Cancelled Richardson review a better option to assess Bondi security

The chairwoman of the Royal Commission into Antisemitism and Social Cohesion, Virginia Bell, has not disappointed in presenting an interim report on the date that was originally given to the Dennis Richardson review of the adequacy of security arrangements following the Bondi Beach massacre.

But as Bell herself predicted in her public statements on February 24, after the Richardson non-statutory review was folded into the royal commission process with all its attendant formalities and legal framework, there would consequently "be delays in obtaining and assessing … the adequacy of security arrangements".

In his subsequent withdrawal from the royal commission, Richardson predicted the interim report due on April 30 would necessarily be vaguer and be more limited than his.

The interim report confirms both these predictions.

Of the report's 14 recommendations, one pertains to the NSW Police concerning greater attention to "other high-risk Jewish festivals"; five are not detailed but are "contained in the confidential interim report". Indeed, seven of the 10 publicly released chapters have large parts "contained in the confidential report".

While understandable given the nature of the issue, it partly undermines the public efficacy of the whole royal commission process – an open public inquiry is what was wanted.

Also, in Prime Minister Anthony Albanese's rush to accept all recommendations pertaining to the Commonwealth, it is hard to know exactly what he is agreeing to, since so many are confidential. As recommendations 3, 4, 5, and 6 concern the Australia-New Zealand Counter-Terrorism Committee, discussion with the New Zealand government would be necessary. Similarly, given the multiple security agencies and departments in Australia, and let's not forget the states that are part of this exercise, they would also need to be consulted. Has that all been done within a few hours?

While governments under political pressure will be tempted to agree immediately to all of a royal commission's recommendations to be seen to be "doing something", this can amount to "doing nothing" effectively. Good policy process of reviewing and thinking is sacrificed on the altar of short-term politics.

Moreover, as the interim report itself notes, its findings so far have been based only on the different agencies' documentation and not until hearings occur and issues and views are tested will a more accurate assessment be possible.

Further, it is worth noting the circumspect way many of the 14 recommendations are framed. The words "should apply", "should consider" or "should prioritise" abound in those recommendations that are not in the confidential basket. Such language gives governments wriggle room to modify or to marginalise proposals. More direct language, such as "strongly recommends", makes it harder for governments to fudge recommendations.

Lastly, the recommendations that have been made public are largely of an administrative type or more about "policy maintenance" than real policy action and change.

For instance, do we really need a royal commission to tell the NSW Police, as in recommendation 1, that they should now review its treatment of other types of Jewish events? Or that the Commonwealth "consider" upgrading its counter-terrorism co-ordinator (recommendation 2)? More pertinent might have been why, in these times, this had not already been done?