Will the Xi Jinping era come to a quiet end?

The so-called "Beidaihe Conference" does not actually exist, because it is not listed on the CCP's regular meeting agenda. In Beidaihe there are only irregular, closed-door consultations. It is widely believed that this year's Beidaihe talks will decisively influence the CCP's Fourth Plenary Session scheduled for October, which in turn will shape the 21st Party Congress. I have long argued this point: major CCP meetings are usually pre-arranged, with key decisions already negotiated within the top leadership. These are then rubber-stamped through routine meetings by "hand-raising machines" (party delegates, NPC deputies, or CPPCC members) to provide procedural legitimacy, before being announced to the party and the public.

The central question this time is: will the Beidaihe talks quietly bring an end to the Xi Jinping era? That is the biggest point of attention.

This year's closed-door talks at Beidaihe are a continuation of last year's. The political upheaval that occurred during the Third Plenary Session last year was linked to the military's "quasi-mutiny." Without the military emerging as an independent force at a critical historical moment, neither the extraordinary political anomalies of the past year nor the flood of rumors would have been possible. These are not mere rumors; they have been reported by major international media outlets and even, in some form, indirectly confirmed by senior US officials. For example, Voice of America reported in 2024 that during his visit to Beijing on August 29, US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan met with Zhang Youxia, Vice Chairman of the CCP's Central Military Commission. Ordinarily, the US National Security Advisor should have met with China's Minister of Defense; the meeting with Zhang Youxia was clearly an extraordinary arrangement, reflecting Washington's awareness that Zhang held real authority over the Chinese military and was therefore the key figure to engage with.

When rumors surrounding Zhang Youxia were swirling, it would have been very easy for relevant CCP departments to dispel them or set the record straight. All that was needed was for Zhang to publish a pledge of loyalty to Xi in the PLA Daily. Clearly, that did not happen. Since the latter half of last year, the PLA Daily has not only stopped promoting the system of "the Chairman of the CMC taking full responsibility," but has also ceased urging the military to "be good fighters for Chairman Xi." Instead, a series of declarative commentaries have been published, focusing on party principles, collective leadership, and intra-party democracy. Everyone understands that the military is an institution where all commands must be obeyed. Thus, when the PLA Daily gives high-profile emphasis to "democratic centralism," it is not really addressing the military about democracy - it is sending a message directed at the Party's central leadership.

Therefore, a "mutiny" - that is, an abnormal shift within the military - has already taken place. How it will affect the CCP's political landscape, or more precisely, how it will shape the political struggles during the Beidaihe talks, will determine the agenda of the Fourth Plenary Session and may even decisively influence the selection of top leaders at the 21st Party Congress.

Without a mutiny or quasi-mutiny (not aimed at overthrowing the regime, but at altering the structure of personal dictatorship), there would be no force within the system capable of shaking Xi Jinping's personal autocracy, which has already entrenched itself through constitutional amendments and the establishment of a model of lifelong rule. It is precisely because the military has emerged as an independent force that the Party elders have re-entered the stage, creating a balance of political power against Xi Jinping's faction.

"Ending the Xi era" has become a consensus among the party, government, and military

First, Xi Jinping brought an end to the Reform and Opening-up era. At the level of national strategy, he abandoned Deng Xiaoping's principle of "keeping a low profile while biding time," pushing China into heightened tensions with the United States and the West, to the point where the US now classifies China among its adversaries. The international political and economic environment has become more hostile than ever.

Second, Xi has moved politically in the opposite direction of political reform. The pragmatic arrangements of the Deng era - such as the "seven up, eight down" retirement norm, the practice of designating successors across generations, and the system of limited terms - have all been abandoned. Through constitutional amendments, Xi enabled indefinite re-election, making lifelong rule possible. The Party now fears the return of Cultural Revolution–style politics. Such personalist dictatorship serves only the ruler's supremacy while bringing countless harms, and no benefits, to the Party, the state, and the people.

Third, Xi's massive investments in the "Belt and Road Initiative," the construction of Xiong'an New Area, and similar projects have pushed China's economy into a deep crisis. Today the crisis has erupted on an unprecedented scale: the economic achievements of Reform and Opening-up have been dramatically eroded, with many middle-class families finding their homes turned into negative assets, sliding back into poverty. Should Xi Jinping bear responsibility for this?

