Evolving democracy in Kurdistan

From fighting in the mountains to running in parliament, fundamental achievements have been made since 1991 but democracy is still bogged by changing times, factional alliances and increasing expectations of the people.

To state that 1991 was a unique milestone in Kurdish history is perhaps the understatement of the century, for the Kurds, quite literally.

The Kurds have suffered immeasurably under authoritarian Arab rule since the creation of the artificial state of Iraq. Finally free from the totalitarian grip of Saddam Hussein after immense sacrifice, Kurds were now able to decide their own future; to have self-determination which they had been deprived of for so long.

And what better way to showcase your credentials for statehood and self-rule than show the world and your nemesis in the region that you are capable of democracy and a way of governance that would not only be unique to Kurdistan, as it would be a first, but could also serve as a benchmark for the rest of region.

Sometimes the best way to highlight where your enemies fail is to implement it yourself. Kurds have tried hard to implement a system of tolerance to other religions and ethnicities, something that they themselves have not received. Where their democratic liberties have been deprived, they have chosen to win back their lost rights - such the city of Kirkuk - in a democratic manner than by using the same force that their enemies would have used on them.

Iraqi Kurdistan legislative elections of 1992

On May 19, 1992, history was made when the first ever elections were successfully held in Iraqi Kurdistan. For the first time, the Kurdish people could choose who they voted for: elections were made to the Kurdistan National Assembly (KNA), the parliament of the Kurdistan Region. It was not only the first ever elections in Kurdistan, but was also the first free and fair parliamentary elections in Iraq itself.

One hundred and five seats were made available in the KNA with five seats reserved for the Assyrian community. The 7 per cent threshold that political parties had to achieve ensured that the seats were contested between the two main parties in Kurdistan: the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) led alliance. This system naturally alienated some parties such as the Islamic Movement of Kurdistan (who achieved just more than 5 per cent of the vote), and this later contributed to difficulties with Islamists in later years.

Though the KDP won 51 seats and the PUK alliance 49 seats, it was agreed to share power 50-50. The first law was passed by the assembly a few months later, establishing it as the region's legislature.

The elections were clearly a monumental achievement for a region that had fought hard to see such an elusive day, and were well commended by a number of international observers.

However, for all the early promise, democracy in Kurdistan fast displayed a number of fundamental flaws. The infant roots of democracy in the region were soon haunted by short-lived gains.

Civil war and the stalling of democracy

The euphoria around the recently won freedoms and the historical milestone of democratic elections soon turned sour. A number of differences soon resulted in perhaps one of the most unforgettable events in Kurdish history, as a bloody civil war between the PDK and PUK Peshmerga forces raged between 1994 and1997.

In the period around the civil war, and the ensuing years after it, democracy suffered a major setback in Kurdistan. The deep rifts between Massaud Barzani, who narrowly won the presidential elections that were conjointly held in 1992, and Jalal Talabani, resulted in control of Erbil changing hands between both sides on a number of occasions.

Iraqi Kurdistan was then effectively split into two administrations, one PUK controlled from Suleimanyia and one PDK based from Erbil. The de facto delineation between both administrations naturally diluted full democratic practices. This period saw freedoms restricted and a tense political climate in the two major cities. Tolerance for supporters of each group in opposing regions was minimal.

A UN embargo on Iraq coupled with Saddam's own brutal economic impediment on the region, further compounded matters in the region.

This was made worse, as Kurdistan at the time before UN oil for food program, suffered from inflation and lack of commerce and basic necessities.

However, the UN agreed to permit authorised oil exports from Iraq, with the provision of aid for the people in return, brought welcome relief to the Kurdish people. A 13 per cent share of oil revenues, and custom duties from trade with Turkey, brought an income to kick-start much needed development in the region.

Washington Accord

No major fighting took place after September 1, 1996, however, it was a case of no war but no peace either. This was until a peace deal, referred to as the Washington Accord, brokered under the auspices of the Clinton administration, that saw both the PDK and PUK agreeing to transitional power sharing followed by elections, equitable distribution of revenues and the easing of restriction of movement between their regions.

With the Kurds extremely keen to win support for long-term Kurdish autonomy, there was little room for any lack of reconciliation.

In spite of the agreement, the thawing of ties was somewhat leisurely and animosity remained. Implementation of the accord was stalled by disputes over revenue and the format of the proposed joint administration.

In 2001, the administrations finally resumed formal dialogue and eased restriction of travel. The two sides moved quickly to resolve their differences with the emergence of a militant Islamist group, Ansar al-Islam with ties to al-Qaida. Reconciliation has deepened further with US plans for the removal of Saddam from power in 2002. Barzani and Talabani had the first face-to-face dialogue in this time for seven years.

The Kurdish parliament convened later that year for the first time since 1994 to implement the Washington Accord and get the ball rolling for legislative elections.

General elections were not held until 2005, almost 13 full years since the landmark elections of 1992 that offered so much hope to a nation ravaged by repression and war, but only delivered setbacks.

Changing political climate post 2003

Although a grainier form of democracy was still practiced with relative civil liberties and municipal elections in opposing administrations, it was hardly in commendable shape prior to 2003. The fall of Saddam Hussein and the second Gulf War not only brought unprecedented elections to Iraq, but also kick started democracy in Kurdistan.

With the removal of Saddam Hussein and with prospects of a new Iraq, Kurdish leaders were at a unique juncture. Under full international view there was a growing threat from the Turkish government over Kurdish ambitions at the dawn of their new era, Kurds could ill-afford not to present a united front. A united front was encouraged by the US, with strong ties and a reliance on Iraqi Kurds, as their Iraqi adventure was soon derailed.

