Brexit: vindication for de Gaulle but maybe a pyrrhic victory for British nationalism?

The UK's recent decision to leave the European Union (EU) has justified the 1963 position of Charles de Gaulle (repeated in 1967) to veto Britain's bid to join the then six country European Economic Community (EEC).

The UK did not sign the 1957 Treaty of Rome and predecessor agreements, that led to the establishment of the EEC.  Initial British reluctance was set aside following a subsequent decline in Britain's economic performance compared with Europe.  By the early 1960s the British Government had been simply bursting to join the Community, and its then PM, Harold Macmillan, also supported a world governance model based on key regional groupings (such as the EEC).

De Gaulle could not understand why the British wanted to join.

In his press conference of 14 January 1963, when he vetoed British entry, de Gaulle pointed out that"

England in effect is insular, she is maritime, she is linked through her exchanges, her markets, her supply lines to the most diverse and often the most distant countries; she pursues essentially industrial and commercial activities, and only slight agricultural ones.  She has in all her doings very marked and very original habits and traditions.  In short, the nature, the structure, the very situations, that are England’s, differ profoundly from those of the continentals.  What is to be done in order that England, as she lives, produces and trades, can be incorporated into the Common Market, as it has been conceived and as it functions?

De Gaulle had additional concerns about the UK's links to its Commonwealth and its special relationship with the United States.  De Gaulle said that the UK was "incompatible with Europe" and that she harboured a "deep-seated hostility" to any pan-European project.

The UK eventually talked its way into Europe after de Gaulle left the political arena.  It arguably never fully committed to the Community, though it did sacrifice the trade interests of Commonwealth countries, such as Australia and New Zealand.  The Treaty of Accession was signed in January 1972 by PM Edward Heath.

At that time the UK was expected to play a strong positive political role, lessening the rivalry between France and Germany.  The Brits seemed to do this initially but seemingly lost interest in later years.  Arguably, part of the problem for the UK was that, by joining the EU late, the timing coincided with a move within the EU for greater integration and expansion, that was to provoke internal dissent in the UK.

It did not take long for UK enthusiasm for Europe to falter.

Labour in its general election manifestos in February and October 1974 promised a renegotiation of the UK’s terms of membership followed by a referendum on the UK’s continued EEC membership on the new terms.  The referendum was targeted to appease Labour's left, led by Tony Benn.

On the other side, the Conservatives were overwhelmingly enthusiastic for staying in the Community on free trade grounds.  The main dissent on the right came from former Tory, Enoch Powell, who had just become an Ulster Unionist MP and opposed membership on sovereignty grounds.

Compared with the recent (23 June 2016) Brexit referendum, when 51.9% voted to leave, the 5 June 1975 referendum found only 32.7% wanting to leave.

Interestingly (by constituent country) support in 1975 for leaving was least in England (31.3%) and Wales (35.2%) but highest in Scotland (41.6%) and Northern Ireland (47.9%).  This contrasts with 2016, when majority support for Brexit existed only in England (53.4%) and Wales (52.5%).  Only a minority supported Brexit in Scotland (38.0%), and in Northern Ireland (44.2%).

Unlike Scotland (where no electoral district supported Brexit in 2016), there were regions in Northern Ireland (Antrim, East Belfast, Strangford, Lagan Valley and Upper Bann, - all Unionist strongholds), where the majorityvoted to leave the EU.  Most Unionists see themselves as staunch British nationalists, who oppose any weakening of British sovereignty.  [Reliance on Democratic Unionist support was to subsequently prove very problematic for Theresa May in attempting to get her Brexit legislation (especially the "Irish Backstop") through the Commons.]

The biggest "remain" vote of all the voting areas in 2016 was actually in Gibraltar.  (Gibraltar’s vote was fed into the South West England regional count.)  Only 4.1% of voters in Gibraltar voted to leave, and there was a very high turnout of 84%.  Gibraltarians dreaded being again economically separated from their economic hinterland, as well as the prospect of returning to hard borders with Europe/Spain.

Growing British disillusionment with the EU from the 1990s can be traced to a number of factors.

Firstly, the heritage of British imperialism meant that (especially in England) there was a deep-seated antipathy towards ceding any form of sovereignty over the UK to other counties or agencies.  While Britain had been disdainful of nationalism within its colonies, its own nationalism was a key part of the country's DNA.

The UK's accession to the EU/EEC was promoted from the top down to a less than convinced public, mainly via Conservative politicians.  The UK probably would have remained in the EU, if Britain's political class had their way.  David Cameron's Conservatives only agreed to the 2016 Brexit Referendum because they expected it to be defeated.  Tony Blair (Labour Prime Minister between 1997 and 2007) also supported Remain, and campaigned for a second Brexit referendum.

While there were trade benefits to the UK's EU membership, the UK suffered from being a major net contributor to the EU Budget.  Additionally the EU historically spent disproportionately on supporting agriculture, which is only a minor sector of the UK economy, and membership increased the price of food.  The EEC was notorious for its food "mountains" (the result of subsidies), something that also did not go down well with the British public.

The UK also was not a supporter of further integration with Europe.  It did join the European Exchange Rate Mechanism in 1979 but permanently withdrew from the system in September 1992.  It later opted out of the European Monetary System (Euro) in 1999.  All of this meant that becoming full member may not have been the best decision for the UK to make.

