The return of the Sandinistas: a complicated affair

Although far from perfect and certainly with corrupt elements among their ranks, the FSLN until the mid-1980s managed significant reforms before Nicaragua’s economy began to crumble due to the effects of war.

Before that, in mid-1979, Ortega met with then-President Jimmy Carter and asked for aid which in the FSLN’s view, was seen as only fair considering Washington’s strong support for the Somoza dictatorship. When Carter rejected the Sandinistas’ offer, they then knocked on Europe’s door which was also closed off.

Eventually, after Washington successfully pressured others not to sell weapons to Managua so as to fight the Contras (Somoza’s ex-national guard and kept almost completely operational due to US support), Moscow stepped into the arena, although nowhere near the scale it was involved with Cuba.

The fact that the Sandinistas only nationalised properties owned by Somocistas, adopted a mixed economy, held open elections in 1984 that were recognised by the United Nations, had many practising Catholics in government and with rare exceptions, allowed an open press to operate during conditions of war did little to persuade the Reagan administration that the FSLN might be a distinct political animal.

When the World Court in 1986 ordered the US to pay Nicaragua $US17 billion for its “unlawful use of force” - acts which ranged from covertly mining harbours in Managua to supplying mines in lunchboxes with Mickey Mouse stickers so as to attract children - the US, as expected, ignored the decision. After more tampering in the 1990 elections, Washington and the Contras were triumphant over a country of impoverished peasants - roughly 30,000 which were left dead due to the war.

Countless efforts by activists and church groups inside the US and throughout the world undoubtedly contributed to avoiding an even greater calamity - for example a full-scale US invasion of Nicaragua.

Over the past 16 years, an end to the FSLN’s rule saw a conclusion to the brutal war and small economic growth, yet it also meant a huge roll back for the policies aimed at reducing poverty established during the 1980s. When Ortega lost in 1990 to Violeta Chamorro, most Nicaraguans still supported them although the continuation of war was simply seen as unfeasible, in particular after the US invaded Panama in 1989 under the guise of capturing a former-friend turned foe drug dealer named General Manuel Noriega.

Today the grinding poverty of Nicaragua is seen as unacceptable by the population as per capita income is less than what it was in 1960. Over 800,000 children do not belong to any educational institution and 1.5 million people suffer from hunger every day in a country which has approximately 87 doctors for every 100,000 people. Figures on unemployment, which are often poorly established, are at 11 per cent with a further 36 per cent underemployed.

Unfortunately, Ortega’s victory brings with it other problems as his record outside of office has been rather questionable. Repeatedly accused of corruption, Ortega in 1996 made a pact with the then-President Arnoldo Alemán - a hard-right conservative - in which they divided up control of the country’s basic institutions, legislated immunity for themselves from prosecution for any criminal charges and granted themselves seats in the National Assembly for life.

In 1998 Ortega used his parliamentary immunity after sexual assault charges were brought forward by his stepdaughter. By 2003 Alemán’s immunity was revoked as he was sentenced to 20 years' prison for embezzling over US$100 million in public funds - later to be served from his private ranch due to “health problems”.

Working backroom deals with men such as Alemán and holding on to the party’s leadership at the expense of younger blood, Ortega’s reputation has been tarnished. Many leading Sandinistas such as Sergio Ramirez and Herty Lewites have withdrawn from the FSLN and set up the Sandinista Renewal Movement (MRS).

Despite the situation with Ortega, most Nicaraguans have opted for a return of the FSLN. Even advertisements with footage of corpses from the Contra war in the 1980s, warning people what might happen if they voted the “wrong” way, were not enough to obtain a victory for Montealegre highlighting that Nicaraguans have not taken a light decision.

In future, even with strong support for the FSLN from Venezuela, Cuba, Bolivia and perhaps Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay, the lessons of history teach us that Washington will certainly be looking to impose its dictates over Managua. This time, however, the Sandinistas will not be alone in the Americas and hence why they would be wise not to squander their new opportunities on rhetoric in contrast to actions.

Likewise, intelligent business leaders will be aware that they can negotiate with the FSLN as they do with Chávez. As for the Washington consensus, if the FSLN are serious about addressing Nicaragua’s severe poverty, at some point they will have to break away from it. If this occurs, one should expect the international press to paint the FSLN in black and white terms despite their diversity of colours.