Tinker with defence policy and risk attack

During the past decade, the ADF has demonstrated that forces structured for the defence of Australia and its approaches can meet all the tasks asked of it by the government (for example, in East Timor, the Persian Gulf, Somalia, Cambodia and now in the Afghanistan theatre). Why give this up for some ill-considered lesser role?

I have yet to see a respectable intellectual case of how to structure our defence force optimally against so-called transnational threats.

Those who would commit the ADF to resolving transnational problems do not seem to understand the central mission of a defence force – which is the application of lethal force – or the proper role of civil authorities in resolving these problems.

As for terrorism, as important as this has become we must be careful not to let today's surprise determine our long-term force structure. Because tomorrow's surprise may be quite different.

With our army, we have about 2000 troops serving overseas. We are about to deploy 150 Special Air Service soldiers in the Afghanistan theatre. There is obviously a good argument to increase the size of the SAS and ensure that the commando battalion is fleshed out. But beware the ambit claims by retired army officers that we need to increase the size of the army by 7000.

Why? And what do they propose that the ADF should give up?

The defence white paper was more prescient than its critics allow in this regard. It noted that "various forms of military operations other than conventional war are becoming more common". It specifically mentioned terrorism and concluded:

"The ADF will continue to undertake a range of operations other than conventional war, both in our own region and beyond. Preparing the ADF for such operations will therefore take a more prominent place in our defence planning than it has in the past."

The critics impose a false choice here between the defence of Australia and these other tasks. In the real world of policy it is possible to walk and chew gum at the same time.

The defence capability plan already commits to substantial investment in areas such as intelligence and information systems, surveillance and equipment for special forces. We may need to bring forward some planned enhancements, such as those involving intelligence and special forces. We should also give urgent attention to fixing up any deficiencies in the ADF's force structure for operations in our immediate neighbourhood – such as air and sea transport and in-flight refuelling. Because if something goes badly wrong in our immediate neighbourhood, the US is going to be distinctly preoccupied elsewhere.

And we may well need to provide additional funding to support the higher operational tempo of our deployments in the Gulf-Afghanistan area, particularly if the ADF experiences a prolonged deployment involving the rotation of forces.

But the bottom line is that we do not need a new defence policy. Unless, of course, some erudite so-called defence expert can come up with a new set of force structure priorities that are financially responsible and bear more than a passing relevance to our unique strategic circumstances. Designing the ADF to fight people smuggling, money laundering, drug trafficking and other non-military threats – even terrorism – is a recipe for disaster. It would leave Australia defenceless.

Short attention-span proposals that simply react to the latest media fad or academic fashion are simply not good enough.