War against Hezbollah was a political disaster

The Bush administration's refusal to call for an unconditional cease-fire seemed to validate one of Nasrallah's favorite admonitions - that the American support was fickle and ultimately subordinate to Washington's alliance with Israel and pursuit of regional vendettas.

The war undermined the March 14 coalition's political leverage not only by revealing its modest placement in the scale of American priorities and boosting public support for Hezbollah, but also by exposing the Lebanese Government's total lack of planning for the contingency of a full-blown Israeli air campaign.

Implications

While Israel achieved significant strategic and diplomatic goals, the war against Hezbollah was a political disaster for Olmert. A strong public consensus in Israel that the military campaign was a failure is partly because of popular misconceptions about what was realistically possible to achieve.

Israel might have dealt Hezbollah a more serious blow had a different military strategy been followed, but there was never a viable prospect of preventing its regeneration once the dust settled.

Although Hezbollah suffered strategic and diplomatic setbacks, the war dramatically boosted its domestic and regional popular appeal, while eroding the strength of its adversaries.

This gives Nasrallah considerably more political leverage than he had before the war, effectively shelving any prospect of pressuring Hezbollah to disarm in advance of far-reaching political and economic reforms.

Prime Minister Fouad Siniora ordered a Lebanese military deployment of unprecedented strength south of the Litani River, but only after reaching an agreement with Nasrallah whereby Hezbollah keeps its weapons out of public view and the army pretends it doesn't see them.

Much like the governing coalition's 2005 electoral pact with Hezbollah, this "don't look, don't tell" arrangement was billed as a compromise, but largely preserved the status quo ante.

Since there is no way for Israel to disrupt re-supply of Hezbollah short of bombing all trucking traffic from Syria into Lebanon, the arms embargo imposed by Resolution 1701 cannot be enforced without the earnest co-operation of either the Lebanese or Syrian governments.

The sudden proliferation of calls for negotiations with Assad among American pundits is a pretty good indicator of how dimly prospects for the former are viewed in Washington.

Nevertheless, the outcome of the war may prove to be a stable equilibrium. Though he has essentially defused internal pressure to disarm, Nasrallah appears to recognise that violent provocation of Israel will be far too risky for the foreseeable future.