Ascertaining motives in the Persian Gulf

If, for example, Trump fails to win a second term the Senate cannot protect him from conviction as a co-conspirator for obstructing justice, or from criminal charges against his family and business empire. As the noose draws tighter he may in desperation try to avoid or defer years in prison by appealing to patriotism with a strike against either Iran or North Korea.

Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, the ruler of Saudi Arabia, has a problem dealing with the fallout from Jamal Kashoggi's murder. He may try to restore (or distract attention from) his own and the nation's conduct with a patriotic war against the Kingdom's traditional enemy Iran.

The same is true of the Emirates. While the federation is part of an influential geopolitical axis with Saudi Arabia and the US, its record on human rights, noted by US State Department reports, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International and Wikipedia, is appalling. (Iran's record may be no better and is perhaps a good deal worse, but it has been common knowledge for years.)

President Netanyahu of Israel is also in trouble, and about to be indicted for corruption by his own attorney-general. Many observers believe he is ready and willing to strike Iran as soon as the White House flashes a green light.

Whether war with Iran would indeed benefit these nations is a matter of opinion but a more important factor is the degree to which the fate of their rulers rests on a close relationship with the US, which in practice means a willingness to support the policies of President Trump.

Finally, while judges, the media and others must try to clarify the reasons for acts of violence, there is a huge difference between inferences drawn after a careful study of the facts and simply attributing motives according to one's political aims and personal prejudices. This is, after all, why we support the UN and other judicial tribunals.