Does Australia have a bomber gap?

But by contrast the JSF and the Super Hornet can deliver the 2,000 pound GBU-24/B laser guided bomb, which has a hard target penetration capability, hence giving them more bombing capability than the F-22 but the burden even in these aircraft will fall on the 1,000 pound JDAM. The old F-111 has the virtue of being able to carry the 5,000 pound GBU-28 (here is a graphic slide show of the GBU-28), the main conventional bunker buster in the US arsenal, so really on this measure the F-111 trumps them all.

It should be stressed, lest all this talk of the explosive power of conventional bombs impresses us unduly, that this conceals the fact that the whole concept of “strategic strike deterrence” comes from nuclear deterrence theory. It would be completely illegitimate to throw around terms like this as if they automatically apply in a conventional context for nuclear weapons are unique in their effects. But let us follow the lead of the airpower advocates and try anyway.

With nuclear deterrence the main class of targets are urban-industrial concentrations, nuclear facilities and forces, and hardened command and control bunkers for decapitation. This is a quaint phrase referring to knocking out the command centres or command “brains” of an enemy. If you have this ability then one’s potential opponent, assuming rationality, would be deterred from engaging in war because they realise that they could not have command co-ordination over their forces, especially in a political system that places stress on centralised leadership.

JDAMs would be able to knock out individual urban-industrial targets and hardened above ground command and control facilities but would not be able to knock out certain classes of hardened command and control bunkers; a task for which the GBU-28 has limited capabilities depending upon the depth of burial (up to a max of 100ft of soil and 22ft of reinforced concrete) and the construction (cut and cover types) of the bunker.

Despite all this a small force of deliverable JDAMs (in effect no F-111 means no GBU-28) and even less GBU-24s would not be able to achieve decapitation. Despite possessing absolute air superiority NATO forces during Operation Allied Force were never able to destroy the Yugoslav Army’s integrated air defence command, a key objective. That is, they did not even decapitate the air defence command let alone national command authorities.

So, no matter what “bomber” we have we would not be able to decapitate anybody in the region. This would be the most potent deterrent we could theoretically have. By the same token again and again the ability to hit urban-industrial targets with conventional bombs has rarely ever achieved deterrence and has never proved decisive in war. Air power can be decisive not in the context of strategic bombing but rather when used for close air support in land battles.

In fact, the whole focus of matching aircraft type with aircraft type in assessing deliverability of weapons is also wrongheaded even on its own terms. In the age of network-centric warfare the side possessing superior battlefield situational awareness achieves military superiority. In Australia’s case the possession of the Jindalee Over the Horizon Radar and the Wedgetail Airborne Early Warning and Control System will give Canberra this superior situational awareness and hence regional air superiority. This applies even in the case of the much lampooned F/A 18 Super Hornet and F-111.

There is no “bomber gap”.

But what would an Australian bomber force actually deter? An outright invasion of Australia is laughable. The combat radius of these aircraft, even with aerial refuelling, makes them limited to bombing sorties in our immediate region, but not northeast Asia at any rate.

Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia or Alfredo Reinado cannot even remotely invade Australia.

There are two other relatively more likely contingencies that would be of concern. The use of a limited raiding strategy against us in the remote resource rich north or the emergence of state sponsored terrorist infrastructure on the Taliban Afghan model.

In the first case the use of strategic air power would be counter-productive. It would limit Australia’s ability to muster international support in the appropriate international organisations and would limit diplomatic options to terminate the crisis on terms favourable to us.