Does Australia have a bomber gap?

Airpower would be of most use in such contingencies as a means to provide decisive firepower in support of light highly mobile land forces. This would be an instance of deterrence by denial rather than deterrence by punishment, a key distinction.

In the second case of state supported terrorism our bombing capability would be seen as reflecting a doctrine of pre-emptive if not preventive war. The problem with this is that it smacks of Bill Clinton’s standoff Tomahawk Cruise Missile strike strategy when dealing with al-Qaida. These strikes did not deter or prevent 9-11 and in fact, may have actually precipitated the 9-11 plot. The same would apply in similar regional scenarios. The alternative, of regime change, is not in Australia’s military capabilities. Besides, regime change in Afghanistan has not prevented the emergence of al-Qaida training camps in the Pakistan border region. Terrorism is a political not military problem.

The best strategy for Australia here is to keep a low profile and thereby prevent us from becoming a target in the first place. The purchase of a whole raft of military hardware in order to become inter-operable with the United States military in the Middle East is really part of the problem, not the solution.

Which ever way you look at it not only do we not have a “bomber gap” but also the whole idea of a limited “strategic strike deterrent” reflects poor strategic thinking. For a country like Australia alternative concepts of security such as common and co-operative security backed up with deterrence by denial would always be much better than alliances and deterrence by punishment.

In fact if we combine “strategic strike deterrence” with uranium enrichment then the regional strategic consequences of decisions taken now could really home come to bite us hard in the future.