Australia's military support of the US in the Asia Pacific against China is typical of regional concern

As of May 2020, at a time when many Southeast Asian countries were cutting defence spending as a result of the economic crisis brought on by the coronavirus outbreak, China announced it will increase its defence spending by 6.6 percent in 2020 which still allowed it to expand its ability to enforce its territorial claims in the South China Sea and grow its military presence in the Western Pacific and Indian oceans.

While many Asian countries have been wary of upsetting China, the most important economic partner to most nations in the region, many are responding in different ways.

Take Indonesia's government which currently does not wish to openly take sides in geopolitical competition as its historical experience has shown the US and China are equally capable of threatening Indonesia's territorial integrity and security.

Despite much closer economic relations between Indonesia and China in recent years, albeit now with growing Indonesian domestic concern about the influx of Chinese goods and migrant laborers for projects and Indonesia's inability to seize business opportunities in China's market, security cooperation between China and Indonesia remains extremely limited largely because of the Indonesian military's ongoing distrust of China and public anxiety about China's aggressive behaviour in the South China Sea.

And despite Indonesia's concerns about AUKUS, fearing that an anti-China alliance will provoke nuclear proliferation in the Pacific and threaten overall regional security, it is noted that Indonesia still needs US and allied support against Chinese aggression.

With regard to Beijing's Global Security Initiative (GSI), which is intended as an alternative to US-led security norms, others note that the idea of an "Asia for Asia" approach that is free of interference from outside actors is countered by fears that the GSI will be skewed towards China's interests.

After all, China's supposed rejection of unilateral action stands in direct contrast to recent Chinese actions in the South China Sea that ignores the 2016 ruling by an international arbitration tribunal that found its expansive nine-dash line claim to the South China Sea had no legal basis.

Currently Indonesia is upgrading its naval capabilities with its Minimum Essential Force plan aiming for a 274-ship green-water fleet, 10 fighter squadrons for its air combat capability and 12 new diesel-electric submarines with its defence budget for the upcoming year at $13.6 billion, a record but less than half of the defence minister's request.

The Philippines is more open about its reliance on the US, having a 2022 defence budget of just $US4.5 billion.

In line with President Marcos recently stating "The United States has always been our longest partner and ally" within his belief "that the future of the Philippines, and for that matter the Asia-Pacific region, will always involve the United States", the Philippines recently granted the US permission access to four new military bases in addition to the five bases already used under a 2014 defence cooperation agreement.

With northern bases as close as 250 miles to Taiwan, Rommel Jude Ong, a maritime security expert and retired vice commander of the Philippine Navy, notes that the agreement allows the Philippines to develop a viable counter-strategy against China's incursions into its waters and play a role in managing the geopolitical tensions in the region.

Vietnam, one of the more vocal opponents of China's assertiveness in related disputes concerning all or part of the Spratly and Paracel groups of islands in the South China Sea, is also seeking to modernise its military.