Deconstructing North Korea's rocket and nuclear diplomacy

If so, this would make the rocket launch more consistent with a space launch, not a missile test. We should not presume that the North’s actions are all designed for external political effect.

Granted the North has engaged in troublesome conduct, but as Leon Sigal has argued the behaviour of the North has tended to be tactically based upon tit-for-tat. The 2006 nuclear test, for example, occurred after fake US money laundering allegations scuttled diplomatic agreement. Such tactics are the tactics of a rational actor. For Cumings, “North Korean behaviour has been quite predictable” and “an irresponsible American media” actually “obscures the real nature of the United States-Korean conflict”. This means that North Korea would not lie outside of the rationality criterion of deterrence theory, which undermines the case for Ballistic Missile Defence.

North Korea’s reaction to the UN Security Resolution fits this tit-for-tat tactical pattern. As a part of the six-party process North Korea has declared that it has separated 37kg of plutonium, enough for a small nuclear deterrent. The Yongbyon reactor can produce about 4-6kg of plutonium per year, enough for one bomb. Should the North Korea proceed to reverse the partial disablement of the Yonbyon facility we would not expect the North to engage in the mass production of weapons. North Korea has also stated that it will consider building a light water reactor, but analysts consider this to be beyond the current capability. Such a reactor would also require an enrichment plant built to an industrial scale.

By contrast under the Bush administration the US strategy appeared to have been one of regime change based on selective external pressure, under the assumption that the regime in Pyongyang was tottering on the brink of collapse. I invite the reader to consider the ethics of subjecting a nation in the grip of famine to external pressure for strategic and political ends. This dubious approach to nuclear diplomacy has been expertly documented by Mike Chinoy, a former CNN journalist.

Further sanctions will do little to help matters. Indeed, under the tit-for-tat historical pattern sanctions might very well lead to further escalation. North Korea still has room in which to ride the escalation ladder, for instance by restarting a proper missile testing schedule. It can further play the role of spoiler by undermining attempts to control nuclear and missile technology trade. If our goal is escalation control then sanctions are not a viable policy option.

The core underlying issue that is before us is that the US needs to change the assumptions of its North Korea policy and engage in meaningful dialogue, if necessary by way of direct bilateral talks, with a view towards gradually integrating North Korea into the broader Northeast Asian regional architecture. This would open up room for would be reformers in the North Korean power structure. Such changes can occur in the most unlikely of places; it was not long after the Cultural Revolution that China began its four modernisations reform program.

To do anything less is to risk the eruption of conflict or strife on the Korean peninsula that would make Iraq and Afghanistan pale in comparison. Peaceful reintegration of the Korean peninsula, or greater co-habitation, remains a key global security issue; we could be slipping towards a major human catastrophe. In a very real sense this lies at the heart of the situation, rather than warheads and missiles.