Edmund Burke on politicians

We argue over what these familiar values require - whether one form of democracy is fairer, or an official response to racial discrimination is justified, or whether our ideals of freedom and human dignity call for more or different programs to counter ignorance and poverty. We argue over both the weight and the point of values we hold in common.

None of this makes sense unless participants share a belief - even if its truth is widely disputed - that one interpretation is, in the end, superior; just as litigants in court believe one interpretation of relevant legal principles is more defensible - each thinks it is the interpretation which supports his case. (It is because all lawyers share this view that no-one thinks judges should toss a coin when there is no clear answer).

Critics like Dr. Bonham, who find it easy to dismiss Burke in a sentence or two, ignore this logic of moral argument; they seem not to realise how much their own contributions to public debate depend on it. This is why they misread Burke when he talks about acting 'on conscience.' They think he wants politicians to pray or meditate or consult a priest or guru or a lecturer in moral philosophy. He means nothing of the sort; he means them to form and act on their own judgment, not delegate the task to others.

By contrast, Rattray assumes her duty is to do what constituents want. They may, on reflection, want her to use her talents to serve their interests as well as respect the values they share, both tasks which require her to form and act on her own judgment. This is the core idea in Burke's theory of political responsibility.

It may help to clarify this feature if we consider the implications of a practice once rare but now common among civilized nations; this is the formal apology by governments for an abuse of rights by past officials, even if it was decades ago and those responsible acted in good faith at the time.

Premier Lara Giddings has recently apologised to the victims and families of forced adoptions. She did not see herself as citing 'today's' values to judge policies and attitudes which were justified by the values of yesterday; she was affirming that forced adoptions were always wrong , even if welfare authorities and churches (and perhaps the public) then had a different view.

Confusion on this matter was rife during the debates over the apology for the 'stolen children', much of it arising from a failure to distinguish an excuse from a justification. John Howard's inability to see the difference is one reason why he rejected the proposal, and did not attend the apology as a former Prime Minister.

It is this feature - the right of citizens to question the morality as well as wisdom of conventional opinion - which underlies the claim that private conscience is the ultimate safeguard of public values, and justifies the priority Burke gives it. While I question his views on social justice, democracy and conservatism as a political principle (much of it a reaction to the excesses of the revolution in France) I believe he did get this right, and that it is incompatible with the present doctrine of party unity.

I would add that my own reading of Burke supports much of what Dr. Bonham says about him. I must also agree with Kev Rothery that Andrew Wilkie's achievements as an independent are remarkable; they confirm the value of Burke's theory of political duty as a model for all elected members, not just independents.

Turning to the comments, it is clear the term 'acting on conscience' is a source of confusion because of its religious, spiritual and psychological overtones, and because 'conscience votes' are traditionally reserved for matters about which people have deeply personal and religious convictions. It is clear, however, that Burke meant only that politicians act on a conscientious (honest, informed and personal) judgment.

On this reading Dr. Bonham is closer to Burke than he thinks. I have no doubt Burke would exclude 'politics' - strategies and tactics to win elections - as irrelevant in judging the merit of legislative proposals (this is clear from his speech at the end of his term for Bristol and may explain why, despite huge parliamentary talents, no one would give him a Ministry). Burke clearly excludes community values in the second, 'sociological' sense discussed. So these exclusions do not, as Dr Bonham asserts, 'trump the judgment and conscience stuff', they exemplify it.

Kev Rothery raises interesting questions, including the difficult issue of compulsory voting, but I would comment on only one matter: although I share his belief in the basic goodness of people, this cannot support Rattray's deference to public opinion because the opinions of good people are also affected by ignorance and prejudice. This was clear in the early stages of homosexual law reform, when public opinion was prejudicial.