The importance of American military might to Australia and the Asia-Pacific

Of course, Western and other nations have to compete with the unaccountable CCP which uses its vast resources to achieve economic aims, an aspect much more difficult for democracies which have to justify any spending to their publics.  

Hence, there are many obstacles for Western security aspirations.

In Papua New Guinea, after Major General Toropo described the upgrade of the main naval base (Lombrum) on Manus Island as a positive development at a time when China's growing presence in the region presented “a challenge”, he was rebuked by Prime Minister James Marape’s statement that “I do not perceive China as a security threat, but rather as an important development, investment and trade partner with shared values conducted under mutual friendship and understanding”.

PNG’s need for investment is obvious. On Manus, which lost its refugee process centres in late 2019 with the remaining refugees transferred to Port Moresby, about 3,000 locals lost work as a result, thus resulting in “an increase in lawlessness on the island because of frustration that our young people can find jobs”.

With regard to the Philippines, the US, while approving plans in July 2021 to sell the Philippines $2.6 billion worth of fighter jets, missiles and related equipment, has also been keen to not make more of the Duterte government’s human rights record with regard to the country’s bloody war on illegal drugs, despite the Biden administration declaring human rights a centrepiece of US foreign policy.

With Duterte leaving office in 10 months, which may then lead to a reset of US-Philippine relations, Duterte also said his decision to continue the military arrangement with the US was a “concession” in exchange for the millions of COVID-19 vaccines donated by President Biden in recent months, albeit the Philippines public had also grown skeptical over the efficacy of the Chinese-made Sinovac vaccine.

The same careful balancing act is evident by the US relationship with Indonesia, the country viewed as the de facto leader of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.  

While the August 2021 meeting between their foreign ministers suggested a “new era of bilateral relations” after much less communication under Trump and US Vice-President Kamala Harris’s July 2021 trip to Southeast Asia not including Indonesia, it is clear that Indonesia’s relative neutral stance towards China and the US is also influenced by favourable investment decisions.

At a time when Indonesia was increasingly concerned about budget overruns in building the Jakarta-Bandung high-speed rail (under the belt and road plan), and had been pursuing China to finance a greater share of construction costs, the Indonesian policy analyst Thomas Noto Suoneto noted that “The continuation of the infrastructure commitment is really important to the bilateral relationship”, and “If there is a change of commitment [from the US], it would impact Indonesia’s perception of Washington”.

For Australia, its own security depends greatly on its close relationship with the US as Chinese influence moves closer to its border.  

On 16 September 2021, the US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin, having stated that “Beijing has seen over the past months that Australia will not back down and the threats of economic retaliation and pressure simply will not work”, noted that “the US will not leave Australia alone on the field or, better yet, on the pitch”.

Both Australia and the US indicated much greater cooperation between them with more US troops to rotate through Darwin with extensive cooperation to occur with regard to missile development and enhanced maritime capability.