Thinking practically about an Australian republic

At the present time, republicans are drawing breath either between defeat and victory, or between defeat and future catastrophe. It is a good time to think deeply on matters of principle, without becoming too absorbed in the usual debilitating republican game of "my model is bigger than yours".

At the same time, we can never lose sight of the fact that republicanism ultimately is a practical question. Nothing is more brutally practical than the necessity to win a referendum under the Australian Constitution. We cannot afford to be Peter Pan republicans, designing and re-designing the republic of Never-Never Land.

What this means is that while we certainly need to imagine a republic, we must at the same time carefully plan how we are going to implement it.

At this stage of the republican debate, therefore, there are probably three issues worth thinking about.

1. Definition. What is a republic, and who is to be counted as a republican?
2. Design. What types of constitutional changes would produce a satisfying and effective republic?
3. Practicality. What form of republic would as a matter of reality be approved by the Australian people at referendum?

Definition

The issue of definition is a crucial one, as unless one knows what a "republican" is, it is impossible to define a republican solution. The problem in Australia is that there is a strong difference of view over who is entitled to wear a republican guernsey.

A narrow view is that anyone who wants an Australian head of state is a republican. No more is required. On this definition, many Liberal Conservatives, such as Peter Costello (and myself) are republicans.

A wider view, however, holds that a republican must subscribe to a "republican" constitutional agenda. This typically includes an elected head of state, constitutional guarantees of human rights (such as a bill of rights), and a general conviction that the Australian Constitution is not a very impressive document.

The crucial point in this debate is that, if one takes the wide view of republicanism, then what might be termed "conservative republicans" are off the republican team. They share none of the suppositions of broad republicans. They do not want an elected President. They are suspicious of bills of rights. They regard the Australian Constitution as, if not perfect, then very, very, good.

On this exclusionary basis, "republicanism" ceases to be a concept that potentially unites Australians across a wide political spectrum in favour of a particular, nationalistic constitutional reform.

Rather, it becomes simply a label for the traditional programme of the constitutional Left. This is a programme not for a republic, but for a re-constitution. By definition, it can never attract general political support.

These issues of definition have profound implications in relation to republican design and practicality.

Design

On the question of design, there is no point in expecting narrow and broad republicans readily to agree on a republican model on the grounds that they are all the same species. On the contrary, each group has distinctly different constitutional suppositions.

To the narrow, typically conservative republican, the Australian Constitution is a remarkable document that has stood the test of time in providing a century of progressive constitutional democracy. It should not be tampered with lightly, and all that is required is a minimal, republican adjustment.

To broader republicans, the Constitution is at best outdated, and at worst pernicious. It fails to deal adequately with such issues as human rights, and needs extensive surgery. At the very least, popular democratic principle requires that the head of state be elected.

Between these two positions, the only obvious common ground is that Australia’s head of state should be an Australian citizen.

In particular, it should be quite clear that narrower, more conservative Australian republicans will be irretrievably opposed to an elected head of state.

There are two straightforward reasons for this. First, an elected head of state would enjoy a popular mandate, destabilizing the Australian constitutional settlement. Second, any model of direct election would require radical surgery to the Australian Constitution.

This is made usefully clear by the direct election models included in the discussion paper of the Australian Republican Movement. All will prove anathema to conservative republicans.

Model Three, with its president selected by a directly elected presidential college would see a head of state chosen by a body which itself unavoidably would become an object of party political contest. The president then would draw an indirect but powerful popular mandate by virtue of the fact that he or she was chosen by those who had been popularly elected for the sole purpose of electing him or her. The practical impossibility of removing a political president completes the picture.

Model Four, providing for full direct election, would face all of the well-worn charges concerning the incompatibility of popular mandates residing in both the head of state and the head of government. It would share the difficulties of Model Three in relation to dismissal, and add to them the practical nightmare of codification.

Model Five, comprising direct election from a parliamentary list bravely combines all the practical and theoretical difficulties of full direct election with the fact that those most enamored of direct election presumably would be highly unhappy with parliamentary limitation of their choice.

