Reforming Australian defence: from Cold War relics to an affordable, independent missile and drone deterrent

Production would leverage Australian innovation supplemented by selective overseas technology transfers - exactly the model already underway in GWEO. Local assembly and eventual full manufacture would create jobs, reduce supply-chain risks and enable rapid scaling in crisis.

Costs per unit are orders of magnitude lower than a submarine or fighter jet. A swarm of 100 drones might equal the price of one F-35 yet achieve comparable or superior effects through saturation. The ADF would retain minimal high-end platforms for specific roles: coastal patrol vessels, limited fighter cover for sovereignty tasks, and light mobile forces for domestic security. Heavy-armour and large surface fleets could be de-emphasised. Command-and-control, sensors and electronic warfare would integrate everything into a networked "kill web."

Northern bases (Darwin, Tindal, Curtin) would host mobile missile batteries rather than vulnerable fixed assets. This posture aligns with "deterrence by denial." Potential adversaries would face prohibitive risk attempting operations in Australia's approaches. The force would be sustainable, expandable in wartime and genuinely produced and controlled in Australia without reliance on foreign political approval for key munitions.

Beyond alliances: strategic independence

The assumption that the United States will always underwrite Australian security is no longer prudent. America confronts internal divisions, fiscal pressures and competing global demands. AUKUS itself illustrates the risks of over-dependence. Policy must plan for scenarios where US support is delayed, conditional or unavailable. Independence does not mean isolation; bilateral and multilateral partnerships remain valuable for intelligence, training and technology. But core strike capability must rest on Australian soil and Australian industry.

Nor should planning fixate on any single adversary. A flexible, missile-centric force deters aggression from any quarter while preserving diplomatic flexibility. It avoids the trap of self-fulfilling threat inflation. Implementation would require political courage: reallocating funds from AUKUS overruns and legacy platforms, accelerating GWEO with dedicated ministerial oversight, and investing in workforce and testing ranges.

The 2023 DSR and 2024 National Defence Strategy already point toward long-range strike; the next step is to make missiles and drones the centrepiece, not an add-on.

A force fit for Australia's future

For half a century Australian defence policy has chased relevance through alliance and high-tech platforms. The result is a force expensive to maintain, vulnerable to modern threats and dependent on external powers. The wars of the 2020s and the rapid evolution of artificial intelligence have rewritten the rules.

victory belongs to those who can field mass, precision and adaptability at sustainable cost. A missile and drone-based deterrent offers Australia precisely that. Locally built, layered across ranges, capable of striking before threats materialize. It would provide genuine independence and credible deterrence. This can be affordable, scalable and aligned with geography. By moving beyond Cold War relics and alliance assumptions, Australia can secure its future on its own terms - sovereign, resilient and ready for the missile age.

Breaking free from Cold War legacies

Australia must move toward an Independent, missile-centric deterrent. Australia's defence policy and force structure remains heavily shaped by Cold War-era thinking and deep integration with United States military planning. The Australian Defence Force (ADF) emphasizes high-end, expensive platforms-advanced fighter jets, large surface combatants, and nuclear-powered submarines under AUKUS-designed primarily for coalition operations far from home rather than standalone defence of the continent.

As an island nation with vast maritime approaches, Australia faces limited utility in maintaining a large conventional army with heavy armour or blue-water fleets vulnerable to modern precision strikes. Recent conflicts demonstrate that affordable, mass-produced missiles and drones can achieve disproportionate effects against superior conventional forces.

A pivot to a sovereign, layered missile and drone capability built locally with selective international inputs offers credible deterrence by enabling strikes on approaching threats long before they reach Australian shores, at sustainable cost. The historical Evolution of Australian Defence Posture from the 1970s to present needs to move into the new era of war and conflict as seen in Ukraine, and Iran.