The Bering Strait Tunnel: from intercontinental link to a governance ecosystem

Holistically, this opportunity changes the planning question. As opposed to treating the tunnel as an isolated construction project, policymakers would need to consider a coordinated and subjective governance ecosystem that encompasses transport standards, customs procedures, investment rules, data-sharing, energy infrastructure, environmental protection and cross-border energy management. With this perspective, the GAFG Connectivity Doctrine's logic of governance as the multiplier applies, whereby infrastructure creates potential, but institutional quality determines its productivity.

Furthermore, the Arctic dimension must also be noted. Infrastructure within this region must take accountability for severe climatic conditions, fragile ecosystems, permafrost, and the interests of local and Indigenous communities. Long-term viability would also require environmental assessment, meaningful consultation, and clear mechanisms for monitoring impacts through the project's life cycle.

This heightens the cruciality in examining how connectivity can cause resilience, the economic opportunities it distributes, and the risks it introduces. A technologically monumental link that lacks sufficient traffic, effective connecting networks or an effective governance framework could become an expensive liability, or perhaps a multilateral cautionary tale.

This perfectly instantiates the core tenets of the GAFG Connectivity Doctrine and its ecosystem logic: economic value emerges from a variety of different streams, not from the efficiency of any single link.

Figure 4: Visualisation of governance considerations for a Bering Strait link within the framework of the GAFG Connectivity Doctrine (Joe Harvey Field, GAFG)

Economic opportunities

From a specific economic perspective, advocates for the project suggest several possible advantages. For example, the current proposition would invite shorter land connections between Asian and North American markets, access to mineral and energy resources of the Far North, collective energy and data lines alongside the tunnel, as well as a land alternative to sea routes. Nevertheless, such advantages depend on the conditions that the tunnel cannot currently offer. Likeminded critics heighten that US-Russia trade is small, subject to sanctions, and that neither Siberia nor Alaska currently consist of the infrastructure that the tunnel would require. The economic case for this project, therefore, relies less on the cross of freight volumes, but instead ensuring markets and insurers would accept the connected infrastructure and financing.

Complementarity, not rivalry

The project would not exist in isolation, as the tunnel would enter a crowded field that already includes the Trans-Siberian Railway, the Northern Sea Route, the Middle Corridor, and the International North-South Transport Corridor. The GAFG Connectivity Doctrine's answer to such complexity is to assess corridors as a portfolio of complementary routes rather than as competing projects. The relevant question is therefore not simply whether the tunnel could offer another connection, but whether it would add genuine resilience, optionality and value to the wider network. Where could traffic be redirected if one route were disrupted, and under what institutional and economic conditions would alternative routes remain viable?

This analysis builds on GAFG's previous work on Arctic connectivity, examination of the Eurasian Gateway Network, and GAFG's recent discussion of the America–Panama corridor. Together, these contributions reinforce the Connectivity Doctrine's central argument: infrastructure must be understood not as an isolated project, but as part of a wider network of complementary routes, interoperable systems and coherent governance. The Bering Strait Tunnel should therefore be assessed within this broader connectivity ecosystem, particularly given the tendency for ambitious infrastructure proposals to become entangled in political rhetoric before their practical requirements have been established.

Feasibility before symbolism

The argued cost reduction forecast to 'below USD 8 billion' is an attractive proposition, however it should be deemed as a claim that requires further independent verification. The operating costs of just boring the tunnel cannot be equated with the cost of delivering a transcontinental corridor. Therefore, a comprehensive feasibility study is suggested, in order to assess geological conditions, safety, construction methods, access infrastructure, freight demand and financing. Notwithstanding, the project's feasibility analysis should also consider the lifecycle of continuous operations, maintenance, and potential expansion strategies.

A suggested phased approach would allow governments, investors, and additional stakeholders to test the project's economic assumptions, before committing to its full development. Essential assignments should consider independent technical assessments, transparent cost estimates, a credible allocation of financial and operational risks, and their subsequent contingencies. Through this preparation phase, one must not consider this as a diminishment of the project's ambition, but instead ensure the project has a gravitational strategic vision.

The missing link is governance

The proposal provides the opportunity to reconsider how major infrastructures should be conceived in an increasingly interconnected world. Corridors are not simply lines on a map; they organise economic relationships, shape regional development, and redistribute strategic opportunities. The durability of such an impressive project depends on the coherence of the systems that are built around it.

The tunnel may or may not prove technically or economically feasible under the proposed conditions. Nevertheless, the deeper significance provokes another question - can connectivity become a practical instrument of cooperation, as opposed to a mere expression of political aspiration?

As referenced, the strategic objective should prioritise the project's viability, resilience, and mutual benefit within the governance ecosystem that is concerned with the tunnel. Only then can a physical link between Eurasia and North America become an outstanding instrument to intercontinental activity, and more than just an engineering achievement.

The Bering Strait could eventually become such a gateway, but the tunnel itself would not deliver that outcome on its own. Therefore, the main denominator within this project, as well as previous projects that GAFG Connectivity Doctrine analyses, is the significance of governance. Considering the GAFG Connectivity Doctrine, the answer begins with the policy recommendation's core principle. As repeatedly noted by GAFG's Forum researchers: 'gateways link places; network hubs link systems'.