Influencing Iran’s determination

UN sanctions and the missing link

This picture may make more sense if we consider Iranians’ concerns regarding the UN sanctions. It is arguable that the initial response of Iranian activists was that they believed that the UN sanctions, at least indirectly, have helped the hardliners grow stronger in terms of justifying their disciplinary behaviour towards the public. If their theory of “protecting” society from the rest of the world is valid, it is undeniable that the UN sanctions have to some extent provided anti-western groups with the opportunity to support Iran, that is, to become more aggressive not only outside of the country, e.g., elsewhere in the Middle-East but also inside Iran.

This is probably why Iranian activists have always been critical regarding lack of consideration of human rights by those sanctions. Whether this belief is right or not, its connotations may assist us to understand the disjunction between the two main groups which share similar concerns about how dangerous the situation could become if the fundamentalists in the region gain access to nuclear weapons; namely the world’s political leaders and Iran's civilian rights activists.

One research shows that during Ahmadinejad’s first three years, the western media’s coverage of Iran, i.e., the developing of its nuclear program, its conflict with the United States and Israel, and the topic of oil left “all” other issues such as social movements with less than 2 per cent of total coverage. This may explain why Iranian civil society feels that they have been ignored not once but twice: (a) by the Iranian media, and (b) by the world's mass media.

New era: Iran’s post-election

While the state’s interior policy to put the cost and pressure of UN sanctions on the people’s shoulders has been successful, the post-election circumstances have the potential to collapse this policy. Iran’s social movement and people’s will to insist on their civilian rights, along with the so-called green movement, have put Iranian social issues on the Western mass media’s headlines. Based on independent reports, this welcome publicity has given some Iranian people the confidence to resist their fundamentalist government. Also, due to the Supreme Leader's total support for Ahmadinejad, as well as reformists' religious or non-religious ongoing opposition, we are no longer dealing with the “old” Iran.

It has been said that the important characteristic of a regime such as this is that one can never distinguish between “official” and “real” power due to the obscurity of the system. For the first time since the 1979 revolution, a religious leader has taken a radical decision against the majority of the people and even the clerics’ will. Thus, the political decision-maker has become totally visible to the society. This is why both of the reformist candidates in the recent election, who failed to delineate clearly their position on Iran’s nuclear program during the campaign, are now critical not only of Ahmadinejad’s policy but also of the Supreme Leader's and the Revolutionary Guard’s policies.

What I am trying to argue here is that as a result of the post-election circumstances, Iranians are now faced with new avenues to pursue that may render the fundamentalists’ position fragile - which may help both the world’s nuclear concerns to find a solution and our society to at last realise their civilian rights. Giving activists this opportunity to become visible in the western media - as well as voicing Iranians' human rights concerns - sends a strong message of support that will boost the Iranian public’s will to pursue social reform. There will be no contradiction if the forthcoming sanctions send a message to the Iranian people that this ongoing split between the people’s will and those in power is open to world scrutiny.