Waiting for democracy

In a taped broadcast in late December, al-Qaida chief Osama bin Laden warned that anyone who took up arms against his group would be considered traitors.

Earlier in January 2008, eight Shiite Awakening Council members and their leader were killed in the Shaab neighbourhood of Baghdad. In addition, in the past few months a number of prominent council leaders have been killed.

For the time being, at least, Sunni and Shiites may just have a common enemy to fight in Iraq.

Long-term ramifications

The Awakening Councils that have been formed with a communal underpinning and guided by local sheiks and tribal leaders are more likely to be effectively controlled and organised. However, the rapid expansion of the councils throughout the rest of the volatile, and now ethnically mixed, provinces may well mean that the number of armed Sunnis, alarmingly, could reach more than 100,000.

Even before the onset of a popular anti-insurgent movement, some sections of the Sunni population were divided. The risk of splinter groups joining al-Qaida-led forces cannot be discounted.

Furthermore, the independent-minded view of most of the tribal leaders formulates a key problem for the Iraqi government. If the Awakening Councils cannot be embedded into the Iraqi security force apparatus as they hope, thus diluting current Shiite domination of such forces, then potentially Iraq may well have three armed, autonomous, and formidable forces in the country: the established and widely respected Kurdish Peshmerga force, the Shiite-led Iraqi Security Forces and other regional Shiite militias, and an emboldened and dangerous Sunni force.

For the time being, the Iraqi government has been generally supportive of the councils while watching developments very closely in the background. Prominent Shiite leader Abdul-Aziz al-Hakim recently credited the councils with practicing an honourable national role and hailed the councils as an expression of unity against the enemies of Iraq.

Clearly, the key question is the long-term status of such councils. The primary question is whether the councils will the support the government for the long-term or whether they are just a more powerful substitute for the same insurgent forces that they helped eradicate.

For some Sunnis, the question is far greater now than driving the Christian “invaders” out. Increasing Iranian influence has taken equal footing to the “ill-fated” presence of their foreign occupiers.

Animosity toward their Shiite brethren is, however, untouched, and in reality this will remain in the long term. Centuries-old sectarian tension can never be swept aside with such a degree of ease. Perhaps the knowledge that they are now armed and protected inside strongholds may alleviate Sunni fears of being sidelined in the future Iraq, but deep mistrust of Shiite-dominated Iraqi Security Forces will remain until a satisfactory sectarian balance has been achieved.

Another key factor in the declining violence is the decision in the summer of 2007 by influential cleric Moqtada al-Sadr to temporarily cease fighting. This has contributed greatly to the drop in violence that the American administration has hailed. Once the powerful Mehdi Army is back in full swing, their influence on the sectarian stage will provide an interesting observation.

Conclusion

Iraq may in theory be heading toward stability and an era of improved security with a dramatic drop in violence and seemingly on a return to national harmony and co-existence: unfortunately, the lasting nature of short-term gains remains uncertain and to an extent artificial.