War against Hezbollah was a political disaster

The implications of the war for outsiders cut several ways. Washington gained some strategic leverage over Iran, but its refusal to call for an unconditional ceasefire during the fighting enflamed anti-American sentiments throughout the Arab world, weakened the Lebanese political coalition it was hoping to strengthen, and embarrassed Arab governments that followed its lead by criticising Hezbollah early in the campaign.

The war also set in motion congressional pressure on the administration to take punitive actions against the Lebanese Government so long as Hezbollah is represented in the cabinet. All in all, the ability of the White House to decisively impact Lebanon's political trajectory has declined.

For Iran, the returns are mixed. The expanded UNIFIL deployment and Lebanon's new political map will discourage Iranian efforts to incite anti-Israeli violence from Lebanese soil as Tehran comes under greater international pressure to halt its suspected nuclear weapons program.

Although Iran derived some diplomatic leverage from the crisis, the conventional wisdom that Iran has emerged stronger "by showing the world that it is capable of wreaking havoc through its support of the Hezbollah militants" must be qualified.

The resolve of the United States and Western European governments to derail Iran's nuclear program has not been substantially weakened by the crisis. However, the presence of European troops in close proximity to Hezbollah guerrillas may discourage support for American military action against Iran down the road.

Burgeoning anti-Israeli hostility in the Arab world obviously has its benefits for Iran, although the devastation of Lebanon during the war might temper its ability to translate pervasive anti-Israeli hostility among Palestinians into organised acts of violence.

The recent outpouring of popular support for Hezbollah across the region may discourage some Arab governments from overtly supporting American policy on Iran, but it has hardly mitigated their desire to see the end of Iran's nuclear ambitions.

The pacification of south Lebanon is a significant strategic setback for Assad, and his blunder of having provided Hezbollah with substantial quantities of imported Russian anti-tank missiles and other weapons will likely complicate, if not preclude, future Syrian arms purchases from Moscow.

However, he derived considerable political capital from the war - both because Hezbollah is very popular among Syria's youth and because its increased stature in Lebanon may blunt the March 14 coalition's hostility to Syria.

It has also given him a new diplomatic lease on life, as a host of dignitaries in the American and Israeli foreign policy establishments have come out in favour of negotiations with Syria.