In the 1983 general election the opposition Labour Party campaigned on a commitment to withdraw from the EU without a referendum but got thumped in a landslide by Thatcher's Conservatives.

PM Margaret Thatcher became increasingly opposed to further European integration.  Her successor, John Major nursed the Maastricht Treaty bill through the Commons in 1993, despite a major revolt within his own party.  Major had secured (for the UK) an opt-out of economic and monetary union, as well as the removal of the entire social chapter from the treaty itself.

The Maastricht Treaty had faced opposition in other countries as well as the UK.  Three countries (France, Denmark and Ireland) held referendums on Maastricht ratification.  In both Denmark and Ireland, two referendums were required before the treaty passed.  Even in the 1992 French Maastricht Treaty referendum, a bare 51% were in favour.

Brexit in part reflects wider dissent within the EU against greater integration and expansion.  When the UK joined the EEC in 1973, the community consisted of just nine states.  By 2004 it ended up being part of an intrusive "superstate", that was a political and economic union of 28 member countries.

Those favouring Remain maintained a lead in UK opinion polls, except around 2000, when Prime Minister Tony Blair aimed for closer EU integration, including adoption of the Euro currency.  Later, around 2011, immigration into the United Kingdom became a growing issue for voters.  As late as December 2015 there was still, according to ComRes surveys, a clear majority in favour of remaining.

When Brexit was finally approved by the European Parliament, many EU countries expressed regret.  President Macron posted a letter addressed to his “dear British friends”, saying that although this was a “democratic choice France has always respected”, he felt “deeply sad at this departure”.  Many other European leaders expressed regret that Britain was leaving.  Former Belgian prime minister Guy Verhofstadt, predicted that the UK would rejoin one day.  Members of the European Parliament even stood holding hands to sing Auld Lang Syne as a goodbye gesture to the United Kingdom. 

Brexit leader, Nigel Farage had a "good riddance" attitude.  In his final speech he said: “Once we’ve left, we are never coming back and the rest frankly is detail.”  His farewell speech was cut-off, when he started to wave a miniature British flag, contravening rules on displaying national flags in the debating chamber.  Fellow Brexit Party MEPs cheered “hip-hip hooray” before marching out together.

So what are the likely implications of Brexit?

Some trade outcomes appear obvious.  There are likely trade benefits for Australia, New Zealand, and other major food exporters, assuming they can negotiate better access to the UK for their agricultural exports.  Before Britain joined the EU, Australia and New Zealand were major supplies of products such as meat, dairy, fresh and dried fruits etc  Some of these exports are likely to be re-invigorated following a likely bilateral trade agreement, though new competitors from other parts of the world have emerged since the 1970s.

It is likely that there will be some diversion of UK trade from EU to non-EU countries, that had until now been disadvantaged by EU trade rules.  Losers will include EU farmers, and the fate of British farmers will depend on whether the UK will make up for lost EU subsidies and market supports.  Brexit will be a particular challenge for the Republic of Ireland because the UK historically was its biggest trading partner and the main destination of its farm exports.

The economic implications for the broader UK are uncertain at present.  British exports to the EU (including services) may be adversely affected but the extent will depend on whatever post-Brexit trade deal is negotiated with the EU.

Within the UK and its overseas territories, Brexit poses a range of challenges.

Gibraltar will likely be the biggest loser.  EU membership definitely reduced tensions between the UK and Spain over the Rock.  Relations between Gibraltar and the neighbouring Spanish region of the Campo de Gibraltar became a textbook example of two territories using EU rules to create mutual prosperity.  One in four jobs in the Spanish region is supported by Gibraltar, while more than 14,000 people cross the border every day to work in the British territory.  Tourism (Gibraltar gets over 10 million visitors annually) is also facilitated by an open land border.  How relations between Spain and the UK will play out post Brexit is anyone's guess, but Brexit is an unambiguous negative.

The biggest risk for the UK is that Brexit will provide further oxygen for Scottish independence because most Scots voted to remain.  In the 2019 election the Scottish Nationalist Party (SNP) made big gains.  The party won 81% of the Scottish seats in the House of Commons.  Leader, Nicola Sturgeon stated that  the country had sent a "clear message" on a second independence referendum.  Boris Johnson is likely to seek to put off such a referendum.

Brexit also poses challenges for Northern Ireland (NI).  A major issue is the possibility that a hard border with the Republic could re-emerge at some future time, and lead to social and political unrest, placing pressure on the Peace Agreement.  The Brexit withdrawal agreement commits the UK to maintaining an open border in Ireland, so that the de facto frontier in some ways may become the Irish Sea.  All this could rekindle historic tensions.  A further complication is smuggling, that used to take place across the Irish border (often by organised criminals linked to paramilitaries) in response to different tax and pricing regimes.  Such smuggling could re-emerge in the absence of a hard border.

An independent Scotland would have implications for NI, in that NI is a lot closer geographically to Scotland than it is to England.  Scottish independence would result in a very odd rump UK.  [Scotland and the NI coast are just 19 kilometres apart, and the migration of people between the two regions has been going on for centuries.  The distance between Scotland and England is over 90 kilometres and cultural connections weaker.]

I suspect that most Brits outside Scotland place a more value on maintaining the Union with Scotland than on leaving the EU (Brexit).  Ironically Brexit could be the final straw that pushes the Scots down the independence path.  A breakup of the union is exactly what most British nationalists don't want.