Of caution and circumstance

Fourth, South-East Asian states have been eager to develop external relationships as ballast to China’s weight. Australia has become a more sought-after diplomatic partner - as have New Zealand, India, and the United States - as a way for South-East Asia to hedge against China’s pull.

The future

Howard’s attendance at the December 2005 East Asia Summit stands as a capstone for a decade’s successful diplomacy in Asia. But Machiavelli would argue that there is no cause for complacency, because fortune can change, especially as fortuna “shows her power when there is no virtù [prudent but bold resolve] marshalled to resist her”.

Not even the Howard Government’s most loyal supporters would accuse it of grand strategic vision or sweeping diplomatic initiatives: its own foreign policy White Paper asserted that “preparing for the future is not a matter of grand constructs”.

The major challenge for the Howard Government will be how it deals with challenges in the Asian region that do not respond to pragmatic incrementalism. Machiavelli would not have been optimistic: “The cautious man … cannot act impetuously when the times demand it of him, and this leads to his ruin.”

Howard’s cautious pragmatism has served him well so far, but may be a liability in dealing with major coming challenges. One such challenge is where Canberra’s growing closeness to Beijing will take us.

In his speech to the Lowy Institute in March 2005, Howard said, “Australia does not believe there is anything inevitable about escalating strategic competition between China and the United States”.

There is a desperate optimism in this statement, used to mask a deeper strategic uncertainty about where Australia might stand if forced to choose between its traditional great and powerful friend and the coming colossus. If it precludes careful, long term thought about issues such as this, the Howard approach to diplomacy in Asia may yield diminishing returns in the coming years.