The Philippines - three decades of terrorism

In 1995 about 200 arrived by boats and attacked a largely Christian town on the western coast of Mindanao where they indiscriminately fired on the population killing at least 53 people and wounding another 44. The town was previously almost entirely Muslim in population but had been overtaken by Christians. The massacre was also a warning to other Muslim groups not to co-operate with the government. In a statement after the attack an Abu Sayyaf spokesman criticised the mainstream MNLF leadership for “betraying the Muslim cause”.

The Abu Sayyaf has also employed bandit-like tactics such as kidnapping and beheading of foreigners. In May 2001 the group kidnapped 20 people, including three American hostages one of whom was beheaded. The rebels obtained millions of dollars from these and other criminal activities (such as drug-running) and for years escaped massive military resources arraigned against them.

It now appears that the terrorist group's Houdini-like skill resulted from money-for-information deals between Abu Sayyaf and the army, deals that led to much comment and criticism within the Philippines media. After the September 11 attacks the Filipino government, with advice from American Special Forces, launched a major campaign against the Abu Sayyaf killing scores, perhaps hundreds, of their fighters and sympathisers. The history of the Abu Sayyaf and the government's attempt to eliminate it illustrates a common theme that emerges in the Philippine battle against terrorism. Bribery and brutality appear to go hand in hand; the terrorist groups and the authorities practise both.

One example of this official brutality was illustrated to me in 1998 at the beginning of the Estrada regime by supporters of thrice-elected Davao Mayor Rodrigo Duterte who attained almost cult-like status in the country after making the most lawless city in Mindanao a relatively safe and secure place for locals and foreigners. They told me that when he was first elected, ten years earlier, Duterte inherited a city plagued by kidnappings, murders, drug addiction and a huge communist insurgency problem. Duterte began by negotiating with the communist terrorists. He told them that they had to stop assassinating government officials and robbery. He promised housing, jobs and money for their followers and money for their leaders.

The negotiations were successful so he turned to kidnappers, bank-robbers and muggers and issued a public statement warning criminals that unless they stopped, they would pay a great price. Many just laughed. But then the bodies of kidnappers, robbers and remaining communist terrorists were found lying on the city's footpaths with bullets through their heads. Duterte denied any involvement but no one in Davao had any doubts about the existence of death squads. Duterte's success was relatively short lived. Five years later crime in Davao was increasing and so was terrorism, as was so dramatically shown by bombing attacks at Davao airport.

It is clear to me that neither bribery nor brute force will end terrorism in the Philippines, a fact that the government of President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo is just coming to grips with. Though her Government, with the assistance of American military advisors and personnel, appears to have had some successes against the Abu Sayyaf, this group is far from destroyed.

Similarly, as social and economic conditions remain abysmally bad and corruption continues unabated, the Moro groups grow from strength to strength. That bribery still plagues the police and military was vividly illustrated during the escape and subsequent shooting of the fanatic Jemmah Islamiyah terrorist Fathur Rohman al-Ghozi. He was originally a member of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front but as a Jemaah Islamiyah terrorist was responsible for many bombing deaths in the country. Al-Ghozi was able to walk out of his high security cell with breathtaking ease.

Although hundreds of al Qaida recruits trained at Moro camps in the late 1990s, Jemaah Islamiyah and other fellow travellers move freely around the Philippines, no overarching terrorist organisation yet exists. The Moro rebels aim for an independent Islamic State, Abu Sayyaf has degenerated into a bunch of bandits and the NPA seems preoccupied with building up its financial resources and members. But how long will it be before these metamorphose into an oligarchy that is structured and organised? Some terrorist researchers such as Professor Rohan Gunaratna, author of Inside Al Qaeda, believe that over the past year groups like Jemmah Islamiyah, Lasker Jihad, the Abu Sayyaf, the MILF and MNLF have formed interconnecting networks that eventually aim to create a unified Islamic state across the region.

Unless President Arroyo, or her successor, begins to deal with the causes of terrorism, rather than just with its symptoms, we can expect to see even more guerrilla violence and the tentacles of terrorism spreading throughout this complex and highly volatile country. It is, however, difficult to be optimistic when the leaders of far more developed, affluent and politically sophisticated nations also continue to try to combat terrorism by addressing its end result rather than its causes.