Public opinion and democracy

Reflection suggests that argument on social and political issues makes sense because it is rarely, if ever, a confrontation between different moral systems, but a dispute over competing interpretations of values which, at a certain level of abstraction, we see ourselves as sharing; this is why, in real life disputes, we argue over the meaning and requirement of ideals of fairness not their validity - we also believe opinions may be right or wrong, not just sincere or disingenuous, self-seeking or altruistic.

The idea that one interpretation is better presupposes criteria for the purpose, and this is found in the institutional practice of the community - in the history of interpretation of the same values which are still justified by these standards. The integrity of argument rests on its overall moral coherence in this fashion. This brief and crude sketch, provocative as it is, suggests why, despite the never-ending appeal of sceptical theories, it will always make sense to question popular opinion - along with legal rules, policies, social practices and public institutions - in light of community values.

Some philosophical critics find this conception of a social moral practice problematical: how can one interpretation be better if there is no way to 'prove' the claim - no agreed way to demonstrate or verify that it is, indeed, the best interpretation? This objection, which expresses a conventional, 'positivist' approach to what constitutes knowledge in the social sciences is, however, itself under fire: it must defend this assumption against the arguments which support an interpretive approach.

There is now a rich philosophical literature on interpretivist theories; the Wikipedia entry under 'interpretivism' considers it as a theory of law which has been both influential and controversial for nearly half a century. This is largely true of the Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy entry; both are daunting for ordinary readers unfamiliar with the terminology and dense manner of treatment.

Interpretivist theories of morality are comparatively recent and likely to be much more controversial; they rest on the same interconnected ideas and arguments which underlie this contemporary jurisprudence. Both are largely the work of the late Ronald Dworkin, whose views are set out in Justice for Hedgehogs, Harvard, 2013. Reviews suggest it is likely to be close to the cutting edge of both moral and legal philosophy for some time to come.

To return to the theme of this paper, suppose we were to assess the doctrine of unity by asking how the budget might look if members were asked to give priority to community values by acting, as Burke would have them act, on their own judgment and conscience. Suppose members of the Liberal Caucus were each given copies of the Audit Commission Report, asked to go home and read it together with whatever data, analysis and criticism they considered relevant, and come back with a detailed response in thirty days, but without consulting colleagues or knowing the views of party leaders.

Suppose (to make the exercise even more of a fantasy) they were asked to treat all citizens with equal concern and equal respect; this would rule out assumptions that people are poor because they lack character or a sense of responsibility or some other virtue. In light of this egalitarian principle members would need to inform themselves of the impact on those most disadvantaged by spending another thirty days listening to relevant groups - all reports would be confidential and anonymous.

Could we doubt that, if members were to act on this view of their duty to the community, the present budget would be different to that which, because of the doctrine of unity, insists members give priority to the views of party leaders? There would at least be a better understanding that, if equal concern is to mean anything, the budget has to increase revenue by taxing the wealthy not cut spending on those in need.