Tony Windsor on being independent

As Burke explained to his electors at Bristol in 1774,

It is his duty to sacrifice his repose, his pleasures, his satisfactions, to theirs; and above all, ever, and in all cases, to prefer their interest to his own. But his unbiased opinion, his mature judgment, his enlightened conscience, he ought not to sacrifice to you, to any man, or to any set of men living. These . . . are a trust from Providence …. Your representative owes you, not his industry only, but his judgment; and he betrays, instead of serving you, if he sacrifices it to your opinion.

Nothing illustrates this idea of political duty more than the decision, the most important in Windsor's political career, to support Labor despite his electorate, a rural and conservative constituency, having returned Country Party and National members since 1922. He explained why in a public announcement on September 7^th, 2010, emphasising the importance of political stability and the need to redress a systemic neglect by major parties of rural interests throughout the nation. Hence a crucial factor was Labor's roll out of the national broadband. There was no reference to the views of New England voters.

Why, then, should 'so-called conscience issues' be treated differently? Why should an elected member, especially an independent, give up his judgment and conscience and simply poll constituents or the nation, knowing that public opinion will be defined as much by 51% as by 95%. This seems so bizarre, and the idea of a collective conscience so strange (a spectre from 19^th century German metaphysics), that we need to go back to first principles. There is, in fact, a good case that Windsor's theory of political duty may be due to a common misunderstanding of democracy, as well as confusion over the relationship between 'acting on conscience' and respect for community values.

The most defensible if bare-bones view of democracy is that the representatives of the majority have a stronger right to make the rules than those of a minority or any other group, full stop. It does not say the rules they make are wise or moral rather than foolish or unjust. Such claims must be judged by community values, which all politicians claim to uphold. But these values, which include freedom, fairness, compassion, community wellbeing and respect for human dignity, are not the same as opinions on moral issues, and democratic theory cannot confer moral status on a popular opinion.

In this case the values in point are fairness and dignity and the question is whether it is unfair to discriminate against same-sex couples by excluding them from an official ceremony, with a rich historic and symbolic meaning, whose aim has been to celebrate and encourage a commitment, hitherto recognised between a man and a woman - to love and support each other to the exclusion of competing relationships - sexual, romantic or otherwise, and with the hope and expectation of permanency.

The only way to take this question seriously and make a responsible decision is to act on an informed and personal view. That is, to act on a conscientious judgment of what fairness requires, not an assessment of what other people, however impressive or numerous, think fairness requires. Windsor began this task when he chose to attend a civil union and reflect on what it means to respect the dignity and humanity of gays. Former Prime Minister Kevin Rudd has, it now seems, taken a similar path.

It follows that the opinion of New England voters is not a moral reasonfor anyone, including politicians they elect, to vote for or against reform. But the same is true of public opinion; because opinions on moral issues are not values, one cannot resolve issues of social or political morality by counting heads - one must argue from the values themselves, that is, from one's sense of what they require. This is what acting on conscience means; it is, on reflection, the only way to respect community values.

This suggests there is no difference between ordinary, everyday politics on substantive moral issues, and this supposedly special class of 'conscience issues'. In which case a more controversial question arises - one which underlies a good deal of the present discontent: if the primary duty of members is to the public - the source of their salaries and offices - and if this duty is to serve the interests of the public while keeping faith with community values, how can it be right to delegate this duty to one or more leaders, or even to caucus, under a doctrine of party unity? Burke, who saw his duty to act in good conscience as a sacred trust, had no doubt it would betray those who elected him; but while politicians across the spectrum continue to pay Burke homage, few take him seriously.

The problem as posed by Burke remains: How can we justify this practice of moral self-subordination on such grave issues of principle as the apology, same-sex marriage and the Iraq War? While this is not an auspicious time to challenge theories of party unity, no one has been willing to acknowledge the question - certainly there has been no attempt to answer it with arguments which reach beyond platitudes and brief, unexamined assertions of what is or is not 'practical'.

Finally - lest readers get the wrong impression - while I believe Windsor's theory of duty is incoherent I would, if I were a New England voter, want him as a representative. But this speaks to his sense of decency and his integrity. Burke, who also abjured abstract speculation, had a simple theory, but it was consistent and made good sense; in large part because it tied the world of private conscience to the realm of public values in a way no one has since improved on.