Finally comes Model Six, discussing the possibility of an executive presidency. The simplest observation to make of this model in relation to conservative republicans is that, whatever theoretical virtues it might or might not have, it would be entirely unacceptable as involving a wholesale reconstruction of the Australian Constitution.

The result is that the basic differences in republican definition and supposition naturally produce basic differences in republican preference. Broad republicans typically desire direct election, while this is entirely inconsistent with the operating assumptions of narrower, more conservative republicans.

The crucial point is that attempting to devise models of direct election that will tempt conservative republicans is quite futile. It would be like trying to procure a sufficiently attractive elephant, in the hope that one could persuade one’s dog to conclude a match.

All of this has basic implications for the practicalities of a republican referendum.

Practicality

At the end of the day, the only real republic is not one that is satisfying to devise, but one that is approved at referendum. We cannot go from being alleged "Chardonnay republicans" – those who devise republics in North Shore restaurants – to "Cocaine republicans" – republicans who are just deeply, deeply deluded.

To this end, we need to absorb the simple and objective lesson of the 1999 referendum: passing a republican referendum always will be desperately hard work, and will be bitterly and skillfully contested.

For this reason, I react with frank disbelief to the view that it will be easier next time if only we have a radical model with a wholesale constitutional revision tacked on. It is like the high-jumper failing at four feet, who wants the bar moved to ten in the hope that sheer elan will carry him through.

In fact, one hundred years of referenda, and one highly evocative republican referendum, have provided us with a fair guide to referendum success. Clearly, the people must like the broad idea proposed (a republic), but as 1999 showed, this will not be enough. Fundamentally, there must be as broad a consensus as possible in favour of a republican model, with correspondingly large support and minimal opposition. Critical to this will be the achievement of bi-partisan political support, without which a republican referendum will be doomed. Finally, it has to be accepted that the larger and more complex the model, the easier it will be for its opponents to attack it and confuse the electorate.

There is one brutal reality that emerges from this analysis. Starting from the obvious position that any republic will be opposed by a determined monarchist apparatus, no republican model will succeed without the support of narrow, conservative republicans, as well as that of broader, more radical republicans.

The proximate reason for this is clear. If bi-partisan support is indispensable for a republic, it has to be accepted that the overwhelming majority of those political conservatives who are republicans are, unsurprisingly, conservative republicans. Without them, there will not be bi-partisan republican support. This position is compounded by the fact that conservative constitutionalism is not entirely party-specific, and extends into some reaches of the Australian Labor Party, with Premier Carr being an obvious example.

This has blunt implications for the intersection of republican definition, design and practicality. In terms of definition, unless Peter Costello is accepted as a card-carrying republican, there never will be an Australian republic.

In terms of design, direct election, let alone direct election in company with a range of other constitutional innovations, is a dead duck. It never will be supported by republican conservatives, and its adoption as a referendum model simply will delivery the conservative wing of the republican movement into the arms of the monarchists.

Of course, it is sometimes suggested that a process of constitutional "education" might produce an electorate more inclined to accept dramatic constitutional reform. There are two points to be made here. First, anyone who could suppose that the Constitution ever will become an object of popular interest in Australia is a supreme optimist.

Second, the terminology of ‘education" suggests that there is a correct constitutional answer in these contexts, to which people will come if they only are sufficiently informed. The truth is that it always will be perfectly possible for intelligent people to disagree on such issues as direct election, a bill of rights and the general adequacy of the Australian Constitution.

Conclusion

As a republican – and I think I am one – I view with horror the idea that the way forward is with a bigger, bolder, more radical, more divisive republican model.

On the contrary, the only viable route to an Australian republic will be through an exercise in political consensus. An unavoidable element of that consensus will have to be an accord between what might be termed progressive or liberal conservatives and more adventurous political and constitutional elements.

The only consensus that we have or ever will have in this context is that we should have an Australian head of state. If that is worth doing, we should do it, again in a manner and form that will attract a similarly wide coalition of republican support.

If it is not worth doing, or if agreement cannot be reached as to ways and means, then we should be resigning ourselves to the reign not of Charles III, but of William V.