Southern Thailand’s phantom insurgency

Organizations such as the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) are not directly controlling events on the ground. Fluid cells of activists, some of whom are not formal members of any peak revolutionary organizations, carry out acts independently, according to their own agendas, rather than according to any grand plan.

The BRN is over-claiming influence on the ground. They are now more a political, rather than a direct-action organization, although individual members and associates may be involved. This leaves violent acts totally unexplained, where speculation can only assign cause and blame, rather than any real evidence.

The Thai Fourth Army is bogged down with a mass commitment of personnel, infrastructure, and real estate. Many roadside bases and vehicles are relics of past failed strategies, rather than for any active anti-insurgency operations. The greatest problem for the troops on the ground is that they can’t see or identify the insurgents. They don’t hide along the roadways and jungle as sighted daily troop operations appear to suggest. They are at home, carrying on normal lives, perhaps jumping into their double lives on occasion.

Thus real interaction between the army and any insurgents is all but nonexistent. The insurgents have modified Sun Tzu’s classic, The Art of War, from hit and run to hit and hide, a classic Malay strategy. The army lacks any real human intelligence (Humint) capability to infiltrate these cells at the grass roots.

The deep south for the army is a budget sinkhole, or from their point of view a budget opportunity, a region where all sorts of new equipment and ideas are brought and tested. It is also the training ground for officers looking to bolster their service records for fast-track promotions. Most officers and enlisted personnel do their tour of duty without seeing any action.

The various actors within this phantom insurgency find the current situation very convenient. The reputation of the BRN is enhanced by the impact of incidents, which they don’t directly control. This reputation of the BRN also assists the army justify its operations and budgets. Army presence in the south, then goes on to give a justification for the continuation of the BRN and its activities. This is the viscous circle of the deep south.

However, in reality, the communities within the deep south are now indifferent to this insurgency. Communities are looking for normality; socially, culturally, and economically. The deep south now distinctly doesn’t resemble the rest of Thailand, where Malays stand proud of their cultural freedom.

There will continue to be incidents. Negotiations between the Thai Government and the artificial umbrella group representing the insurgents, MARA Patani, will continue. Hopes will rise and fall through the media, where reports will talk of promise and later report talks are going nowhere, like an ongoing drama. The real underlying reasons behand the struggle have not even been broached as yet, nor have areas of common agreement. The fundamental flaw in any discussions is that the communities within the deep south are not represented. That’s the dilemma of the phantom insurgency, with the real stakeholders omitted from the process.

The deep south is waiting for an economic boom to happen, after the borders are re-opened with Malaysia. Malay tourists from Malaysia will flood new tourist attractions and towns. Malay entrepreneurs will expand their markets into Malaysia and Indonesia with a host of new products they are producing. Fields of rich oil and gas reserves are waiting to be exploited within the next generation, ensuring economic growth and prosperity. The big question is, whether this phantom insurgency will just disappear, or will the vested interests on both sides keep things going?