Elections to the KNA were held on January 30, 2005, to coincide with the Iraqi elections and elections to the provincial elections. The turnout was high with more than 1.7 million people voting. There were 111 seats contested in the elections via a system of proportional representation. This time the PDK and PUK united under one list, the Democratic Patriotic Alliance of Kurdistan, attaining 104 seats or just more than 89 per cent of the votes.

The alliance, at least on paper, forged a strong unity across a number of parties, including the Kurdistan Islamic Union, Turkmen Party and other minority parties.

Current state of democracy

Although the democratic system in Kurdistan is far from perfect, achievements in less than two decades and particularly in the last six years have been historic. No democracy has ever flourished without its pains and conflicts, and Kurdistan is no different.

In the time since its inception, the parliament has passed a number of important laws, covering press, economy, administration, general society and culture. The improvements in freedoms and laws since 2003 have been noticeable, for example with increasing rights for woman and increased government tolerance to opposition.

Elections for the KNA are to be held every four years as stipulated in article 8 of the Kurdistan Electoral Law. Elections for the KNA are based on a closed party-list representation system, meaning that the electorate votes for the list of candidates of a party rather than individual candidates. Seats are allocated to each party in proportion to the number of votes it receives, and the party is then free to choose someone from its candidate list.

Among the main highlights of the Kurdish democratic experience is that the system of government is secular, freedom and practice of faith are high and there is a strong encouragement for wide representation across ethnicities in the region. As an example, there is a liberal attitude to alcohol consumption, wearing of head-scarves and public expressions of love.

The current system ensures that if no party representing a minority wins a seat, one seat is automatically awarded to that minority (for example, Assyrians, Chaldeans or Turkmen). There is currently one independent and 14 political parties represented in the KNA.

Another fundamental benefit in the current system is the strong representation for women with the legal requirement that at least 25 per cent of parliamentarians must be women.

The passing of several laws has heavily contributed to the regions relative economic progress and social progression in recent years. Politicians have been generally quick to adapt laws to accommodate the present socioeconomic environment and modernise the legislative aspects of the region in line with modern-day demands: for example there is now a European standard investment law; there has been the outlawing of polygamous marriages; and there is increasing intolerance of honour killings.

Although, the KRG has evolved a great deal of the past few years, high expectations of the people, means that the government will need to continuously adapt to meet the growing pressure from the public.

For example, an open party listing where people can choose their candidates is strongly advocated. Such a system, were individuals are directly voted into parliament, puts voters more in control of their democracy and at the same time places pressure on politicians to serve the very people who have purposely selected them to fulfill their duty.

Flaws of the democratic system

Although, the achievements have been commendable in a short period of time, there are also a number of flaws in the application of democracy in Kurdistan. Elements of corruption still exist in government and there has been frequent criticism of nepotism. Although the major cities have seen major economic boom and construction projects, basic services are still lacking across. The increasing economic prosperity has created a new rich-list and, depending on where you visit in Erbil, a contrasting standard of living among the citizens.

There is still an element of apprehension about whether the parliament is really supporting and serving the people. There is a general consensus that parliamentarians have to be more attentive to public concerns and demands. Accountability must increase for this to be realised.

In the West when politicians make mistakes their political careers are often quickly doomed and public enquiries are launched. However, this level of accountability to answer to mistakes and actions is somewhat lacking.

To achieve an experienced and proficient pool of politicians to create a vibrant level of competition and opposition takes time. The transition from freedom fighters to running a Western democracy is hardly a small gap to plug.

Regional expertise and intellectualism has improved significantly, aided by an educated and developing Diaspora. As the people become more accustomed to rights, freedoms and privileges, this has increased pressure on the government to raise parliamentary standards.

However, one must also judge a subject within its context. With the exception of Turkey, which houses many constraints of its own, neighbouring countries can hardly be classified as model democracies.

At least in Kurdistan minorities have representation: for decades the Kurds, forming a large part of the population of Turkey, did not have a single voice in the Turkish parliament. Even today, cultural tolerance in Turkey is hardly up to a European standard, and this is a country which has received wide-scale credit as an example of Islamic democracy and which has ambitions to join the EU.

It is evident that Kurdish leaders have tried hard to implement a system of government that is closer to the West than the geographically closer East.

The need for adaptation and evolvement

Democratic elections in Kurdistan are to a large extent predictable. Much like the US where certain states have become beacons of support for either the Democrats or Republicans, there is a general affiliation across parts of the region for either PDK or PUK. However, there are signs that some political parties are evolving. For example, recent instability in the PUK alliances briefly resulted in rumours that the party may split.

Growing freedoms in Kurdistan can be seen in the wide range of liberal newspapers, which are becoming more confident to criticise and oppose the government and to debate regional affairs. Although, Kurdistan had a flourishing press since it won autonomy, too often it was the mouthpiece, or under the control, of political parties. As a result, there was little room for independents without approval from government authorities.

The next elections in Kurdistan are just around the corner in May 2009 and it should be an interesting reflection of the mood of the people for the last four years or so. There is still a notion of a conceptual battle between the old school of thought and new liberal minds in Kurdistan.

Democracy in Kurdistan may not be perfect but consider that Western democracy was not created in just two decades.

In an imperfect region, it is hardly fair to scrutinise Kurdish democracy and pick out its evident failings after such a short period of time. But this is no means an excuse for Kurdish politicians to rest on their laurels and not strive to improve the region, politic establishments and in the way the serve the very entity they have been created for, the people.

We must also not forget that democracy in Kurdistan is to a great extent intertwined with democracy in Iraq as they are officially part of one state. Democracy in Iraq is far from perfect and when it comes to the practice of federal democracy, such as the implementation of national legislations and an elected constitution, it takes two to tango.