Making Australia and Afghanistan accountable: UN Security Council Resolution 1325

In 2001, the then government committed Australia to sending troops to Afghanistan. Regrettably, unlike the case of Iraq, the major parties were in agreement. Still, it was by government fiat, and against protest around the country, that Australia effectively went to war. The first Australian troops entered combat in Afghanistan in October 2001. In this, Australia joined a conflict in train in Afghanistan long before the USSR (as it then was) invaded in 1979. Britain and Russia had been slogging it out for more than a century in a struggle for assertion of supremacy in the region: the first Anglo-Afghan War ran from 1839 to 1842, the second from 1878 to 1881.

Since 2001, at least 2036 US troops have died in Afghanistan. On 1 July 2012, British deaths (including both police and troops – some Fiji nationals) totalled 422, while for Australia the Department of Defence reports 230 wounded in action and thirty-three 'operational deaths'. Regrettably, albeit unsurprisingly, other countries involved in military action have suffered deaths, too.

Meanwhile, thousands of Afghan civilians have died as a direct consequence of military action – both foreign (including Australian troops' action) and insurgent, as well as the deaths of 'possibly tens of thousands of Afghan civilians indirectly' through 'displacement, starvation, disease, exposure, lack of medical treatment, crime and lawlessness resulting from the war'. The vast bulk are women and children, particularly girls, who are also subjected to rape and other forms of sexual violence and abuse as a part of the conflict, sometimes also resulting directly in death.

In April 2012, Australia's Prime Minister announced a new schedule for withdrawal of Australian troops from Afghanistan, saying troops would 'begin pulling out this year and most would be home by the end of 2013'. This withdrawal is to begin 'once Afghans [take] on responsibility for security in Uruzgan province', the base for most Australian military. The pull-out is scheduled to take 'between twelve and eighteen months' and, when complete, 'Australia's commitment in Afghanistan will look very different to that which we have today'.

The Prime Minister said that after 2014, Australia would make a 'fair share' contribution to international aid and military funding for Afghan security forces. She added that Australia is 'also prepared to consider maintaining a limited number of troops' and 'would commit to helping train Afghan forces'.

Withdrawal from Afghanistan will please many Australians, hundreds of thousands of whom marched against deployment and war in the first place.

Yet Australia's responsibility goes beyond the question of military funding and training Afghan forces. Indeed, one may question this arm of the pledge to a 'fair' contribution, lacking any vision of a conflict-free Afghanistan, which surely must be the desire of the vast bulk of the Afghan population.

The nod to international aid gives some hope of real reconstruction – involving civilians and civil services, public sector support and multi-facetted assistance for ending the conflict. Reconstruction must be envisioned beyond a military philosophy and practice and notions of 'security' being an extension of this. Surely upon exiting, having engaged in belligerent action, 'mopping up' ought not to be seen as simply leaving the country on a continued war-footing? The people of Afghanistan are tired of war, killing, conflict, death, destruction and mayhem. The skills of those outside the military are what are needed, rather than more of the same.

The Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) in Denmark has directed its attention to reconstruction upon Denmark's withdrawal from Afghanistan. WILPF has given the Danish government notice of its responsibilities arising out of its commitment to UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (SCR 1325).

Like Denmark, Australia is a signatory to Resolution 1325. A wise government would recognise the fundamental importance of its provisions in post-war (as it may be hoped) Afghanistan.

SCR 1325 is premised upon the involvement of women in resolution of conflict and all negotiations to end conflict. Amongst other provisions, SCR 1325 urges Member States to:

… ensure increased representation of women at all decision-making levels in national, regional and international institutions and mechanisms for the prevention, management, and resolution of conflict;…

… increase their voluntary financial, technical and logistical support for gender-sensitive training efforts, including those undertaken by relevant funds and programmes, [including] the UN Fund for Women and UN Children's Fund, and by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and other relevant bodies …

SCR 1325 further calls on 'all actors involved' in peace agreement negotiations and implementation to 'adopt a gender perspective', including but not limited to:

• the special needs of women and girls during repatriation and resettlement and for rehabilitation, reintegration and post-conflict reconstruction;
• measures supporting local women's peace initiatives and indigenous processes for conflict resolution, and that involve women in all of the implementation mechanisms of the peace agreements;
• measures ensuring protection of and respect for human rights of women and girls, particularly as relating to the constitution, the electoral system, the police and the judiciary.

According to WILPF (Denmark), withdrawal of Danish troops from Afghanistan has the limitations that appear to be so for Australia's planned withdrawal. The Helmand Plan 2011-2012, programming Denmark's withdrawal sets as its 'overall objectives':

• Danish combat troops out of Afghanistan by the close of 2014;
• Support in strengthening the capacity of Afghan to take over responsibility for security;
• The latter aim to be achieved by increased training of the Afghan army and police.

As WILPF (Denmark) emphasises, 'Nowhere are women mentioned in the Helmand Plan description of overall Danish objectives.' This limitation is universal, for the plan is 'based on co-operation with NATO, UK and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)'. The intention is to ensure an orderly and constructive withdrawal by Denmark and the UK. WILPF (Denmark)'s concerns should be heeded by the Australian government in its own plans for ending military engagement in Afghanistan.

The Helmand Plan gives a nod to 'strengthening the civilian effort', noting that the civilian effort 'has a much longer perspective than the military withdrawal'. However, WILPF (Denmark) wants more attention paid to women's part as central to 'the civilian effort'. Informally women's place is affirmed to some degree in that, for example, Denmark 'wants to promote women's legal rights through more women in the police force', and women 'are included in the Danish micro-loan arrangement, with 80 percent of the funds going to women'. Nevertheless, no requirement mandates this under the Helmand Plan.

