War is a dying business

Russia's failure to secure a quick victory in Ukraine is another reminder that war is a dying business. It just does not pay. Very rarely have recent wars achieved the successes their initiators had planned.

Part of the explanation is that the nature of warfare has again changed.

Over the millennia there have been occasions when success could come from attack; other times when it comes from defence.

Trends in warfare form a pendulum moving between offence and defence.

For example, French knights in the Middle Ages were a formidable fighting force. But then Welsh archers with their long bows were recruited into the English army. They could bring down knights, who were not agile when forced off their horses. The knights were captured and then ransomed back to their serfs to pay for their freedom.

Leaping ahead to the 19^th century, the emphasis was on offensive operations led by cavalry regiments.

World War I (1914-18) saw the pendulum swing back to defence and the use of trench warfare. World War II (1939-45) saw the pendulum swing back to offensive operations, such as the use of the tank in "blitzkrieg" attacks and aerial bombardment, culminating in the attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

Since 1945 the pendulum has swung back to defence. In particular, guerrilla fighters have been difficult to defeat. A guerrilla group fighting on their own terrain, with high morale, and with the support of the local population are almost impossible to defeat.

Guerrillas and other defensive operations have defeated both superpowers. Indeed, Russia is now doing so badly in Ukraine that it no longer deserves the title of "superpower". 40 million Ukrainians are beating 140 million Russians.

Ukraine is putting up more resistance than Putin expected. This is not a rerun of Russia's Crimean operation in 2014, when the west led by President Obama did nothing to resist the Russian take over in Crimea and other parts of eastern Ukraine.

The Ukrainian resistance this time has galvanised the international community. It has been Ukraine's spirited defence that has obliged the international community (minus China and India, which are running with own pro-Russian agendas) to force the international community to avoid a rerun of 2014.

Putin has been stunned by the international community's unified reaction to the Ukraine invasion. Even if Putin were to be shot today by one of his bodyguards, it will take years for Russia to be accepted back into the international community.

Additionally, Putin has given fresh vigour to NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization). This was created in 1949 "to keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down". It had been largely dormant since its victory over the USSR in 1991 and the end of the Cold War: mission accomplished.

NATO had spent the last three decades as an answer in search of a problem. Three years ago, President Macron of France said that NATO was "brain dead". Suddenly all of this has changed.

Ukraine's spirited defence has inspired much of the world.

Meanwhile, Russia is conducting operations in an era of "transparent warfare". Mobile phones are mobile cameras uploading news reports immediately to a global audience; all of Russia's failings are being publicised globally.

The pendulum of warfare has also affected the US.

The USSR was beaten by Afghan guerrillas 1979-89 (much as they had beaten British forces in earlier eras).

Now a new generation of Afghans has beaten the US as well.

The US had no clear war strategy 2001-21. Some saw the invasion as a war against al-Qaida (which had begun in 1997 with bin Laden's declaration of war on the US). The US was also trapped in a civil war between various Afghan tribes (Taliban are Pathans, for example, with kin across the UK-created border [Durand Line] in Pakistan); there are also feuding Tajiks, Uzbeks and Hazari minorities. Afghanistan is a pre-modern state (with little sense of "national" identity). Americans and their allies did not understand the country.

Meanwhile there was also a regional war: a struggle between India and Pakistan for regional dominance. China is now also a player (especially given the US$3 trillion worth of Afghani raw materials and the access south eventually to the Indian Ocean).

The US also took on other agendas: such as education of girls, eradication of poppy, and the provision of infrastructure. These were all worthwhile ventures, but they clouded the military vision. The US didn't know for sure what it was trying to achieve.

The US defeat in Afghanistan – its longest war – needs to be seen in the wider context of the pendulum of warfare. Despite Hollywood movies with their glamour and drama, the US has in fact had an appalling war record since 1945. Hollywood has provided a wrong image of the US.

The US post-1945 US has had only a limited list of victories: 1983 invasion of Grenada, 1989 invasion of Panama and arrest of Manuel Noriega (1934-2017), liberation of Kuwait (1990-1), and the Kosovo War (1998-9).

They were all "conventional" operations. Korea (1950-3) was a "draw". The defeats were all in the guerrilla conflicts, such as Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan.

The US is not short of money for defence: total military expenditure for the world is US$1,981bn. Of that the US spend US$778bn (39 per cent of total and easily #1). China is a long way behind at # 2 at US$252bn.

But money alone does not guarantee victory. You cannot simply buy victory in an era of defensive warfare.

High morale, a clear sense of military direction, and plenty of scope for local military initiative are all key factors.

Ukraine is demonstrating this on a daily basis. Russian soldiers don't know what hit them. They were told they would be welcomed as liberators. Others were told they would only be going on a military exercise. The lies have damaged their morale.

Meanwhile Ukrainian morale is high. The Ukrainian leader is now an international hero (and potentially a Time magazine "person of the year"). The Russians are already trying to redefine what would constitute "victory" for them because they will not be able to take over the country. The invasion has failed, albeit at immense human cost

We will be talking about the Ukraine invasion for many years to come. It will serve as a warning to governments about the risks of waging offensive warfare. Governments will need to find alternative ways to settle their international disputes.