Is a plebiscite more democratic?

'It is his duty to sacrifice his repose, his pleasures, his satisfactions, to theirs; and above all, ever, and in all cases, to prefer their interest to his own. But his unbiassed opinion, his mature judgment, his enlightened conscience, he ought not to sacrifice to you, to any man, or to any set of men living….Your representative owes you, not his industry only, but his judgment; and he betrays, instead of serving you, if he sacrifices it to your opinion.'

Apart from an early treatise on aesthetics, Burke did not contribute to philosophical debates. He prided himself on being a practical man, not a 'dabbler in abstractions.' But he did, it seems, have an intuitive sense that a judgment based on informed conscience is necessarily a conscientious judgment of relevant values, and perhaps the closest anyone can get to an ideal of moral truth on contested social and political issues - that is, issues which lead politicians to appeal to values to justify their views.

This is an important insight, reminding us that the relationship between a judgment of conscience and community values is as much a philosophical issue as a psychological one. However that may be, there is a good case that for Burke acting on conscience was the same as taking a stand on principle. If so, then his eminence as a political philosopher rests as much on his commitment to principle as on his reputation as a champion of conservative politics.

Most politicians will, if pressed, agree with Keating that policy should always have priority over politics, and an underlying assumption - which no one seriously disputes - that policy should rest on arguments of principle. But, because citizens - unlike elected members - are free to vote their interests, the principles in point are put at risk whenever politicians seek to avoid responsibility by an appeal to popular opinion.