Contesting the constructs of national identity and values

What creeds should Australians hold in common?

In recent months, a debate has exploded about the nature of “Australian values”, and of the need to promote said values in our teaching of history and to demand an appreciation of Australian values, history and culture as a precondition of citizenship.

Prime Minister John Howard has forcefully communicated a view that multiculturalism can be taken too far, that there is a need for a clear national narrative and a clear sense of national identity. In particular, Howard’s insistence on an English proficiency test for migrants as a condition of citizenship would be certain to discriminate against older migrants.

While Kim Beazley has shadowed John Howard closely in this debate, the broad Left has been overwhelmingly critical of the Howard view of multiculturalism and of what Howard is now calling a commitment to a policy of
"integrationism”.

What are we to make of this debate and what are we to make of the call to more clearly define “Australian values”?

While some who identify as being from the Left have responded cynically to calls for a clearer definition of “Australian values”, supposing a desire among conservative politicians for a return to an imagined monocultural past, or to force a restrictive political template on a pluralist public sphere, there is much at stake in the battle to contest Australian identity and perceived national values.

Generally speaking, Australia enjoys a liberal democratic political culture: a culture where freedom of speech, assembly and association are more or less taken for granted, as are political representation and a division of powers that prevents the arbitrary exercise of authority.

It is, indeed, ironic that those on the conservative side of politics, who have historically done much to undermine Australia’s social liberal settlement - for example the attempt to ban the Communist Party; Bjelke-Petersen’s ban on street demonstrations; and more recently, the introduction of punitive labour and sedition laws - appear now to be most ardent in advocating the recognition and enforcement of liberal principles.

The hypocrisy of the conservatives in this regard, though, ought not to lead us to dismiss the value of liberal tradition, institutions and culture. Many on the Left today are dismissive of Western tradition and of the Enlightenment principles that historically have guided the development of Western liberalism. Living in a country where liberal rights are generally taken for granted, it is easy to forget that there was once a time, in the Western world, where the arbitrary power of what Sieyes called the Second and First Estates - the monarchy, aristocracy and clergy - stifled political and philosophical discourse.

More recently, brutal and arbitrary power has been exercised in its Stalinist and fascist guises, as well as in neo-liberal and US client regimes in Central and South America (for example, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Pinochet’s Chile), to devastating effect. If anything, the rapid and generally unexpected rise of fascism in the heart of Europe in the 20th century shows the potential fragility of those liberal rights and institutions we take for granted.

The point of this, essentially, is that liberal rights and institutions, as well as an open, participatory and pluralist public sphere, are things worth defending and extending. What is more, there is nothing inherently wrong with educating our youth in the values and principles that underpin the liberal tradition: in particular the pluralism and culture of open inquiry that ought to ensure the representation of diverse and opposing perspectives in our public sphere, and in the curricula of our educational institutions.

If anything, providing for a critical appreciation of history, politics, ethics and society throughout the public sphere and throughout our educational institutions, in the spirit of fearless and open inquiry, is a duty that government owes its citizens and a duty that, collectively, we have to ourselves and our children.

The commitment of the conservatives to these principles is dubious at best, as evidenced by Howard’s attempt to promote a more “celebratory”, as opposed to thematic and critical, approach to the teaching of history in our schools. Nevertheless, there are some values we ought to hold in common: and while, in a pluralist society, a single template is not enforced, there is nothing wrong with promoting civil liberties and the liberal and democratic values that form the basis of our political settlement.

Such values, however, should be explored and interrogated critically rather than simply being celebrated. And in a spirit of pluralism and open inquiry, these values should be considered - again in the public sphere and in our educational institutions - from all manner of ideological perspectives. (Perspectives which, incidentally, the conservatives seek to silence through their purely “celebratory” approach to history and civics education.) Enlightenment presumes open, free and unfettered critical inquiry. And this spirit, as much as the tradition of liberalism, ought to form the foundation of what we construct as “Australian values”.

