Making the Senate work efficiently is an imperative for the 21st century

An efficient and hard-working Senate, scrutinising, criticising and examining legislation and keeping the government accountable, is a great institutional safeguard for all Australians.

But when the Senate crosses the line and acts as an obstructional competitor to the democratically elected government of the day, frustrating or substantially delaying urgently required responses to national problems or insisting on its own policy, it is no longer a House of Review but a House of Obstruction.

Critics of Senate reform will point to the fact that most legislation gets through in the end. This obscures the importance of bills that are obstructed or delayed.

The reforms that have been implemented have only been achieved with the support of minor parties or independents.

Minority parties and independents are an essential part of a democracy where power is well distributed throughout the institutions of government.

Where it becomes untenable however, is when no compromise can be reached, other than complete capitulation by the government.

It is not in Australia's interests to have what we have now, two competing governments with almost equal and opposite mandates to govern.

These problems were recognised at Federation.

What Federation required in achieving a union between the existing colonial states (the Original States) was a geographical distribution of votes in the Senate as a balance to the greater numerical representation in the House of Representatives of the most populous states.

Whatever the founders may have intended, it is clear that the Senate does not function as a states' House.

Any expectation that Senators would vote in a block according to the state they represent is unsupportable, not the least because of the emergence of rigid party discipline which presently controls all but four independent Senators and also because in a Federal democracy the Senate does not represent states' rights but rather represents electors voting by their states.

There is no escaping the theoretical difficulties in reconciling federalism and responsible cabinet government in the institutional design.

While responsible government equates to having and retaining the confidence of the House of Representatives, does this also extend to the Senate?

If the impact of proportional representation in 1948 was to be a landmark in our electoral history the increase in the number of Senators from 10 to 12 in 1983 and the resultant reduction in the quota from 16.66 to 14.28 per cent, has been described as a "watershed".

These two changes have ensured that neither of the major parties will have a working majority in the Senate for the foreseeable future.

What makes it difficult for government is when urgently needed reforms in the national interest are opposed outright.

Should you not think this matters, let me mention the nature, scope and policy rationale of just one of the deadlocked measures currently banked up in the Senate.

Currently, over half of Commonwealth government spending is directed to health and aged care. This means that the government has to make some long-term, structural policy choices now so that we can enjoy the same living standards in 2040.

The cost of the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme or PBS is growing rapidly as medical science improves and we have a greater ability to treat more conditions. The government's reforms will ensure that the PBS is sustainable into the future and that new, highly effective but expensive medicines can continue to be listed under the scheme.

They are opposed by Labor and the minor parties in the Senate and the bill to effect the changes is a double-dissolution trigger in the current term of government.

In my view the inescapable conclusion is that the Senate routinely opposes the Howard government reform agenda. The nation needs these reforms to remain competitive and productive and to provide capacity to meet the needs of its greying population.

The two proposals that have gained recent currency recognise that there needs to be a more efficient and practical way to resolve deadlocks.

Australia is the only country in the world that has double-dissolution provisions to resolve legislative deadlocks.

Arguments about a mandate to govern do not produce an outcome. What is needed is a rethink about Senate powers - how to retain it as an important check on the government of the day without bringing the reform agenda to a standstill.

The reform model initially proposed by the Prime Minister is based on the recommendations of a Joint Parliamentary Committee on Constitutional Reform as long ago as 1959. Once the Senate has twice rejected legislation it could be put to a joint sitting of both Houses without the requirement for a double dissolution.

The second model (the Lavarch model) in essence suggests that after a general election if the government is returned, bills twice rejected in the previous Parliament would be put to a joint sitting.

Variations on this model canvass mechanisms to alert voters to what bills could be put to a joint sitting in particular that the government would nominate the deadlocked bills in advance of the election.

It is difficult to argue against this model. It has the advantage that, if returned, the government's mandate to have those bills passed is unequivocal. The policies, indeed the precise legislation, will be on display for all to see and discuss during the election. If the nation does not approve, it is their democratic right to toss the government out.

We all know that the prospect of Senate reform involving a referendum is bleak. I call on the Labor Party to negotiate in good faith with the Coalition on reform of the Senate.