Australia’s beef with China

Then came the minerals boom. Chinese ploughed investment into the mining and agricultural sectors. In 2014 and 2015 Chinese interests purchased 99-year leases for the Ports of Newcastle and Darwin respectively. China funded the setting up of Confucius Institutes at Australian universities and appointed Australian ex-politicians as consultants and lobbyists. Chinese nationals bought up real estate across the country while Australian manufacturing moved en masse to China, making it a major source of Australian products.

The United Front Work Department, under the direct authority of the central committee of the CCP, is very active within Australia, controlling Chinese language media, Chinese cultural and business organizations, student associations, and uses business elites to develop relationships.

With 25 percent of its trade with China, with many universities reliant on Chinese students, with primary producers relying on China as a market, and Australian manufacturing captive in China, with various levels of government the target of influence-seeking activities, Australia has primarily used appeasement as its diplomatic strategy.

China presents three specific issues: military and diplomatic expansion throughout Southeast Asia and the Pacific, infiltration into Australian politics and society, and the management of the Australia-China relationship for Australia’s benefit.

China’s insistence of sovereignty along the nine-dash line is bringing much concern to the littoral nations along the South China Sea, with each involved in some sort of altercation with China over the past few months. Not only has China been much more aggressive, but the Chinese naval build-up is quickly turning China into an unassailable regional force.

Australia has two specific problems with this. First, since the decommissioning of the aircraft carrier HMAS Melbourne in 1982, which was ironically sold to China and studied to assist in the development of Chinese carriers, Australian military forces have extremely limited capacity to project any significant presence away from Australia’s north coast. Its Attack-class submarines are not due until the 2030s, and the RAAF only has six KC-30A Multi Role Tanker Transport aircraft.

However, this is not Australia’s biggest problem. Its traditional focus on the US alliance since the Howard government cost the nation its own individual identity within the circle of Southeast Asian nations. Unfortunately, many neighboring government bureaucrats and politicians sense an Australian sense of superiority, which still exists within some parts of the Department of foreign Affairs and Trade. Australia’s relationships with most of its neighbors within both Southeast Asia and the Pacific have tended to be transactional at best. Many countries just don’t feel they are accorded the respect of being considered equal partners in their bilateral relations. In addition, the regional Australian business presence is relatively poor, and military cooperation on the decline. Long gone are the days when the Royal Australian Air Force operated the Butterworth base in Malaysia, stationing squadrons of fighter and bomber aircraft. Today there is only a token presence. With the exception of Singapore, Australia doesn’t have strong intelligence cooperation.

It’s here where Australia must loosen the alliance with the US and develop new regional military alliances where there are more immediate and direct common interests. Closer military cooperation within the region is the best way Australia can create a meaningful buffer between forces deployed within the South China Sea and home.

There are no quick solutions. Ex-Australian leaders must be forced to put Australia’s national security before their own personal interests. Canberra must diversify trade relations and find new markets to decrease the importance of any one trading partner. It must work through a grouping of middle political and trade powers, so there is a critical power mass that the super-powers will take very seriously. Australian universities need to examine their sizes and consider the concept of downsizing and becoming less dependent on foreign students, particularly post Covid-19.

Canberra must handle relationships with China in a way that Australia is perceived as an independent nation and opinion leader. International issues must be approached together with like-minded nations for strength. There are a large number of diverse nations that can fit that criteria. Australia must not be perceived as being tied to the coattails of the United States. An ally yes, but not unquestioningly. This has hindered close ties within the immediate region.

Appeasement doesn’t bring respect, and the Australian public may no longer accept an appeasing federal government. Chinese diplomatic narratives indicate China has lost respect for Australia. Australia must recreate a position of strength with an independent, innovative foreign policy that reflects the aspirations of the region. This was talked about 30 years ago but the US alliance prevailed with the advent of the Gulf Wars and the war on terror. Defense policy must be reframed towards protecting the country with non-military strategies, and consistent with foreign and national security policies. Crisis brings opportunity. It is now time for Australia to redefine its positioning.