Going nuclear – not a politically failsafe strategy

The Dutton federal Coalition's announcement to move Australia to nuclear energy has immediately defaulted to a political rather than policy debate with an inevitable pile on by the government, various interests and experts including even his own party in Queensland.

The result are claims and counterclaims on costs, timeframes, and environmental safety, leaving the public confused, decision makers divided and the policy process suspended.

Making precipitous announcements on such politically sensitive issues and where evidence is marginalised and so contested as to be meaningless seems how we do policy in Australia these days.

No wonder reform has stagnated and our productivity has stalled.

Once, when faced with an emerging controversial issue where there were competing views, governments appointed an independent, expert, public inquiry to clarify the facts, weigh the evidence, hear all arguments and make recommendations. Such inquiries educated citizens and decision makers alike.

Of course, the Productivity Commission has performed similar tasks, but its underlying principles are under attack by trade unions and recently its remit has been narrowed, diminishing its capabilities and perceived independence.

While an arm's length public inquiry is needed, it is worth noting we have been here before with the 2006 Taskforce Review on Uranium Mining, Processing and Nuclear Energy. Appointed by the Howard government to "undertake an objective, scientific and comprehensive review of uranium mining, processing and the contribution of nuclear energy in Australia in the long term", it ticked all the boxes for an independent review. It members were expert, its processes public, its methodologies rigorous, and all was overseen by the Chief Scientist's Expert Panel of eminent scientists.

The Taskforce assessed hundreds of submissions and employed reputable consultants and university research bodies to supplement its research. It made site visits to USA, Canada, UK, France, South Korea, Sweden, Belgium, Hungary including to where nuclear power plant accidents had occurred like Three Mile Island (USA) and Chernobyl (Ukraine).

Further, the Taskforce framed its recommendations in the context of the "scientific consensus" on climate change and the need to "contain and reduce greenhouse gas emissions". No head in the sand here.

Although the Taskforce concluded nuclear energy was a viable option and could be operational within ten years under an "accelerated program", it did not adopt a take it or leave it stance like many expert bodies.

It understood the practical difficulties of moving to nuclear power given "current legal and regulatory impediments", the need for "some form of government support", waste management issues, and the importance of upgrading workforce skills. It acknowledged nuclear power was a "difficult issue for many Australians" and thus any step in that direction was necessarily a "social decision".

Because the Taskforce reported in the last year of the ebbing Howard government it was caught in the cross-fire of partisan electoral politics. The Howard government had left the issue too late.