A government could hold a joint sitting after a fixed-term election to vote
on legislation which had (1) originally been detailed in the government's election
manifesto, (2) subsequently been introduced to parliament within the first year
of the government's three-year term, (3) been rejected twice under the present
requirements for a double-dissolution trigger, and (4) been put to the people
again at the next election.
My proposal has a number of advantages.
It extends the average length of time between elections. Over my 28 years in
the Senate there have been elections approximately every 2 1/2 years. A guaranteed
three-year term would give governments more time to implement their program, yet
continue to allow senators to be elected for six-year terms. It would also remove
some of the uncertainty surrounding the timing of elections.
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It also introduces a measure of stability by having senators who are not too
closely focused on the short-term imperatives of their re-election. It allows
a broader perspective on issues in the house of review, rather than a focus on
the more immediate parliamentary cycle.
The focus of most comment in the lead-up to the discussion paper has been on
the Senate as a problem. But the real problem is that the present system does
not provide a predictable system for resolving deadlocks. Deadlocks are a problem
caused not by the Senate itself, but by irreconcilable differences between the
House of Representatives and the Senate, and more particularly between the major
political parties.
There is an opportunity to reform the Australian Parliament but that reform
needs to be balanced. My reform option provides minimal changes to our parliamentary
system, yet offers governments a workable system by which deadlocks can be resolved.
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