Reforming Australian defence: from Cold War relics to an affordable, independent missile and drone deterrent

Australia's defence posture remains anchored in a model forged during the Cold War and refined through decades of close alliance with the United States. Large, expensive platforms - advanced fighter jets, surface warships and heavy armoured formations - dominate the Australian Defence Force (ADF).

Yet this configuration is increasingly mismatched with the realities of modern warfare, Australia's geography as a vast island continent, and the need for genuine strategic independence.

Recent conflicts in Ukraine, along the Thai-Cambodian border, and involving Iran have shown that low-cost missiles and drones can neutralise far more expensive armed-systems. A new defence policy should pivot to a locally produced, layered missile and drone force capable of striking potential attackers long before they reach Australian shores.

This approach would deliver credible deterrence at a fraction of the cost of programs like AUKUS while assuming neither perpetual US dominance nor any single country as an inevitable enemy. The Australian Defence Forces (ADF) today fields approximately 59,000 active personnel and 33,000 reserves. Its navy relies on ageing Collins-class submarines, Hobart-class destroyers and a shrinking surface fleet. The air force is transitioning to F-35 Joint Strike Fighters after retiring the F/A-18 Hornets. The army maintains infantry brigades supported by limited armoured vehicles, with recent cuts to infantry fighting vehicle numbers.

These capabilities reflect decades of planning that prioritised interoperability with US forces for expeditionary operations rather than standalone defence of the continent.

A half-century of shifting priorities

Australian defence policy has oscillated for 50 years. In the 1960s and early 1970s, "forward defence" sent troops to Vietnam alongside American and allied forces. The 1976 Defence White Paper marked the first formal articulation of a "defence of Australia" doctrine after the Vietnam withdrawal and the British drawdown east of Suez. It emphasised self-reliance within an alliance framework but still assumed US support in major contingencies.

The then landmark 1987 Defence White Paper, underpinned by the Dibb Review, crystallised this shift. It called for a maritime strategy focused on northern approaches, rejection of large-scale land armies, and capabilities to operate independently in Australia's immediate region.

The 1990s and 2000s saw a partial reversal. Interventions in East Timor (1999), the Gulf Wars, Afghanistan and Iraq pulled the ADF back toward expeditionary roles. White Papers in 1994, 2000, 2009 and 2013 increasingly referenced the rise of China while maintaining the US alliance as the cornerstone.

The 2016 Defence White Paper and 2020 Strategic Update accelerated focus on the Indo-Pacific. The 2023 Defence Strategic Review (DSR) and 2024 National Defence Strategy introduced "National Defence" and "deterrence by denial." Long-range strike and guided weapons gained priority. Yet implementation remained platform-heavy. Nuclear-powered submarines under AUKUS dominated budgets, while other programs faced cuts.

The pattern is clear: every decade or so, policy rhetoric evolves, but the underlying force structure - expensive, alliance dependent platforms persisted.

Vulnerabilities of the Current Model Australia's geography dictated that any serious threat must cross vast oceans or approach through northern chokepoints. A large standing army or heavy armour offers little adversary thousands of kilometres away.

Modern precision munitions render surface ships and air bases vulnerable. One lesson from the Black Sea was unmistakable: cheap unmanned surface vessels and drones have devastated a Russian fleet once considered formidable.

Australian jet fighters, while advanced, represent high-value targets. A single F-35 costs over $100 million; losing even a handful in the opening hours of conflict would be catastrophic. Surface warships face the same risk from anti-ship missiles. Coastal patrol and mine countermeasures vessels retain value, but blue-water power projection fleets are increasingly redundant for an island nation focused on denial.

AUKUS exemplifies the problems. The projected to cost up to A$368 billion over decades. The program locked Australia into nuclear submarines whose delivery timeline stretches into the 2040s. Delays in US Virginia-class transfers, industrial bottlenecks and opportunity costs have already forced reductions elsewhere: fewer Hunter-class frigates, cancelled MQ-9B drones, scaled-back infantry fighting vehicles.

Critics rightly note the deal assumes China as the primary threat and perpetual US reliability. With the United States facing domestic challenges, stretched global commitments and potential shifts in priorities, reliance on such a massive, single-platform bet undermines sovereignty. Defence spending sat at around A$59 billion (roughly 2% of GDP) in 2025-26 and is projected to rise.

Yet AUKUS and related naval programs consumed a disproportionate share, crowding out potential investment in affordable mass systems. The result was a force optimised for yesterday's wars rather than tomorrow's missile-dominated battlespace.

Lessons from contemporary conflicts

Ukraine's experience is insightful. Low-cost drones and missiles have sunk or damaged dozens of Russian warships, neutralised expensive air defences and inflicted attrition on armoured columns at minimal expense to the defender. Fibre-optic guided FPV drones evade electronic jamming; loitering munitions turn commercial components into precision strike tools.

The Black Sea "drone war" showed that sea control can be contested without a traditional navy. Similar dynamics played out in the 2025 Thai-Cambodian border clashes. Both sides deployed kamikaze drones and FPV systems reminiscent of Ukrainian tactics. Cambodia used Chinese-supplied drones. Thailand responded with domestically developed models, including bomber and multi-copter systems. These low-cost assets disrupted conventional operations, targeted air bases and forced rapid adaptation. Iran's missile and drone barrages against regional targets further illustrate how relatively inexpensive systems can saturate defences and project power across hundreds of kilometres.

