Biden’s South-East Asia doctrine: repairing damage and neglect from the Obama and Trump years

China is not the only concern for the US. Overtly, Myanmar is of concern, while covertly the situation within Thailand is silently noted: both issues where the US has no control over any outcomes. Nurturing the Vietnam relationship, and building a strong Singapore, appears to be of prime importance. The US lacks any significant relationship with Cambodia, and a spasmodic relationship with the Philippines. The US aims to build further on its relationship with Indonesia. The US hopes Malaysian concerns over Chinese incursions within its EEZ will lead to more cooperation within the South China Sea. Finally, the effectiveness of ASEAN would be of concern.

This is all within a backdrop of the Covid-19 pandemic, where the public health resources of South-East Asian nations are thoroughly stressed.

The Biden Doctrine

Austin outlined the US belief on the importance of partnerships within the region. This is particularly important in the areas of (1) the Covid-19 pandemic, (2) climate change, (3) coercion from rising powers, (4) the North Korean nuclear arsenal, and (5) the Myanmar crisis.

Austin emphasised that the US is not expecting South-East Asian nations to be forced to make a choice between the US and China. The US intends to seek areas of mutual interest in bilateral and multilateral relations, rather than pursuing US interests. The US is seeking a stable and constructive relationship with China, within the South China Sea.

The US also sees a central role for ASEAN to play within the region, pointing to its diplomatic efforts on Myanmar. Austin's vision is that ASEAN can complement the QUAD, where members are domiciled on the peripheries of the region. Although, what specific initiatives the US would like to see were left out. Austin just espoused the theme common security as underpinning cooperation.

Austin outlines three phases in the doctrine, (1) Covid recovery, where the US has already donated 40 million vaccine doses to Indonesia, Laos, the Philippines, Malaysia, Thailand, and Vietnam, (2) investing in cooperative partnerships across the region, through diplomacy and military means to create integrated deterrence through coordination and networking, and (3) developing a long-term coming together in partnership within a rules-based order in the region.

Austin mentions areas within the rules-based order that will have priority; freedom of the sea, human rights, and the resolution of community disputes. Although, the US affirms its desire for a stronger relationship with China, it disputes the nine-dash line.

Kurt Campbell clearly states that these initiatives must be tested and fine tuned as they are developed and implemented. This strategy will be challenging and a learning experience for the administration.

This is a clear departure from Trump's unilateral and transactional nature of his administration's approach to the region. The Biden administration has indicated a strong aspiration to be involved within the region. However, it has so far left out any return to the Trans-Pacific Partnership, the centrepiece of the Obama pivot to Asia, that Trump cancelled upon coming to office.

The doctrine recognizes US weaknesses with some South-East Asian state relationships, and with a realization that any security initiatives within the region, cannot be US responsibility alone. Thus, a cooperative approach is sought, underpinning the need to engage China's influence with both soft power and a military presence.

This acknowledges an era where China is recognized as a major influence within the region, with two-prong-diplomacy. In a good cop-bad cop routine, US secretary of state Antony Blinken dressed down China at their summit in Alaska on issues of human rights, regional aggressiveness, economic malpractices, while the US is working on issues of mutual interest with China, with US climate envoy John Kerry's visit to China to discuss common ground for the upcoming UN climate change summit in Glasgow, later in the year.