promised to undertake serious troop reduction "in the first 60 days" of her administration, with her rival, Barack Obama, pledging to see combat troops "out within 16 months".

Reconciliation in Iraq

Although, the US and Iraqi governments have tried in vain to embed a national unity government by appeasing Sunnis and promising political accommodation, the long-term strength of the devastating insurgency remains to be seen.

The defeat of al-Qaida in many quarters has now resulted in a “mosaic war” across Iraq with a collection of battles rather than any concentrated fronts. However, promise of reconciliation by Baghdad must be finally delivered if Iraq is to stand any chance of capitalising on the few positives gains.

An all-encompassing concord remains intangible. Just recently, Shiite and Sunni blocs in parliament boycotted a conference on Iraqi reconciliation. True reconciliation may yet be a dream while in the interim the US may have to suffer the repercussions of a lack of an Iraqi appetite for urgency to unity and compromise.

One can not understate the rivalry and sectarian passion that underpins the current gulf between the factions in Iraq. Sectarian animosity lasting hundreds of years can not be healed in a matter of years. At a minimum, many military strategists reference a 10-year average for insurgencies, with an expected drop in strength and recruitment after a decade.

Clearly, any hasty US withdrawal now will only create a vacuum that will severely undermine the hard-fought gains. The fear of the US administration is therefore understandable. According to US President George W. Bush, who insists that the war launched five years ago was right, any chaos leftover from Iraq would mean “… the terrorist movement could emerge emboldened with new recruits ... new resources ... and an even greater determination to dominate the region and harm America".

The importance of lasting the course was echoed by US Vice President Dick Cheney, who claimed that premature withdrawal would mean that Iraq would remain a place of "stagnation, resentment and violence ready for export".

The proxy war that has been fought by the Iranian government to undermine US efforts and constant meddling by Iraqi neighbours has only served to increase tension. The majority Shiite population has a natural warming with the Shiite theocracy in Iran. However, conversely, the US remains bitter enemies of the Iranian state and Sunni nationalists strongly despise any Iranian influence on Iraq.

The correlations that surround the artificial state of Iraq are simply vast. While the US may have inherited the problem, in reality the problem was sown with the creation of Iraq as a country long ago.

Factions within a faction

The belief that the key to political reconciliation is bringing Sunni, Kurds and Shiites together is misleading. Such is Iraq that there are many divisions within each faction itself.

There is increasingly violence between Sunnis that remain loyal to al-Qaida and those who are pro-American. Divisions within the Shiite majority are much graver however. Fighting between Shiite government forces and Shiite militias have already cost hundreds of lives in recent weeks and threaten upheaval in the Shiite south.

Bridging the gap between moderates and extremists in each bloc is proving a tough measure.

Conclusion

Ominously, Iraq now boasts three major groups each armed to the teeth by their respective militias.

Political progress has been far-too slow and has been affectively undermined by long-term uncertainties. Indeed, there may still be a bloody civil war, with or without US presence in the country.

Ultimately the surge has failed. It was always going to be a temporary measure to allow breathing space for greater national reconciliation. With no agreement on oil, disputes about federalism and provincial powers, and the issue of Kirkuk intensifying by the day, the Iraqi government has yet again failed to meet most of its critical benchmarks.

Five years on, the US is far from a successful exit strategy. It looks more and more likely that President Bush will hand over the headache and the time-bombs to the next US president.

The strategy of the next US president has naturally come under intense spotlight. Whether they continue their dream of a democratic and prosperous Iraq and battle on, or they withdraw all together, Iraq will continue to dominate the international fold for decades to come.