The bear, not the elephant, in the living room

Three impacts come to mind: on the eurozone; on the European Union and on NATO. And they don't make for pretty reading for Frau Merkel and Monsieur Hollande. Notwithstanding the latter's cheerleading for Greece.

First, in the event of an exit from the eurozone, creditors may find it harder to get their loans repaid. The Troika would need to tightly stipulate what their expectations are in regards to a Grexit and what are the steps involved in weaning Greece off the euro and on to say, the "New Drachma". In addition, given a Grexit doesn't extinguish Hellenic multi billion euro debts, 24/7 monitoring of much needed economic reforms would be mandatory, lest the Greek economy sinks further into the abyss. This time under the weight of its own currency.

Properly managed, the New Drachma could make enormous (long term) sense for Athens as it seeks to intubate its comatose economy. For instance; Greek ties with Russia have been improving since the victory of Syriza in January. Visits of politicians between Moscow and Athens peaked in June with Tsipras visiting St. Petersburg where he spoke very warmly of the budding Greek-Russian relationship.

Only a few weeks ago Russia's energy minister announced a multi-billion dollar pipeline project in Greece and Moscow even asked Greece to join the one-year old BRICs' New Development Bank.

Massive Russian investment – amongst other capital inflows - coupled with a competitive new currency over which Athens will have monetary control can only help significantly dent the horrific jobless numbers which are close to kindling widespread social unrest that could prove to be disastrous for Greece.

Second and separate to the matter of staying within the eurozone, Greece as a member of the EU can upset the rabid anti-Russian mafia within the Union. Currently imposed sanctions against Russia for returning Crimea to the Motherland and for defending ethnic Russians in eastern Ukraine from a host of threats fighting under the Ukrainian banner including neo-Nazis, in particular Azov fighters as well as Jihadists, terminate in January.

All it takes is for one EU member to say "ÏŒχι" and EU sanctions cannot fly. If Athens so chooses, it can be that member.

Third, an Athenian embrace of Moscow could cause a severe migraine for NATO, as Athens inches closer to Moscow, Greece's maritime and aviation assets will no longer exclusively welcome western forces. Instead these facilities will have to be shared with the Russians.

Russia will no doubt wish to celebrate its newfound access to the Mediterranean and the Aegean by sending part of its Black Sea Fleet to make goodwill visits to Greece's warm ports.

A good many naval visits could be viewed by NATO as threatening, but will no doubt be explained by Greece as merely a good deal of goodwill from Russia to Greece.

This will complicate matters severely for NATO in the event of trouble brewing in southern Europe or the Eastern Mediterranean. Especially so if such troubles are (truthfully or falsely) attributed by NATO to Moscow.

The Russian people are alert to the fact that their president is a nationalist first and an economic manager second.