Pre-emption as American policy: issues and consequences

Today Washington stands close to a critical crossroads. The direction it chooses will shape perceptions of the United States for a long time to come. In particular we will be able to judge whether its elevation to the status of sole superpower has begun to corrupt the US political psyche. Will the United States, despite its stands against fascism and communism, evolve into just another big power that likes to throw its weight around, cynically trotting out the usual feeble excuses? Or will it adhere to the principle that one does not make war, certainly not major war, without clear justification apparent to all? One could wish that these decisions were in the hands of a group other than that led by the younger Bush, but as yet nothing irrevocable has been done.

Of course, much of this discussion depends on the assumption that the Iraqis have indeed discovered common sense. If they are caught cheating, or try to deny the UN access to sites or individuals, they will have handed a clear justification for war to the US. The UN would probably endorse war under such conditions, and few would query its legitimacy. Such a mistake would be typical of the Saddam regime, which miscalculated disastrously in attacking Iran and again in invading Kuwait. If it lacks the sophistication to put the onus on the US, it will certainly trigger a war which can only end in its complete destruction.

And what of Australia? There is debate here about the wisdom of following the Americans to war, especially if Washington acts without UN support. Presumably, if Iraq does something which most people would accept as justifying war, we would go to war with broad domestic support. But if the US acts on a pretext, opinions may be more evenly split.

Whether popular or not, whether UN-endorsed or not, I do not believe Australia should join a war against Iraq. Australia has limited resources, and demands aplenty for them much closer to home. Whether we send nothing at all or the maximum force of personnel, warships and aircraft we can pull together, the result in the Middle East will be the same. The US does not need us for military effect but for political support.

In some circumstances we can offer that support, possibly underlined - despite my reservations - by a token military deployment. But if the Americans embark on a war against Iraq without compelling evidence of its necessity, neither Australia's resources nor its reputation should be involved. What is truly important about the next few weeks is not what happens with Iraq but what sort of state the United States of America shows itself to be. Because whatever the answer, it will still be the most powerful state on the planet.