Here, the most crucial question is: why can the military no longer tolerate Xi Jinping's personalist dictatorship?

Unlike Mao Zedong, Xi Jinping has not built up decades of entrenched authority within the military. Mao, over nearly half a century, had personally appointed virtually all senior commanders, and from the Yan'an era onward was elevated through the "Red Sun" cult of personality. Thus, no matter what political campaigns he launched, the military generally remained loyal. Even so, Lin Liguo once plotted the "Project 571" coup plan - though the mutiny ultimately failed.

Xi, by contrast, gained his initial military authority through the support of "princeling" figures within the army. Liu Yuan, Liu Yazhou, and Zhang Youxia were all powerful backers who helped propel Xi to the top. But once Xi consolidated power, he inevitably moved to monopolize control over the military. As a result, Liu Yuan was sidelined, Liu Yazhou was imprisoned, and Zhang Youxia's faction inevitably faced existential risk. While Zhang himself might, like Liu Yuan, have been quietly marginalized, his associates within the military were far more likely to be subjected to a sweeping purge.

It is precisely this sense of existential threat that compelled non-Xi-aligned forces within the military to close ranks into a collective. For them, only by working to alter a one-man dictatorship could the survival of the group be secured. Under such circumstances, invoking "democratic centralism," emphasizing Party principles, and seizing the moral high ground became an obvious course of action. These political ideas also align with those Liu Yuan had embraced in his youth. Therefore, both from a public and personal standpoint, Liu Yuan would naturally leverage his connections within the military and among Party elders to strongly support Zhang Youxia.

Thus, bringing the Xi era to an end has become a consensus among influential forces in the military - a goal that can only succeed, not fail.

Ending the Xi era, therefore, has also become a consensus of the entire nation and, indeed, of the whole Party. Xi has not only damaged the interests of the state and the people but has also endangered the political security of the ruling Party itself.

The political struggle is still intensely underway

Why do we say the political struggle is still unfolding with intensity?

We can observe and analyze the latest developments through publicly available reports. At the August 1st Army Day banquet, neither Xi Jinping nor Zhang Youxia was present, and several senior generals who should have attended were also absent (analysts noted that most of those missing were pro-Xi officers). Who, then, arranged the seating for this banquet? It can be said with certainty that it was not Xi's military secretariat.

In the main hall, five large round tables were placed in the front, with smaller tables behind them. The expansion of the front-row round tables was significant, as different seats represent different political rankings. Particularly noteworthy was the presence of three retired generals seated at one of these front tables: Liu Yuan (son of the late former CCP Chairman Liu Shaoqi), Wang Guanzhong (who served as director of the CMC General Office during Hu Jintao's era), and Cai Yingting (a former deputy chief of the PLA General Staff). The gathering of military figures from different factions at such a symbolic juncture carries profound political significance.

A week later, the PLA Daily published a commentary column:

On August 8, 2025, an article by Ma Sibo titled "With a Heart of Shame, Strive for a State of No Shame" appeared. The piece quoted the classics of the ancient sages and then admonished Party cadres:

Mencius said: "The sense of shame is the beginning of righteousness," and "One who has no sense of shame is not truly human."

For Party members and cadres, knowing shame in conduct and dealings preserves dignity; knowing shame in officialdom preserves integrity. 'To be worthy of the Party above and the people below' is the realm that Party members and cadres should strive for. 'Do not demand perfection from others, but always examine yourself as if falling short.' Every Party member and cadre should carry a sense of shame-constantly reflecting on the harm of greed, constantly discarding improper desires, and constantly cultivating the virtue of governance.

The timing of this commentary makes its target clear: even the CCP's top leader, as a Party cadre, should possess a sense of shame - he should not endlessly cling to personalist dictatorship. Greed harms not only the individual but also the state and the people.

This directly echoes the PLA Daily's series of essays from last year calling for collective leadership, intra-Party democracy, and adherence to Party principles - forming a coherent political message.

