East Asian Summit - just another talkfest?

Getting the big power relationships right

Getting the big power relationships right will be crucial for the future workings of the EAS. The starting point to understand US-China relations lies in the realisation that they encompass many stories and many policies. There is no single US policy towards China. Zoellick, who oversees the US-China dialogue, offers a new optimism about the most vital relationship of the coming century. At the same time, India and Japan will be Asian heavyweights, and depending on one’s political outlook, the closer alignment of New Dehli and Tokyo to Washington will be seen in Beijing as a new era of containment even as all leaders pledge greater co-operation.

Russia has joined the inaugural EAS as an observer state and its return to great power status is a matter of time as it grows in importance by leveraging on its gas and oil reserves.

There is inconclusive evidence that great powers are forming blocs to balance each other. Closer economic integration may not translate naturally into political alliances, and neither should expressions of closer security co-operation be viewed in offensive terms.

The key agenda will be free trade negotiations. This is a positive move forward as ASEAN has embarked on an ambitious round of free trade negotiations to reduce trade barriers to its own exports and hence increase its attractions to investors. ASEAN’s FTA may be small but it is comprehensive, and this week’s EAS will bring forward the final completion of economic integration to 2015. India and Korea have also begun talks with ASEAN and an FTA will soon be ironed out.

So where will the EAS be heading? The optimists say it will herald the dawn of a new Asian co-operative security - the promise of a new political community where the sense of oneness and “we-ness” are more important than long-standing differences. This optimism is visibly displayed on all banners lining the streets of Kuala Lumpur - “One Vision, One Identity, One Community”.

This idea of one community extends beyond the ASEAN-10, although the sense of cohesion is never perfect nor the commitment to multilateralism equally strong among all states. While the geographical location of nations in Asia will impact on how “Asian” states will feel, the landmark summit promises to build greater co-operation even if countries, such as Australia, feel that their participation in the first summit was marginal due to a late entry.

The pessimists will adopt a watch and see attitude. Unlike bilateral relations, the nature of multilateral dealings is such that it will take time before the dividends are seen. As Alexandra Downer noted, it will be years before the East Asian summits will amount to anything. It is far from clear whether Australia, China, India or Japan will seek to be key players in the summit. Equally uncertain is which country will be driving the summit so as not to create the impression that it is an anti-US hegemony.

The notion of ASEAN seeking to be a hub of a community linking the greater powers in the region is tenuous, as it has no material clout to compel big powers from imposing their agendas on the summit. Big powers will forge their own relationships of accommodation and rivalry rather than being constrained by rules of smaller neighbours. Even if each of the three big Asian powers portray themselves as gentle elephants, the reality of smaller nations being the grass they trample upon is unavoidable.

The summit holds great promise to unite Asia but the old quarrels and persistent political differences will remain. It is premature to speculate as to whether it will be a dawn of a new era of co-operative security or just another glorified talk shop. The verdict is still out on how close the reality and rhetoric will be.