What can the world expect from Bush's second term?

India and Pakistan have been left to their own devices in recent years and are likely to be allowed to stay that way as long as their tensions only simmer. The relationship with President Musharraf of Pakistan can be expected to receive further nurturing, although confidence in the contribution of Pakistan in defeating the Taliban and Al Qaeda declines.

The last group includes all other states that are likely to play a two-handed game. They will gradually distance themselves while increasingly becoming self-reliant where it is achievable. Political collaborations such as the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) can be expected to look to greater internal activism to reach common goals on regional issues. But they will find that an emboldened Bush administration will wield its influence on specific issues such as maritime security, container security and free trade. These will be well received by small proactive nations such as Singapore but will meet rebelliousness by larger, less aligned countries such as Indonesia and Malaysia. Whatever their reactions, they will still have to deal with Washington’s long and strong arm.

It is perhaps on the thorny issue of the Middle East that the prospects of the second Bush term are least clear. Will it continue its policy of being a spectator or return to the historical model of American leadership in Arab-Israeli issues? I suspect that the administration will continue to allow Israel a great deal of leeway in shaping the debate over the Palestinian question while making noises of conciliation towards both sides. The recent developments concerning the health of Chairman Arafat however present a “break” in the dynamic permitting the administration to re-enter the arena without having to depart from its existing policy of not dealing with Arafat. For the foreseeable future and for practical purposes the Palestinian question will continue to yield its historically central position in American policy to the more pressing problem of managing post-Saddam Iraq.

The next four years may mean some things stay the same while others will change. The bottom line for all is that they must recognise the political reality and figure out how to deal with it to the best strategic advantage. That at least will be a familiar, and difficult, challenge for policy officers in every foreign ministry.