The bear, not the elephant, in the living room

Last Sunday, over 60% of Greeks followed their leftist government's advice and chose more socialism rather than more austerity. After the vote, proponents of the "No" camp bellowed it was a victory for "independence" and  shouted that Greece "will not be humiliated".

Fighting words from a vanquished people.

Germany, whose taxpayers have kept the Hellenic Republic from drowning in a misery of its own making, tried to convince Greeks that the choice was very different. It was a choice between staying in the euro and exiting from it.

The leader of the Greek Coalition of the Radical Left, the Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras, boasted that a "no" vote would give him a mandate to renegotiate the billions of euros Greece has borrowed and wants to keep borrowing. He never explained that for renegotiations to take place – let alone bear fruit - the creditors must have something new and something credible from Athens to consider. Cheap old Retsina in fancy new bottles just isn't enough.

The tragedy of last week's referendum was that the wrong question was asked.

A more informative binary vote should have been put to the Greeks. That is:

Do you want Greece to have the possibility of a sound economic future on the understanding this would require painful root and branch reforms to the Greek economy which would usher in competition, extinguish corruption, minimise government waste, jettison bureaucracies and introduce reasonable regulations?

But it wasn't to be.

Those that voted "No" want a proud and self-reliant republic but have no understanding that when Greece signed up in January 2001 to the "third European & Monetary Union Stage", independence flew out the window. Greece became part of a union where all members are subjected to a single monetary policy, which determines the value of their shared currency, and hence the foreign price of Greece's outputs.

Greece cannot devalue the currency to make itself more competitive for the simple reason that it isn't Greece's to devalue. Nor can the Greeks run bottomless budget deficits that violate the European & Monetary Union rules.

Separate - but as important - to the mammoth financial questions facing the creditors this weekend is the much-ignored issue of security.

If Greece stays in the eurozone but is irritated by the terms or if it leaves the euro or is pushed out, or for that matter is granted a creative "leave of absence with the right to return", what would this mean for Western Europe's security?

Three impacts come to mind: on the eurozone; on the European Union and on NATO. And they don't make for pretty reading for Frau Merkel and Monsieur Hollande. Notwithstanding the latter's cheerleading for Greece.

First, in the event of an exit from the eurozone, creditors may find it harder to get their loans repaid. The Troika would need to tightly stipulate what their expectations are in regards to a Grexit and what are the steps involved in weaning Greece off the euro and on to say, the "New Drachma". In addition, given a Grexit doesn't extinguish Hellenic multi billion euro debts, 24/7 monitoring of much needed economic reforms would be mandatory, lest the Greek economy sinks further into the abyss. This time under the weight of its own currency.

Properly managed, the New Drachma could make enormous (long term) sense for Athens as it seeks to intubate its comatose economy. For instance; Greek ties with Russia have been improving since the victory of Syriza in January. Visits of politicians between Moscow and Athens peaked in June with Tsipras visiting St. Petersburg where he spoke very warmly of the budding Greek-Russian relationship.

Only a few weeks ago Russia's energy minister announced a multi-billion dollar pipeline project in Greece and Moscow even asked Greece to join the one-year old BRICs' New Development Bank.

Massive Russian investment – amongst other capital inflows - coupled with a competitive new currency over which Athens will have monetary control can only help significantly dent the horrific jobless numbers which are close to kindling widespread social unrest that could prove to be disastrous for Greece.

Second and separate to the matter of staying within the eurozone, Greece as a member of the EU can upset the rabid anti-Russian mafia within the Union. Currently imposed sanctions against Russia for returning Crimea to the Motherland and for defending ethnic Russians in eastern Ukraine from a host of threats fighting under the Ukrainian banner including neo-Nazis, in particular Azov fighters as well as Jihadists, terminate in January.

All it takes is for one EU member to say "ÏŒχι" and EU sanctions cannot fly. If Athens so chooses, it can be that member.

Third, an Athenian embrace of Moscow could cause a severe migraine for NATO, as Athens inches closer to Moscow, Greece's maritime and aviation assets will no longer exclusively welcome western forces. Instead these facilities will have to be shared with the Russians.

Russia will no doubt wish to celebrate its newfound access to the Mediterranean and the Aegean by sending part of its Black Sea Fleet to make goodwill visits to Greece's warm ports.

A good many naval visits could be viewed by NATO as threatening, but will no doubt be explained by Greece as merely a good deal of goodwill from Russia to Greece.

This will complicate matters severely for NATO in the event of trouble brewing in southern Europe or the Eastern Mediterranean. Especially so if such troubles are (truthfully or falsely) attributed by NATO to Moscow.

The Russian people are alert to the fact that their president is a nationalist first and an economic manager second.

Even as Russia's economy suffers from spiralling commodity prices, so long as Putin can project Russian pride abroad by standing up for the Motherland's values in her sphere of influence, with little in the way of Western consequences, the people will stand by their man.

In this context, trying to anticipate Putin's next move is no easy feat, but we can do worse than consider one of his heroes, Vladimir Solovyov.

Soon after the 1877 declaration of war by Russia on the Ottoman Empire, the young philosopher, Solovyov, addressed a crowd in St Petersburg, Putin's hometown. According to his biographer, Judith Deutsch Kornblatt, he celebrated the Slavic conviction in Russia's "divinely inspired historical mission". He assiduously argued that hope for the future lay neither with the fragmented West nor the monolithic East, but with a third people, the Slavs. It is the Slavic character that best integrates the other two he maintained.

From the Troika's standpoint, Greece is indeed painted into a corner.

Whether it remains within or flees from the Eurozone, it owes hundreds of billions of euros with no hope of persuading even a first year accounting student that the country has realistic prospects of repaying its loans.

Nobody in Bruxelles, Berlin or Paris should worry about Tsipras at the eleventh hour pulling a rabbit out of his hat.

Instead Frau Merkel and Monsieur Hollande should worry about him pulling out the Russian Bear.

Soon we shall all see if Vladimir Ilyich Putin's undiluted faith in the historical mission of the Slavic people coupled with a budding partnership with Alexis Tsipras will catch Western Europe and the Obama administration napping.

If so, then his efforts to return Russia to her rightful place amongst the nations would have moved closer to being realised.