The common thread is asymmetry. An attacker need not invade Australia's shores; they can threaten sea lanes, northern bases or offshore assets from afar. Australia's response must mirror this reality: massed, attractable systems that can strike first and sustain operations without bankrupting the nation.

A sovereign missile and drone force

Australia already possesses the industrial foundations for a new model. The Guided Weapons and Explosive Ordnance (GWEO) Enterprise, launched in recent years, partners with Lockheed Martin (GMLRS assembly starting 2025), Raytheon, Kongsberg (Naval Strike Missile and Joint Strike Missile production) and others. Domestic companies such as DefendTex produce low-cost loitering munitions and UAVs like the Drone40 and Drone81, already selected for ADF trials. The Australian developed AI driven autonomous underwater vehicle (XL-AUV) designed for stealthy, long-endurance surveillance, reconnaissance and attack missions by Anduril Industries shows what the nation can produce indigenously.

A restructured policy could prioritise three layers:

Short-range systems (under 100 km): Coastal defence drones, loitering munitions and portable anti-ship/anti-air missiles for northern bases and maritime approaches. These would be cheap, attritable and produced in volume.

Medium-range systems (100-1,000 km): Ground- and sea-launched cruise and ballistic missiles (extensions of existing PrSM and HIMARS capabilities) plus ship-launched Naval Strike Missiles. Mobile launchers dispersed across the north would create a "porcupine" effect.

Long-range systems (1,000+ km): Hypersonic or high-supersonic missiles, potentially air- or ground-launched, capable of reaching adversary staging areas or fleets well before they approach Australian waters. These would form the strategic deterrent.

Production would leverage Australian innovation supplemented by selective overseas technology transfers - exactly the model already underway in GWEO. Local assembly and eventual full manufacture would create jobs, reduce supply-chain risks and enable rapid scaling in crisis.

Costs per unit are orders of magnitude lower than a submarine or fighter jet. A swarm of 100 drones might equal the price of one F-35 yet achieve comparable or superior effects through saturation. The ADF would retain minimal high-end platforms for specific roles: coastal patrol vessels, limited fighter cover for sovereignty tasks, and light mobile forces for domestic security. Heavy-armour and large surface fleets could be de-emphasised. Command-and-control, sensors and electronic warfare would integrate everything into a networked "kill web."

Northern bases (Darwin, Tindal, Curtin) would host mobile missile batteries rather than vulnerable fixed assets. This posture aligns with "deterrence by denial." Potential adversaries would face prohibitive risk attempting operations in Australia's approaches. The force would be sustainable, expandable in wartime and genuinely produced and controlled in Australia without reliance on foreign political approval for key munitions.

Beyond alliances: strategic independence

The assumption that the United States will always underwrite Australian security is no longer prudent. America confronts internal divisions, fiscal pressures and competing global demands. AUKUS itself illustrates the risks of over-dependence. Policy must plan for scenarios where US support is delayed, conditional or unavailable. Independence does not mean isolation; bilateral and multilateral partnerships remain valuable for intelligence, training and technology. But core strike capability must rest on Australian soil and Australian industry.

Nor should planning fixate on any single adversary. A flexible, missile-centric force deters aggression from any quarter while preserving diplomatic flexibility. It avoids the trap of self-fulfilling threat inflation. Implementation would require political courage: reallocating funds from AUKUS overruns and legacy platforms, accelerating GWEO with dedicated ministerial oversight, and investing in workforce and testing ranges.

The 2023 DSR and 2024 National Defence Strategy already point toward long-range strike; the next step is to make missiles and drones the centrepiece, not an add-on.

A force fit for Australia's future

For half a century Australian defence policy has chased relevance through alliance and high-tech platforms. The result is a force expensive to maintain, vulnerable to modern threats and dependent on external powers. The wars of the 2020s and the rapid evolution of artificial intelligence have rewritten the rules.

victory belongs to those who can field mass, precision and adaptability at sustainable cost. A missile and drone-based deterrent offers Australia precisely that. Locally built, layered across ranges, capable of striking before threats materialize. It would provide genuine independence and credible deterrence. This can be affordable, scalable and aligned with geography. By moving beyond Cold War relics and alliance assumptions, Australia can secure its future on its own terms - sovereign, resilient and ready for the missile age.

Breaking free from Cold War legacies

Australia must move toward an Independent, missile-centric deterrent. Australia's defence policy and force structure remains heavily shaped by Cold War-era thinking and deep integration with United States military planning. The Australian Defence Force (ADF) emphasizes high-end, expensive platforms-advanced fighter jets, large surface combatants, and nuclear-powered submarines under AUKUS-designed primarily for coalition operations far from home rather than standalone defence of the continent.

As an island nation with vast maritime approaches, Australia faces limited utility in maintaining a large conventional army with heavy armour or blue-water fleets vulnerable to modern precision strikes. Recent conflicts demonstrate that affordable, mass-produced missiles and drones can achieve disproportionate effects against superior conventional forces.

A pivot to a sovereign, layered missile and drone capability built locally with selective international inputs offers credible deterrence by enabling strikes on approaching threats long before they reach Australian shores, at sustainable cost. The historical Evolution of Australian Defence Posture from the 1970s to present needs to move into the new era of war and conflict as seen in Ukraine, and Iran.