The bond of the sea: Japan, Australia and China

Some say both documents are ambiguous, Clark writes, since they do not outline specifically who was to receive those islands. But the government of the Republic of China was in no doubt. It quickly assumed control over the large island of Taiping in the Spratlys, close to the Philippines. In Taiwan, he points out, it is claimed that maintaining this treaty approved its claim to the Spratlys and Paracels, with this being crucial to Taiwan's sovereignty as a nation. "The same wording used in the San Francisco treaty for the return of the Kurile Islands to Moscow," he says, "is accepted even by Tokyo. What is at dispute is the definition of the words Kurile Islands. True, Beijing has its claims in the East and South China Seas, as other nations in the region do. It would be wrong of China to ignore them. But again, which China?"

Clark, who is a master of history, bothers to trace things back to their point of origin. We hear much about Beijing using a "nine-dash line", he writes, as the basis for claiming much of the South China Sea: "But that claim was not invented by Beijing. It was developed by the Republic of China government well before the Beijing regime existed." In Taiwan, he points out, they call it the "U-shaped line" and they still cling to it as proof of their theoretical right to claim virtually any South China Sea island: "Beijing has slightly reduced the U-shaped line to a less aggressive nine-dash line." How's that for irony?

Our media, Clark says, makes much of the fact that in July 2016 a tribunal of the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague ruled in support of Manila's claims in the island disputes: "Fair enough, but Manila's main claim had been against Taiwan's occupation of Taiping Island. True, other Spratly islands and shoals were examined. In its efforts to deny Beijing's claims to the UNCLOS (UN Convention for the Law of the Sea) -approved 200 nautical mile Exclusive Economic Zone around the islands [that Manila] had claimed … the tribunal said these islands were mere rocks incapable of supporting economic activity and so were not entitled to an EEZ."

But it is clear, Clark continues, that the tribunal was either ignorant or biased; for they went on, rather absurdly, to rule that Taiping was also a mere rock not entitled to an EEZ despite the 43-hectare island having an airport and a population of 200 engaged in a variety of economic activities. Ironically, he points out, "Beijing's 'rocks' now also sustain airports and a range of activities that would qualify for an EEZ."

When it comes to claiming rocks as islands, Japan is much more aggressive. It has taken a piece of exposed coral rock called Okinotori (Offshore Bird), the size of a bed, in a submerged atoll far out in the Pacific to the east of Taiwan and 1740 kms from Tokyo. It has buried it in concrete, declared it is part of Tokyo city, and has asserted its entitlement to EEZ status. As such, it claims the right to frequently capture or expel fishing boats, mainly Taiwanese, in the 200 nautical mile zone. It has also claimed that this small rock is part of Japan's continental shelf, which allows it to claim exclusive rights to exploit the resources of an extra 177,000 square kms of ocean bed.

The Senkaku Islands dispute with Japan is often listed as proof of Beijing's maritime aggressiveness. But this too was originally a dispute with Taiwan rather than Beijing. The island group lies at the top end of a chain of volcanic islands running down to the northern tip of Taiwan, and separated from Japan's Okinawa by a deep ocean trough. Long before Japan began its expansionist moves in the 19th century, Chinese fishermen were using the islands as a base. Hence its Chinese name, Diaoyutai, or fishing platform (also the name of an emperor's palace in Beijing). Japan was only able to take it over and develop it because of China's late 19th century period of weakness. According to Wikipedia,"China claims the discovery and ownership of the islands from the 14th century, while Japan maintained ownership of the islands from 1895". Tokyo at first did not even have a name for the islands. Only later did it begin to use the name "Senkaku".

Clark points out that that name is a translation of "Pinnacle Islands", a name conferred by an English explorer, James Colnett, during his 1789-1791 voyage into the area. "Yet Tokyo," Clark says, "as with all its disputed territories, insists these have been and will continue to be the inherent territories of Japan." Fortunately, it has had the good sense not to try to occupy the islands; it simply maintains a defence against ships sent by Beijing into the area seeking to maintain Taiwan's claim. After ugly tussles with Taiwanese fishing boats in 2008-12, Taipei has been given fishing rights to ease its unhappiness. Moreover, he notes that even the US, even if only for political reasons, has had the good sense only to admit Japan's administrative, not sovereignty, rights to the islands.

Ultimately, Clark observes, these island disputes represent a clash of cultures. For hundreds if not thousands of years the Chinese have seen the oceans around it as natural and exclusive Chinese possessions to be used for fishing and navigation. The only intruders were Japanese pirates, wako, raiding eastern Chinese coastal towns. There was no need to go through any process of claiming legal possession. Then along came the Europeans with their concepts of colonies, gunboats and flags to claim physical possession. The area ceased to be a Chinese lake; instead, it became an amphitheatre in which first the Westerners and then the Japanese felt free to take advantage of China's weakness and appropriate whatever territory they liked. Now China is belatedly claiming the right of possession it always assumed it had, but had never claimed in the Western and then Japanese way.

Meanwhile, Clark suggests, Japan continues to act as if it has an "inherent" right to territories lost as a result of its defeat in the Pacific War, not just to Taiwan and mainland China, but to South Korea and Moscow also. "We should think first," he says, "before accusing Beijing of dangerous, aggressive expansionism."

The back story may not always be simple; it may not lead to a "light bulb" moment of realisation. But it is nevertheless vitally important to understand.