Ultimately, our perceptions of “national identity” and “national values” are constructs which are constantly contested in the public sphere. Importantly, given what seems to be an inherent longing for collective identity and “belonging”, the construction of “national identity” is not terrain that should be left vacated by progressives, even if the extremes of nationalist chauvinism and militarism are ruthlessly criticised and deconstructed.

The very idea of egalitarianism has been perverted by the conservatives into an ideology of supposed “classlessness” and the shallow, shameless and opportunistic exploitation of the language of “mateship” for political gain.

Against this the progressives, those identifying broadly with the Left of the political spectrum, need to contest these ideas and categories, including the very idea of “nation” itself.

Therefore, while we should struggle for the recognition of Australia’s liberal political and social foundations, liberal rights discourse ought not to be the final word in the battle to contest “Australian values”. In particular, a liberal socialist approach would emphasise the traditions of solidarity and struggle of the Australian working class and seek to make this narrative of Australian labour the nation’s own.

While civil liberties should be defended resolutely, including the right to withdraw labour and authoritarian and terrorist approaches to socialism rejected, a rights discourse ought to be promoted which embraces so-called “social rights”: the right to quality shelter and nutrition; the right to employment, dignity of labour and a fair living wage; the right to fair and family-sensitive working conditions including, controversially, community-based childcare and a 35-hour week; the right to quality public health care, aged care and education; the right to legal representation; the right to an open, inclusive and participatory public sphere, including the provision of public space for civic purposes; the right to a minimum standard of living and a guaranteed minimum income; the right to equal opportunity and non-discrimination; the right to equal access to quality public services and infrastructure in fields as diverse as communications, banking, roads, public transport and so on.

For progressives, for democratic socialists and social liberals, the struggle to ingrain “social rights” deep in Australia’s political and popular culture and psyche as “Australian values”, in law and in tradition, is every bit as important as the struggle for civil liberties. While this agenda is inherently mutable, as relative living standards and social needs change with shifts of technology and economic fortune, the spirit of social liberal and social democratic reform ought be constant.

What creeds, then, should Australians hold in common?

As argued, liberal traditions, laws and values ought to form a foundation that ensures the liberties of all, as well as the continued development of an open and critical public sphere of debate and inquiry. Such liberal values are considered entrenched; but in a climate of fear - where the spectre of terrorism provides the rationale for a curtailment of civil liberties - their continued ascendancy is far from certain.

“Social rights”, however, are far from entrenched and what we have in the way of “social rights” are being systematically uprooted by the conservatives, while Labor offers little in the way of a coherent and principled alternative to the neo-liberal hegemony.

The construction of a national identity, centred on “social rights” and also embracing principles of good “global citizenship”, solidarity and internationalism, meanwhile will be a difficult and trying struggle that will involve reclaiming “Australian egalitarianism” and a shattering of the myth of Australian “classlessness”.

While migrants experiencing difficulties in English ought not to suffer sanction and stigmatisation or be refused citizenship, there are also elements of the integrationist agenda (as opposed to the assimilationist agenda that Howard likes to call integrationist), that should not be summarily dismissed.

Specifically, the success of an open and participatory public sphere of critical inquiry and debate presumes shared bonds of communication. As a minimum condition of communication, therefore, it is fair to suppose English should be taught in all our schools. At least this is not controversial. Integration, as opposed to assimilation, does not assume a single template of national culture and identity, but rather can imply the building of common bonds of communication and respect for liberties that provide the foundation for a pluralist and multicultural society.

While pluralism and diversity ought to be celebrated, this does not imply that “anything goes”. “Difference” should not be an end in itself. The existence of pluralism, here, supposes that “anything does not go”, i.e., that the right to pluralism of identity, political conviction, faith, expression are all supported by the nurturing of liberal assumptions in law, culture and tradition.

We must still make ethical judgments between what is right and wrong - including the need for an open, participatory and pluralist public sphere - and this needs to find reflection in law.

Rather than rejecting the very idea of “Australian values”, we should all be contributing to a conversation on this most sensitive of issues in the hope that the consequence will be the protection and advancement of the liberal and social rights that we all ought to enjoy: but not take for granted.