Sack the President at your peril

Recently, there has been some attempt by monarchist apologists to argue that the Queen has a "reserve power" to reject a Prime Minister’s advice.

This is unconstitutional, ahistorical nonsense, supported neither by principle nor precedent. The Queen’s only reserve power is to do as she is told. Unlike some of her supporters, she undoubtedly is wise enough to understand this.

Some other monarchists have attempted a less daring manoeuvre, claiming that the Queen at least can delay a dismissal by claiming time to think about it. The prospect of delay, presumably, is believed to put a dampener on prime ministerial will.

What these would-be constitutional theorists forget is that the fundamental principle of responsible government is that the Queen must act upon the advice of her ministers. If, therefore, a Prime Minister advises the Queen to sack a Governor-General and to do it now, her only option is prompt obedience.

Of course, in Bagheot’s phrase, she may advise, counsel and warn against such hasty action. But in the phrase of any Prime Minister imaginable, who cares?

So what really will change under the referendum model as it touches upon the power of the Prime Minister to dismiss the president?

The profoundly disconcerting answer for monarchists and their direct electionist allies of convenience is that it will make such an exercise harder, rather than easier.

The starting point here is that any presidential dismissal must be approved by the House of Representatives. Opponents of the model scoff, saying that this is nothing more than requiring that the Prime Minister’s actions be approved by his mates.

But think again. Any parliamentary motion for dismissal will be moved in front of the glaring lights, cameras and note-books of every journalist in Australia, and will be debated by the opposition until every salacious drop of political embarrassment has been extracted.

This is the sort of ghastly political set piece that any Prime Minister would chew his own leg off to avoid.

But the real sting lies in what happens after this. At present, if a Prime Minister dismisses the Governor General, he is merely faced with the congenial task of deciding which obedient patsy should appointed as a replacement.

In fact, it is his ability to install his own tool as a substitute for an obstreperous Governor General that is the only thing that makes a vice-regal sacking worth its while to a Prime Minister.