Deconstructing North Korea's rocket and nuclear diplomacy

The first model is largely based on the Scud design heritage. The main novelty for the Unha-2/TD-2 consists of a cluster of four engines for the first stage modeled after China's CSS-2 missile. The second stage is taken either to be a single Nodong engine or a modified SA-5 engine ("SA" is NATO designation for Soviet/Russian surface-to-air missiles) for space launch only.

The upshot of all this is that an Unha-2 so configured would be able to launch, on a trajectory typical of ballistic missiles, a 1,000kg payload some 6,000km. The figure of 1,000kg is cited because this would be the mass typical of a first generation nuclear weapon. That is range sufficient to hit Anchorage, Alaska.

Wright's second model is based on possible, but speculative, improvements for the Unha-2 that go further beyond the Scud design heritage. Wright assumes that such a model would be on a par with China's vintage Long March-1 space launch vehicle. These improvements would consist of different engine propellants to garner more thrust and lighter rocket body material. An LM-1 type capability would see North Korea being able to deliver a 1,000kg warhead some 8,500km reaching San Francisco and cities to its north on the US west coast.

This all just focuses on the missile. North Korea is attributed with a nuclear warhead capability for the shorter range Nodong, but not necessarily for the Taepodong-2.

Now we know from the public comments of the US military, based on telemetry and splashdown analysis, that the North Korean launch was unsuccessful due to failure of the second stage. The failure makes it difficult to reach firm conclusions about the rocket’s trajectory. In 1998 the launch of the Taepodong-1 as a space launcher was unsuccessful due to failure of the third stage. In 2006 a launch of the Taepodong-2 failed after 40 seconds of flight.
This militates against the second, more speculative, Unha-2 design.

Moreover, mature testing programs require missileers to test and test and test again. To go from a test failure to a qualitatively more advanced design would not be rational. Engineers have their hands full with mating the Nodong engine with a new four-engine first stage. At things currently stand North Korea does not have a missile testing program.

If these be the technical aspects of the rocket launch what might we say about the political aspects?

The strategy of the North has been to engage in what is described by strategic analysts as "coercive bandwagoning" with the US. Bruce Cumings, the preeminent North Korea scholar in the United States, has pointed out that the key objective of the North in the post cold war period has been to improve relations with the United States.

For the North, apart from deterrence, nuclear warhead and missile programs are an important means by which to coerce the US towards better economic and political relations for Pyongyang has little other means by which to exert leverage. As Cumings argues, “Yongbyon, in short, began in pursuit of energy self-reliance, and ended as a bargaining chip to trade for a new relationship with the United States”.

The recent rocket launch should be seen, partly (it may also have internal causes coming a few days before Kim Jong-il’s coming out party) in the context of this approach. For the North, as stated above, the repeat of the uranium enrichment allegations tends to suggest that the Obama administration will by and large stick to the second term Bush administration approach.

The internal political aspects cannot be ignored, for both Iran and North Korea space launches. Iran recently successfully launched a satellite and has promised another one, help to garner legitimacy for the regime by projecting an aura of modernity. The same might said to apply in China (recall China’s first man in space) and was undoubtedly an important factor in the space race between the US and the Soviet Union.

Just prior to the recent re-election of Kim Jong il as chairman of the National Defence Commission, at a session of the North Korean legislature, the “dear leader” engaged in a major “campaign” blitz across the country where the rocket launch figured very highly in the propaganda offensive. According to The Washington Post Kim, “seems to have used the launch as the featured event in a campaign to convince North Koreans that he is well, strong and fully in charge of the country”.