Like what you've read?

On Line Opinion is the only Australian site where you get all sides of the story. We don't
charge, but we need your support. Here�s how you can help.

  • Advertise

    We have a monthly audience of 70,000 and advertising packages from $200 a month.

  • Volunteer

    We always need commissioning editors and sub-editors.

  • Contribute

    Got something to say? Submit an essay.


 The National Forum   Donate   Your Account   On Line Opinion   Forum   Blogs   Polling   About   
On Line Opinion logo ON LINE OPINION - Australia's e-journal of social and political debate

Subscribe!
Subscribe





On Line Opinion is a not-for-profit publication and relies on the generosity of its sponsors, editors and contributors. If you would like to help, contact us.
___________

Syndicate
RSS/XML


RSS 2.0

Deconstructing North Korea's rocket and nuclear diplomacy

By Marko Beljac - posted Monday, 20 April 2009


The first model is largely based on the Scud design heritage. The main novelty for the Unha-2/TD-2 consists of a cluster of four engines for the first stage modeled after China's CSS-2 missile. The second stage is taken either to be a single Nodong engine or a modified SA-5 engine ("SA" is NATO designation for Soviet/Russian surface-to-air missiles) for space launch only.

The upshot of all this is that an Unha-2 so configured would be able to launch, on a trajectory typical of ballistic missiles, a 1,000kg payload some 6,000km. The figure of 1,000kg is cited because this would be the mass typical of a first generation nuclear weapon. That is range sufficient to hit Anchorage, Alaska.

Wright's second model is based on possible, but speculative, improvements for the Unha-2 that go further beyond the Scud design heritage. Wright assumes that such a model would be on a par with China's vintage Long March-1 space launch vehicle. These improvements would consist of different engine propellants to garner more thrust and lighter rocket body material. An LM-1 type capability would see North Korea being able to deliver a 1,000kg warhead some 8,500km reaching San Francisco and cities to its north on the US west coast.

Advertisement

This all just focuses on the missile. North Korea is attributed with a nuclear warhead capability for the shorter range Nodong, but not necessarily for the Taepodong-2.

Now we know from the public comments of the US military, based on telemetry and splashdown analysis, that the North Korean launch was unsuccessful due to failure of the second stage. The failure makes it difficult to reach firm conclusions about the rocket’s trajectory. In 1998 the launch of the Taepodong-1 as a space launcher was unsuccessful due to failure of the third stage. In 2006 a launch of the Taepodong-2 failed after 40 seconds of flight.
This militates against the second, more speculative, Unha-2 design.

Moreover, mature testing programs require missileers to test and test and test again. To go from a test failure to a qualitatively more advanced design would not be rational. Engineers have their hands full with mating the Nodong engine with a new four-engine first stage. At things currently stand North Korea does not have a missile testing program.

If these be the technical aspects of the rocket launch what might we say about the political aspects?

The strategy of the North has been to engage in what is described by strategic analysts as "coercive bandwagoning" with the US. Bruce Cumings, the preeminent North Korea scholar in the United States, has pointed out that the key objective of the North in the post cold war period has been to improve relations with the United States.

For the North, apart from deterrence, nuclear warhead and missile programs are an important means by which to coerce the US towards better economic and political relations for Pyongyang has little other means by which to exert leverage. As Cumings argues, “Yongbyon, in short, began in pursuit of energy self-reliance, and ended as a bargaining chip to trade for a new relationship with the United States”.

Advertisement

The recent rocket launch should be seen, partly (it may also have internal causes coming a few days before Kim Jong-il’s coming out party) in the context of this approach. For the North, as stated above, the repeat of the uranium enrichment allegations tends to suggest that the Obama administration will by and large stick to the second term Bush administration approach.

The internal political aspects cannot be ignored, for both Iran and North Korea space launches. Iran recently successfully launched a satellite and has promised another one, help to garner legitimacy for the regime by projecting an aura of modernity. The same might said to apply in China (recall China’s first man in space) and was undoubtedly an important factor in the space race between the US and the Soviet Union.

Just prior to the recent re-election of Kim Jong il as chairman of the National Defence Commission, at a session of the North Korean legislature, the “dear leader” engaged in a major “campaign” blitz across the country where the rocket launch figured very highly in the propaganda offensive. According to The Washington Post Kim, “seems to have used the launch as the featured event in a campaign to convince North Koreans that he is well, strong and fully in charge of the country”.

  1. Pages:
  2. 1
  3. Page 2
  4. 3
  5. All


Discuss in our Forums

See what other readers are saying about this article!

Click here to read & post comments.

Share this:
reddit this reddit thisbookmark with del.icio.us Del.icio.usdigg thisseed newsvineSeed NewsvineStumbleUpon StumbleUponsubmit to propellerkwoff it

About the Author

Mark Beljac teaches at Swinburne University of Technology, is a board member of the New International Bookshop, and is involved with the Industrial Workers of the World, National Tertiary Education Union, National Union of Workers (community) and Friends of the Earth.

Other articles by this Author

All articles by Marko Beljac

Creative Commons LicenseThis work is licensed under a Creative Commons License.

Photo of Marko Beljac
Article Tools
Comment Comments
Print Printable version
Subscribe Subscribe
Email Email a friend
Advertisement

About Us Search Discuss Feedback Legals Privacy