The Bering Strait Tunnel: from intercontinental link to a governance ecosystem

This exact distinction lies at the very heart of the GAFG Connectivity Doctrine, whereby infrastructure is governance made physical. A tunnel can connect two territories, however only an integrated and thought-through system can connect and withstand their economies. The physical proximity between the two states does not automatically produce such economic integration, just as a transport corridor does not by itself guarantee prosperity.

The fundamental question is consequently not whether the Bering Strait can be crossed, but whether the crossing itself can be embedded into an interoperable, resilient and economically viable transcontinental corridor.

The GAFG connectivity doctrine

Through its Global Maritime Governance Forum (GMGF), GAFG has developed its own Connectivity Doctrine to ensure all is follows the institutional coherence, rules and standards. Consequently, corridors are treated as networked governance environments, as opposed to projects concerning infrastructure alone.

The five key dimensions from the GAFG Connectivity Doctrine recur in this exploration:

1. Systems over projects - a corridor should be judged by how it interacts with the networks around it, as opposed to an isolated event;
2. Governance as the multiplier: infrastructure creates potential, however connec-tivity also depends on the engagement of coherence and institutional capacity;
3. Complementarity over competition - corridor systems are optimised as portfolios, not rival routes;
4. Interoperability as the core constant: The main bottleneck usually concerns mis-alignment of rules, standards and institutions (as opposed to physical capacity);
5. Connectivity as an ecosystem property - economic value emerges from system-wide integration, not as individual corridor efficiency.

GAFG continuously argues that current approaches to such projects each miss these key dimensions. Corridor planning presumes that institutions will follow the infrastructure, however this is sometimes not explicitly the case. The doctrine treats these dimensions coherently, and considers how to make such approaches work between systems that were not originally designed to align. The example of the Bering Strait is a test of the GAFG Connectivity Doctrine's argument. A corridor between Russia and the United States would connect two governance systems within an environment that could complicate sanctions, security measures, and the states' international relations.

The geopolitics of connectivity

The aforementioned proposal illustrates how infrastructure can become geopolitically significant. The project itself as a symbol of 'unity' between Russia and the US, and more comprehensively, between Eurasia and the Americas. Such symbolism is understandable, especially as the last century has shown the crossing's reflection of easing diplomatic dialogue and intl relations, as opposed to it solely being a construction plan.

Nevertheless, a political announcement and a durable framework for cooperation are two disparate entities. The project, which intends to transcend geopolitical divisions, cannot exclusively depend on the goodwill of individual leaders, temporary diplomatic openings, nor the commercial interests of a single company. The proposal would also have to be reconciled with the existing sanction mechanisms and the wider political context. This includes current Eastern European geopolitical conflict, which could influence who would finance, insure, and operate such connections.

The proposition is also contingent upon agreements that are capable of surviving political change, whether organic or mandated. Financial arrangements, ownership, operational responsibilities, security provisions, environmental standards and dispute-settlement mechanisms should be established before construction could become a credible prospect. Ultimately, institutional continuity must mirror the engineering capacity.

In this specific context, the tunnel exemplifies a broader question - could strategic infrastructure become a platform for rebuilding practical cooperation, even when political relations remain difficult?

The answer would depend less on the symbolism attached to the project, than on the institutions created to govern it.

From a bilateral project to a governance ecosystem

A fixed physical connection between Russia and the United States would be bilateral geographically, and multilaterally in its economic consequences. The value of such a project would also depend on its opportunity to extend its connections to Canada, the wider North American railway network, Siberia, and the Eurasian transport system. Additional links to Asian and European markets could generate a longer-term vision, subject to demand and the engagement to continue connecting infrastructure.