Of caution and circumstance

Asia during the Howard years

Critics have argued throughout the Howard years that this approach is doing untold damage to Australia’s foreign policy interests in Asia. The paradox I explore in my book is that both the qualitative and quantitative evidence suggests otherwise.

The Howard Government has pioneered and stuck with a diplomatic approach to the region that is very different from that of its predecessors and by and large, it has worked. There are several reasons why, but one cannot ignore the major influence of fortune. Just as the Howard Government began settling into office, the international relations of East and South-East Asia began to change in ways that made the states to our north more amenable to the new approach.

Events between 1994 and 1997 deflated much of South-East Asia’s confident, assertive early-1990s regionalism. ASEAN absorbed four poor, governance-challenged new members, leading to a serious loss of organisational cohesion and momentum. The poor performance of regional institutions during the Asian financial crisis further contributed to this regionalist malaise.

In this environment, a government in Canberra not as devoted to regionalism as its predecessor was welcome. The Howard Government’s preference for bilateralism was closer to South-East Asian diplomatic practices.

The history of regionalism in East Asia shows that its states prefer to manage their relations primarily through bilateral means, and have kept multilateral arrangements weak, procedural and non-binding. Repeatedly, East Asian states have either rejected more binding, legalistic forms of multilateralism or have failed to commit to what appeared at the outset to be strong multilateral agreements.

In the context of the turmoil and political change brought on by the Asian financial crisis, an avowedly pragmatic government in Canberra was also welcome.

Gareth Evans had believed a “globalisation of values” was reducing the salience of the cultural divide between Australia and Asia, as English is adopted as the universally accepted lingua franca, and an ideological consensus emerges on multiculturalism, democracy, free market economies, “inclusivity” and co-operation. The Howard government’s “mutual respect and shared interests” formula appeared much closer to the ASEAN norm of non-intervention and resonated positively with a new crop of pragmatic, technocratic leaders refocused on stability and development.

The third major change during the Howard years has been the rise of China and its increasingly assertive role in South-East Asia. China’s economic development has been the single greatest driver of the post-Asian crisis growth of other East Asian countries. So while the region’s countries have a vested interest in China’s continued economic boom, Beijing is gaining levers of influence over its neighbours. Most South-East Asian countries are aware of China’s growing economic and political importance but are wary of becoming too beholden to Beijing.

South-East Asian countries have adopted four coping strategies. One has been to engage with China as a group, catching the wave of its economic growth.

Another has been to launch a new round of ASEAN integration, forging closer security relations and pushing forward with economic and financial integration.

A third has been to engage China through the ASEAN + 3 process, in order to tie in its interest in South-East Asia while moderating its behaviour through institutional norms.