Pre-emption as American policy: issues and consequences

In September 2002 President George W. Bush released his National Security Strategy of the United States of America. This document declared that "the United States can no longer rely solely on a reactive posture … To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our enemies, the United States will, if necessary, act pre-emptively."

In theory, this means simply that the US will not sit still and allow itself to be attacked when it knows an attack is intended. It will prevent the attack by striking first.

This is fine provided that there is good evidence that the US was indeed under threat of significant attack. Then pre-emption is merely an extension of self-defence: if someone draws a gun on you, you don't wait to be shot at before defending yourself.

But in the absence of good evidence, pre-emption can look like a pretext for aggression. If the Americans cannot show a convincing and imminent threat, they have a problem. And so, maybe, could the world.

Adoption of a policy by the world's greatest power lends legitimacy to it. Already Australia has followed Washington's lead with its own small-scale version of pre-emption, causing considerable of disquiet in our region. The Prime Minister's statement last December even suggested that the UN Charter be amended to allow pre-emption against terrorism. There can be little doubt that in future other states, citing the US precedent, will seek to justify their military actions as legitimately pre-emptive (whether they are or not).

How does theory translate to practice? It seems we are in the process of finding out, as the American buildup in the Gulf region continues. The Iraq issue will provide a crucial test of pre-emption and of future US intentions.

Historically, Saddam Hussein's government cheated, lied, concealed, delayed and generally showed bad faith in implementing the UN Security Council resolutions it signed up to in 1991 as the price of peace after its failed conquest of Kuwait. This time, Iraq has shown hitherto uncommon sense in complying with the latest UN resolution. At the time of writing the UN inspectors have stated that they have found no evidence, no "smoking gun", of forbidden Iraqi weapons programs.

If Saddam really has discovered common sense he will continue as he has begun: he will comply scrupulously with all UN requirements, while rejecting any US demands going beyond what the UN has authorised. This strategy actually offers him the best chance not only of personal and regime survival, but of a political win over Washington.

If, when the UN inspectors report progress to the Security Council at the end of this month, there is still no smoking gun, Washington will be in a potentially embarrassing bind. It will be all dressed up for a war which it cannot justify except perhaps to its more servile allies like John Howard's Australia. What to do then?

This will be the acid test of pre-emption American style. Without a generally acceptable justification, the proper course for Washington will be to withhold military action. Of course this would be a political loss. American claims against Iraq regarding weapons of mass destruction would then be shown to be baseless. Baghdad would crow about US "fabrications" and American credibility could be seriously damaged.

The alternative is to do a latter-day Gulf of Tonkin exercise. To get Congressional approval for escalation of the Indochina war the Johnson administration blew up and elaborated on a minor naval incident. The Bush administration could seize on some trivial Iraqi infraction, or provoke an incident, and use it as a pretext for war. The Iraqis would certainly lose - I will say something in a later column about the losses they might cause while losing - but a goodly slice of world opinion, including many not automatically hostile to the US, could interpret the American action as thinly-disguised aggression.

Historically, American policy is far from unblemished. Its meddling in Allende's Chile and support for Pinochet, its unjustified invasion of Granada and the sordid saga of Indochina all show Washington's fallibility and misuse of power. Yet this is not the whole story. I cannot forget the US role in the war against fascism, its protection and reconstruction of post-fascist western Europe while Stalin's oppressive empire loomed large in the East, and its (admittedly selective) support for liberal democratic principles. Taken on the whole, though it has inevitably shown warts which should not be ignored, the US has been a positive force in the world. Those who doubt this might like to consider what sort of world it would be had the US been a right-wing military dictatorship when it confronted the Soviets.

Today Washington stands close to a critical crossroads. The direction it chooses will shape perceptions of the United States for a long time to come. In particular we will be able to judge whether its elevation to the status of sole superpower has begun to corrupt the US political psyche. Will the United States, despite its stands against fascism and communism, evolve into just another big power that likes to throw its weight around, cynically trotting out the usual feeble excuses? Or will it adhere to the principle that one does not make war, certainly not major war, without clear justification apparent to all? One could wish that these decisions were in the hands of a group other than that led by the younger Bush, but as yet nothing irrevocable has been done.

Of course, much of this discussion depends on the assumption that the Iraqis have indeed discovered common sense. If they are caught cheating, or try to deny the UN access to sites or individuals, they will have handed a clear justification for war to the US. The UN would probably endorse war under such conditions, and few would query its legitimacy. Such a mistake would be typical of the Saddam regime, which miscalculated disastrously in attacking Iran and again in invading Kuwait. If it lacks the sophistication to put the onus on the US, it will certainly trigger a war which can only end in its complete destruction.

And what of Australia? There is debate here about the wisdom of following the Americans to war, especially if Washington acts without UN support. Presumably, if Iraq does something which most people would accept as justifying war, we would go to war with broad domestic support. But if the US acts on a pretext, opinions may be more evenly split.

Whether popular or not, whether UN-endorsed or not, I do not believe Australia should join a war against Iraq. Australia has limited resources, and demands aplenty for them much closer to home. Whether we send nothing at all or the maximum force of personnel, warships and aircraft we can pull together, the result in the Middle East will be the same. The US does not need us for military effect but for political support.

In some circumstances we can offer that support, possibly underlined - despite my reservations - by a token military deployment. But if the Americans embark on a war against Iraq without compelling evidence of its necessity, neither Australia's resources nor its reputation should be involved. What is truly important about the next few weeks is not what happens with Iraq but what sort of state the United States of America shows itself to be. Because whatever the answer, it will still be the most powerful state on the planet.