Only in the Helmand Plan's reference to 'basic schools' do girls come into the picture. Yet positive stipulations are needed for an assurance that girls' rights to education will be promoted and maintained. WILPF (Denmark) notes there is no demand for women's participation in the governorship of schools, nor acknowledgement that to ensure girl's education, 'infrastructure has to be strengthened so that girls are able to get higher-level courses'.

As for public sector governance, the Helmand Plan incorporates 'capacity building' of the civil administration 'to ensure ownership for the process is established among Afghans', but reference to women is entirely lacking.

Only in the section on the Penal Code are women and women's rights in focus, concentrating upon violence against women. Yet here, the aim is to maintain the conditions of women as 'accomplished since 2001', a goal lacking ambition and not, as WILPF (Denmark) says, consistent with government commitments as a signatory of SCR 1325. Furthermore, if violence against women is to be ended or at least ameliorated, more than attention through the Penal Code must be paid. Women will ever be vulnerable to attack, whether in the home or on the street, so long as economic, social, cultural and political equality for women are absent. Hence, even if the sole nod toward women vis-à-vis withdrawal should be to end violence against women, reconstruction with women involved every step of the way, and women being equally engaged in every area, is essential.

Back in October 2011, the Afghan Women's Network (AWN) published 'Listen to the Women: The Recommendations from the Afghan Women'. 'Listen to the Women' is based on communications between AWN and 500 women leaders from more than 20 Afghan provinces, representing 500,000 women throughout Afghanistan. As a follow-up, at a major international conference in December 2011, AWN issued the Bonn Declaration affirming, amongst other matters, that Afghan women's future 'can and must evolve in a different Afghanistan from the past'. The reconstituted Afghanistan must be one 'in which our daughters and their daughters will be able to actively engage in peace building and nation building in an equitable environment'.

AWN sets out the demands of Afghan women as relating to:

• Women and Good Governance
• Women and Transition
• Women and Peace and Reintegration
• Women and the International Commitment to Afghanistan

The Afghan women's demands are consistent with SCR 1325; none can be achieved without the input and direct involvement of the women of Afghanistan.

Pointing out that corruption is 'one of the main obstacles against women's participation in leadership and decision-making', AWN observes that Afghanistan reconstruction must be premised upon the need for strong, practical, focused measures, consistently implemented, 'against the widespread corruption and embezzlement within the government system'. 'Lack of transparency and accountability' in programmes designed for reconstruction, peace and integration also militates against women's contribution. This, says AWN, has 'obstructed [women's] inclusion and participation in governance at national and provincial levels'. For Afghan women, governance reform and service delivery are vital to reconstruction and to women's necessary role in both.

WILPF (Denmark) emphasises Afghan women's demands that women's security should 'become a measurable indicator of transition monitoring and evaluation'. Under 'Women and Transition', the subjection of women government employees to threats, simply because they are women, is high on AWN's list as inhibiting progress and undermining transition to peace. A 'lack of trust' between Afghan citizens and government is highlighted, with the 'best remedy' being 'a strong rule of law and accountable justice system'. One way to ensure rule of law and accountability is to build on and improve women's capacity, skills and expertise in law and jurisprudence, to ensure women's equal participation, including at the highest levels, in law and the judiciary.

As to Peace and Reconciliation, Afghan women 'demand a 25 percentage quota on the High Peace Council and Provincial Peace Councils', a modest request that cannot be gainsaid as a necessary stipulation in accordance with SCR 1325.

SCR 1325 came into being as a direct consequence of the work of women, most particularly WILPF and its then New York representative, long-time Australian peace worker Felicity Hill. That work and the existence of SCR 1325 have been consistently applauded by women around the world, with women in conflict-ridden countries relying upon its terms to ensure they will not be left out of reconciliation plans and reconstruction programmes.

During the Second World War, in the absence of SCR 1325 or any equivalent, in December 1942 the Australian government under Prime Minister John Curtain established a Department of Post-War Reconstruction. The purpose was to coordinate a public works program, to resettle refugees and to establish programmes for the 'rehabilitation of servicemen' , to bring Australia forward in planning for 'after the war'. In this case, 'servicemen' included servicewomen. In addition, although under the leadership of the Director-General Dr HC Coombs the Department was top-heavy with 'smart young men', women's lobbying for inclusion resulted in some acknowledgement that women had to be a part of reconstruction and its planning. The recognition was, too, that 'after the war' meant just that: planning and reconstruction for peace.

It would be disappointing if, having signed up to SCR 1325, in withdrawing from Afghanistan Australia could not do better in ensuring that women gain equal recognition in reconstruction and the need for women's involvement at equal levels in all mechanisms employed to resolve the conflict and build toward a better future – a future of peace, not war.

Objections to Australia's taking a belligerent role in Afghanistan were many. Wisdom now requires Australia, in moving out of Afghanistan, to honour its commitment to SCR 1325 by ensuring that Afghanistan women's voices are heard – and listened to; that Afghanistan women are equally involved in reconstruction; and that the demands of Afghanistan women through AWN and the concerns raised by WILPF (Denmark) have an impact upon Australia's withdrawal policy. The damage done by war can never be undone. However, rebuilding is possible. SCR 1325 provides a clear direction for supporting a constructive outcome, replacing rubble with foundations acknowledging the importance of women to the resolution of conflict.