East Asian Summit - just another talkfest?

Second, the “domino theory” of communism did not materialise, as Washington feared it would, when Vietnam became a communist state in 1975. ASEAN was formed in 1967 and remains a robust sub-regional diplomatic community - gradually winning converts to its “ASEAN Way” of informal and consensus-driven diplomacy. In 1994, the group formed the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), which has 24 member-states to date. Most of the ARF dialogue partners will be represented in the EAS, with the exception of EU, Canada and the US.

Third, the formation of the EAS represents the most visible sign that countries are seeking to abandon the Cold War mentality and there is a willingness to collaborate on win-win gestures compatible with shared prosperity.

An anti-US hegemonic institution?

There are lingering concerns the EAS could be seen as an anti-US hegemonic institution. Since 1990, the US has been opposed to an East Asian-only grouping, saying that such a format would tear the Pacific apart. Washington was more concerned about China's key role in the region and the possibility of Washington's influence waning as a result. Washington had muscled Japan for nearly a decade against participating in an East Asian grouping, first mooted by former Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad.

Australia has gained formal admission into the EAS by acceding to the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation. Alexandra Downer, Australia’s Foreign Minister, said it would be keen to participate in the East Asia Summit, although some countries have opposed its membership. Australia has long baulked at signing the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation - a non-aggression pledge with the 10-member ASEAN grouping - claiming it could conflict with obligations under its security treaty with the US. But Canberra has since made a 180-degree policy reversal to join the historic summit and asserted that signing the TAC will not compromise its alliance obligations with Washington.

The exclusion of the US at the inaugural EAS is not a definite indication of anti-US hegemonic intent. Pro-US states in South-East Asia, such as Singapore, are still open to the idea of Washington’s future involvement. The city state has consistently championed the stabilising role of the US. Foreign Minister George Yeo said the US should continue to play a key role in the region, citing the enormous relief efforts by the American military during the tsunami disaster that ravaged around a dozen countries located along the Indian Ocean coast.

The US deployed 16,000 military personnel, 26 large ships, 58 helicopters and 43 fixed wing aircraft in the relief and recovery effort following the December 26, 2004 tsunami that left at least 288,800 people dead. Future summits could well include the US as a dialogue partner or an observer country in a situation where membership can be fluidly defined and so expanded.

Admittedly, the exclusion of the US does point to Washington losing diplomatic influence to China. Outgoing deputy secretary of state Richard Armitage lamented that China has done well in its “charm offensive” to win over the Asian states by investing heavily in multilateral initiatives. China is very active in the ARF and signed a Code of Conduct in 2002 with ASEAN over the South China Sea territorial claims. It has also resolved most of its border disputes with Russia, India and Vietnam, and in some cases, to Beijing’s disadvantage.

Speaking at an economic forum on the sidelines of the ASEAN summit, Prime Minister Wen Jiabao said international stability was essential and Beijing wanted win-win relations with the rest of the world. China’s intention is to seek peace and implement development through co-operation. Meanwhile Washington has lost ground in Asia, due to its obsession in fighting the war on terror and perceiving Asia as the second front for terror activities. By frowning on multilateral initiatives, such as the ARF and regarding them as merely a talk shop, Washington has unwittingly defaulted the leadership to Beijing.

Washington has now retrospectively begun to seek to engage China more constructively with the hope of recovering lost influence in the region. The Bush administration, guided by Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick, is engaging in potentially the most far-reaching redefinition of US policy towards China for many years. In an interview with The Inquirer, Zoellick repudiates any suggestion of containment as a basis for US policy throwing it into the dustbin of history, Cold War parallels or 19th century balance-of-power concepts as the foundation for Washington's management of China's rise.

Zoellick says:

Our discussions with China focus on how this concept can be applied across a whole range of policy issues: economic, energy, security, nuclear non-proliferation, terrorism and regional security. The challenge of the dialogue is not only to engage people at a conceptual level but start to connect it to operational implications. What I am suggesting to the Chinese is that rather than keeping China contained or at arm's length or in balance, we are trying to urge China to play a role in this system of systems that has evolved.

Notably, the more enlightened view by Zoellick is in direct contrast to Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld’s June 4 speech in Singapore on China’s growing military spending.