Four days after this article appeared, People's Daily published two important pieces - a news report and a major commentary. The front-page report announced that the CCP Central Committee had issued the Regulations on the Work of the Party School (National Academy of Governance). It emphasized adherence to Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, Deng Xiaoping Theory, the "Three Represents," and the Scientific Outlook on Development, while also insisting on fully implementing Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era. The report underscored the decisive significance of the "Two Establishes," the need to strengthen the "Four Consciousnesses," fortify the "Four Confidences," and achieve the "Two Upholds." (People's Daily, August 12, 2025, front page.)

The impression given to readers is that Xi Jinping's political position remains unchanged - he is still the "core" of the Party, and his authority must be safeguarded.

The "heavyweight" commentary was authored by Justin Yifu Lin: "Xi Jinping Economic Thought Is a Scientific Theory Rooted in China, Looking to the World, and Leading the Future (In-depth Study and Implementation of Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era · Experts Discuss Volume I of Selected Works of Xi Jinping on the Economy)". The article claimed that "Xi Jinping Economic Thought inherits and develops Marxist political economy," and that "with a new vision it deepens the understanding of the laws of Communist Party rule, socialist construction, and human social development, thereby forming Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era."

Such extreme flattery, wholly ignoring the fact that China's economy is mired in a profound crisis, is clearly a commissioned piece. The experts involved not only received generous remuneration but also enjoyed high-level political treatment. The purpose of publishing such an article at this moment is obvious: during the Beidaihe closed-door talks, it seeks to generate momentum for the narrative that Xi's political status is unshakable.

The articles from the PLA Daily and the People's Daily clearly represent two opposing political camps. As the saying goes, "When scholars meet soldiers, reason cannot prevail." Yet today we see the opposite: the soldiers are speaking of "knowing shame, so as not to lose dignity," while the Party's court intellectuals serve as cheerleaders for an autocratic ruler.

But what if the soldiers, too, abandon reason and instead voice their opinions through the barrel of a gun - just as was done when dealing with the Gang of Four? What consequences would follow? Perhaps only then would the authoritarian ruler finally realize what it means to align with the will and the heart of the people. A monarch without control of the gun is a monarch whose crown can be taken away at any moment.

After last year's Third Plenary Session, rumors proliferated and various political anomalies emerged. Xi Jinping primarily appeared at Party affairs events, while Li Qiang increasingly took the stage normally reserved for the Premier. Other Standing Committee members also began appearing more frequently in autonomous forums. Particularly after the reshuffle of the Organization Department head, appointments of provincial- and ministerial-level officials began to include individuals from different factional backgrounds. This reflected, prior to Xi's full consolidation of power, a "broad-based" principle in personnel management - preventing any single faction from dominating.

It is widely believed that intervention by the military and Party elders led to what could be described as a "silent coup." Although the overall trend may be irreversible, how Xi is ultimately accommodated and evaluated remains uncertain.

Three possibilities exist:

• The outcome most people hope for: Xi fully retires at the October Fourth Plenary Session, some Standing Committee members are replaced, reformist factions take the lead in the Politburo, and China's political, economic, and international landscape is reshaped.
• Xi remains in office temporarily but must accept an internal resolution without reversal. The current Standing Committee remains largely unchanged until the 21st Party Congress. A consensus is reached between the Standing Committee and Party elders to finalize the next Standing Committee lineup and to select the next General Secretary and Premier through mutual agreement. A key internal consensus would also be that no one may serve more than two terms in the future, with any constitutional amendments handled by the next National People's Congress to correct institutional loopholes.
• Xi continues to influence the Beidaihe closed-door talks, willing to relinquish some power but retaining a central position after the 21st Party Congress, acting as a spiritual leader of the Party and state, using his "thought" to guide the decisions and governance of the next central leadership collective.

My judgment is that the second scenario is the most likely. If Xi insists, it may be to retain the honorary title of State Chairman and prolong his political life as much as possible. Some believe he will insist on retaining the position of Chairman of the Central Military Commission-this remains a red line. If the military allows Xi to regain control over the armed forces, the combined efforts of the elders and the military to check Xi over the past year would be nullified.