The reasons for the liberation of Iraq
are three: the continuing and serious
breaches of the terms of the 1991 Gulf
War ceasefire, the military superiority
of the coalition, and above all the beliefs
- and the courage - of the three leaders
of the Anglo-Australian-American (AAA)
coalition.
The first broadside against the AAA coalition
was the argument that the intervention
was in breach of international law, with
the threat that the leaders, their ministers
and their officers might end up before
the International Criminal Court. Now
the argument that some or other measure
taken by a democratic government is against
international law is becoming a very tired
and predictable mantra, recalling an old
Arab saying: "The dogs bark, and
the caravan moves on".
And the caravan has indeed moved on.
Yet at every point, we were told that
disaster was imminent. We were told that
the intervention would result in a massacre
of civilians, that coalition planning
was in disarray, that the coalition was
disastrously under resourced, that it
was going into a quagmire, that the battles
for Basra and Baghdad would be a new Stalingrad,
etc. As each criticism and prediction
was shown to be completely wrong, new
ones were instantly thrown up. As they
will inevitably be as long as the coalition
remains in Iraq, and even afterwards.
Stand by for the books and films on this.
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In the meantime, having ensured, as the
Soviets did, that the Security Council
would be sidelined, the leaders of the
newly emerging Triple Alliance (Paris-Berlin-Moscow)
now argue that the future governor of
Iraq should be chosen by the Council -
that is by them. This is supported by
the same commentators who denounced
the intervention, the letter writers who
constantly tell us they are ashamed to
be Australian as well as no doubt the
demonstrators, including those who desecrated
Sydney's Anglican cathedral. (Their justification?
They thought it was a synagogue!)
Leaving the governance of Iraq to the
Security Council would obviously be a
recipe for indecision and unworthy compromise.
The fact is that since the Second World
War, almost every territory liberated
by the Americans, the British and the
Australians was left by them as a free
and democratic state. (The exceptions
were those colonies handed back to other
powers and Hong Kong, where the installation
of democratic institutions would have
been interpreted as a provocation by Mao.)
Consistent with this tradition, the coalition
will gradually hand over power, under
tutelage, to an interim Iraqi administration.
This will no doubt emerge from the opposition
in exile and from domestic elements untainted
by Ba'ath party affiliations. And in due
course a constituent assembly will no
doubt be called. Its task will be to make
the new Iraq democratic, and preferably
federal. Fortunately it is the coalition,
and not the Triple Alliance, who is most
experienced in advising on these matters,
for they enjoy constitutional
arrangements which have proved to be among
the most democratic and most stable in
the world.
The future federal structure should not
stress ethnic division but be essentially
territorial. Thus the old geographic names
of the Ottoman Empire provinces are preferable
to say, Kurdistan, which would have the
added disadvantage of provoking Turkey.
It should ensure that the states are strong
and properly funded, indeed as strong
as the Australian states were intended
to be. So, with the benefit of Australian
hindsight the constitution should attempt
to forestall the political-judicial alliance
that weakened our states.
There are only two constitutional models
worth considering for Iraq - Westminster
or Washington. The American system works
very well, based as it was on the then
colonial system and a perhaps convenient
exaggeration of King George III's role.
In the American colonies, the governor,
sometimes chosen by the colonists, was
appointed by, and responsible to London
and not the legislature which was under
the control of the colonists. So the US
today has an executive vested in one person,
the President, who cannot be removed except
by impeachment. Would this work in a country
and a culture which has inherited a "caudillo"
tradition, that is rule by a messianic
strong man? The US system has not worked
well whenever it was translated to another
culture, the Hispanic. The president has
too often become the strong-man dictator.
This even happened in France, when she
experimented with an executive presidency.
The first and only president engineered
a coup, converting himself into another
autocratic Emperor, NapoleonIII! (Not
that France had great success with her
Westminster republics, the Third and the
Fourth.)
So it would seem that for Iraq there
are too many dangers in an executive presidency
for Iraq. In fact, until 1958, Iraq lived
under an apparently benign and democratic
Westminster-style constitution, marred
by the politicisation of the Army, especially
those younger officers who dreamed of
a single Arab nation and resented continuing
British influence. When they engineered
a coup to install a pro-Nazi government
in 1941 they went too far, and Churchill
had to intervene to restore constitutional
order.
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The solution today may well lie in a
Westminster federation, more like Australia
or Canada. Indeed Egypt and, as we have
seen, Iraq had something like the Westminster
system until the dictators took over.
Now Jordan and Iraq are becoming more
democratic. And one of the most attractive
Iraq opposition leaders, working with
Ahmed Chalabi, is the urbane and sophisticated
Sharif Ali bin Al-Hussein, one of the
survivors of the massacre of the Royal
Family in the coup in 1958, which installed
a succession of bloodthirsty dictators.
He will no doubt play a significant role
in this exercise in nation building.
We are on the threshold of a truly exciting
development, the introduction - some would
say the reintroduction of democracy into
the Arab world, but a democracy which
must have the full panoply of constitutional
checks and balances to ensure against
the emergence of yet another messianic
strongman - the sort of politician who
believes he is uniquely endowed with his
"big picture" vision. The world
has surely seen enough of them.