Should freedom ignore fairness?

It has, however, been re-assessed over the years and is now seen as a theory about the limits of human understanding. Those who take this view believe it is not merely hard to foresee the consequences of major change, but impossible to evaluate due to the complexity of the task, and because we cannot know the role of moral ideas in intuitive judgments which, over time, shape institutions. Martin Krygier, in his excellent essay, 'In praise of Prejudice', in his Civil Passions (Black Ink, 2005) conveys something of the appeal of this idea and contrasts it with Kant's commitment to reason. He cites a passage from Burke which justifies his fame as an advocate for prudential government, and could be read as support for the modern view.

This is intriguing and not just because, as Krygier points out, it draws on post-modernist theory to help justify conservative political ideas. If this is how value is created it argues for faith in intuitive judgments by practical men with good intentions, and scepticism of those who insist on reasoning from principles as well as coherence in the reasoning. Perhaps we should keep this in mind when we next hear someone cite Keynes on practical men being the slaves of yesterday's theories.

However that may be, there is a simple, practical test for honest politicians. We need to ask if the conservative theory attributed to Burke and explained by Krygier can withstand a history of resisting social justice reforms which even conservative liberals now accept. The list begins with the great Reform Bill of 1832, and includes the abolition of slavery, universal suffrage, age and disability pensions, the basic wage, unemployment relief, employee and road-accident compensation schemes, as well as national health cover, no-fault divorce, legal aid, and endless regulations to constrain markets in the public interest.

The two problems I have outlined are closely connected because, when politicians give up the doctrine of unity and its demeaning practice of self-subordination, and rely on their own judgment and conscience, they will be making the best judgment they can of the requirement of values they respect, such as the prime values of freedom and fairness highlighted in this paper. A full defence of this claim would take more argument than is possible here, but is implicit in the fact that taking a stand 'on principle' is also a synonym for acting 'on conscience'.